Current Security Challenges in Africa: toward Integrated Solutions

Fourth edition
DAKAR, November 13-14th 2017
ABDOU DIOUF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CENTER

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Current Security Challenges in Africa: toward Integrated Solutions
THE EDITORIAL by HE Sidiki KABA  
THE PROGRAMME of the FORUM 2017

FIRST HALF-DAY Ouverture du Forum

• THE OPENING SESSION
  Mr Moussa FAKI MAHAMAT, President of the African Union Commission
  Mr Masahisa SATO Ministre d’Etat pour les Affaires étrangères de l’État du Japon
  Mrs Florence PARLY, Minister of the Armed Forces, France
  Me Albert Pahimi PADACKÉ, Prime Minister of Chad
  HE Ibrahim Boubacar KEITA, Président de la République du Mali
  HE Paul KAGAMÉ, Président de la République du Rwanda
  HE Macky SALL, President of the Republic of Senegal

• THE PANEL OF HEADS OF STATE

SECOND HALF-DAY Defence, Security and Peace

Plenary 1 Defence, Security and Peace: an integrated approach to defence, security
Conference 1 Support and financing of SSR programs in Africa
Workshop 1 Peacekeeping: How to improve UN/EU/AU/REC provisions
Workshop 2 What changes are needed to the EU’s instruments to support security in Africa?
Workshop 3 Cybersecurity and the governance of information and cyberspace

THIRD HALF-DAY Terrorism and violent extremism

Plenary 2 Terrorism and the need for integrated solutions
Conference 2 The Defence and Security continuum: an integrated approach
Workshop 4 Resilience and the rule of law in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism
Workshop 5 The fight against terrorist financing
Workshop 6 Maritime security and safety in Africa: International challenges

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Plenary 3 New security challenges facing Africa
Conference 3 Protecting businesses: what public-private partnerships are needed?
Workshop 7 Migration and security challenges: what integrated responses?
Workshop 8 Security, humanitarian crisis and development
Workshop 9 Economic and security issues associated with energy transitions

• REPORT ON WORK by HE Sidiki KABA
• THE CLOSING SPEECH by Mr Mahammed Boun Abdallah DIONNE

DAKAR FORUM 2017

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Depuis, cette rencontre est devenue annuelle et un rendez-vous incontournable de l’agenda international.


Le niveau élevé de participation et sa diversité confirment l’intérêt majeur de cette rencontre qui a été l’occasion de délivrer des messages forts sur les stratégies nécessaires à la réalisation d’une paix durable en Afrique.

La problématique de la sécurité sur le continent est devenue particulièrement complexe. Les menaces et les risques, à court et à long terme s’additionnent dangereusement et pèsent lourdement sur le développement, alors que l’engagement des responsables africains est établi, mais que leurs moyens doivent impérativement être renforcés.

Les débats de l’édition 2017 ont porté sur des enjeux majeurs, des questions brûlantes, à savoir le terrorisme, la nécessité de réponses doctrinales claires à la radicalisation et à l’extrémisme violent, la cybersécurité, la sécurité maritime, la reconfiguration nécessaire des forces de sécurité, les effets sécuritaires des migrations, ou bien encore la recherche de nouveaux partenariats mieux adaptés entre l’Union africaine, les acteurs africains, les Nations Unies et l’Union européenne. Toutes ces thèmes ont été abordées avec pertinence et franchise par les quelque 700 participants et intervenants dont nous avons tous apprécié la qualité des contributions.

Responsables politiques, diplomates, militaires, experts et universitaires, représentants du secteur privé ont fait de ce quatrième Forum, rendez-vous de ce type unique en Afrique, un succès éclatant.

Ce document contient le compte-rendu exhaustif des travaux de ce quatrième Forum.

Je tiens à remercier sincèrement et à féliciter, au nom du Sénégal, tous ceux qui ont contribué à ce succès. J’espère que nous poursuivons avec la même détermination ce processus de dialogue, d’échanges et de réflexions.

C’est dans cet esprit que je donne rendez-vous à tous nos partenaires en 2018 à Dakar pour la 5ème édition du Forum International de Dakar sur la paix et la sécurité en Afrique.
LE PROGRAMME
FIRST HALF-DAY Monday, November 13th 2017

Opening Session en présence de HE Macky SALL, President of the Republic of Senegal

Introduction

Intervention des Chefs d’État

Intermède musical avec Baba MAAL

Panel of Heads of States

Introduction par les modérateurs : Assane DIOP (RFI) et Zain ASHER (CNN)

Questions – réponses

Lunchtime

SECOND HALF-DAY Monday, November 13th 2017

Defence, Security and Peace

Plenary 1 Defence, Security and Peace: an integrated approach to defence, security

Xu JINGHU Special representative of the Chinese government on African affairs
Marcel DE SOUZA President of the ECOWAS Commission
Jean-Pierre LACROIX United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Koen VERVAEKE Managing Director for Africa – European External Action Service

Conference 1 Support and financing of SSR programs in Africa

MpakO FOALENG Security Sector Reform advisor – UN
Eboe HUTCHFUL Professor of Africana Studies, Wayne State University and Executive Secretary, African Security Sector Network (ASSN)
Bruno CLÉMENT-BOLLÉE SSR expert
Oswald PADONOU International relations and security affairs programme manager – Konrad Adenauer Foundation

Workshop 1 Peacekeeping: How to improve UN/EU/AU/REC provisions

Ramtane LAMAMRA Former Minister of Foreign Affairs – Algeria
Jaïr VAN DER LIJN Head Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme, Senior Researcher – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Jean-Pierre LACROIX Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Central Africa
Mariam Mahamat NOUR Member of the African Union Reform Steering Committee chaired by President Kagamé

Workshop 2 What changes are needed to the EU’s instruments to support security in Africa?

Comfort ERO Crisis Group’s Africa Program Director
Brigadier General Rainer MEYER ZUM FELDE Senior Fellow at the Institute for Security Policy, Kiel University (ISPK) and Visiting Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Koen VERVAEKE Managing Director for Africa – European External Action Service
Cyriaque AGNEKETHO Director of Peacekeeping and Regional Security – ECOWAS

Workshop 3 Cybersecurity and the governance of information and cyberspace

Moctar YEDALY Head of the Information Society Division – The African Union Commission
Colonel François OUEDRAOGO Head of the National Intelligence Agency – Burkina Faso
David SCHARIA Chief of branch – United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate
Commissioner Augustin Moussou OCHOGNI Head of the Cybercrime Prevention Unit – Digital Information and Evidence Division – Côte d’Ivoire
Commissioner Papa GUEYE Head of the Special Cybersecurity Division – Senegal
Terrorism and violent extremism

Plenary 2  Terrorism and the need for integrated solutions

- Mohamed DIANE  Ministre de la Défense nationale – Guinée
- Jan FIGEL  Envoyé spécial de l’UE pour la promotion de la liberté de religion et de conscience dans l’action extérieure de l’UE
- Mahamat Saleh ANNADIF  Représentant spécial du secrétaire Général des Nations Unies pour le Mali et Chef de la MINUSMA

Conference 2  The Defence and Security continuum: an integrated approach

- General Jean-Paul PALOMEROS  Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, CEIS expert
- General Cheikh GUÉYE  Chief of the Defence Staff – Senegal
- General Grégoire de SAINT QUENTIN  Deputy Chief of Operations – France
- Major General Meissa NIANG  Head of the Gendarmerie and Director of Military Justice – Senegal

Workshop 4  Resilience and constitutional state against terrorism and violent extremism

- Mohamed EL HACEN LEBATT  Principal Strategic advisor to the President of the African Union Commission
- Florent GEE  Director of the Africa Desk – FIDH
- Michelle NDIAYE  Director of the Africa Peace and Security Programme developed by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University, and Head of Secretariat for the Tana Forum on Peace and Security in Africa
- Bacre Waly NDIAYE  Lawyer, UN Special Rapporteur
- Jean-Daniel BIÉLER  Former ambassador; Human Security Division special advisor – Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Workshop 5  Fighting the financing of terrorism

- Mahamat Saleh ANNADIF  Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Mali and Head of MINUSMA
- Pierre LAPAQUE  Regional Representative for West and Central Africa – UNODC
- Abdou CHEFOU  Head of the anti-terrorist investigation and organised cross-border crime division – General Directorate of the National Police of Niger
- Docteur Tafsir HANE  Research fellow

Workshop 6  Maritime safety and security in Africa: international issues

- Commander Cyrille-Serge ATONFACK GUÉMO  Maritime security/safety expert, technical advisor to the Ministry of Defence – Cameroon
- Admiral Hervé DENYS de BONNAVENTURE  Deputy Director of International Relations and Strategy – Ministry of the Armed Forces – France
- Barthelemy BLEDE  International maritime safety and security consultant
FOURTH HALF-DAY  Tuesday, November 14th 2017

Africa and new Security Issues

Plenary 3  New security challenges facing Africa
Jean-Yves LE DRIAN  Ministre de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères – France
Moctar OUANE  Delegate general for peace and security - WAEMU
Jacques Kamfer CILLIERS  Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

Conference 3  Protecting businesses: what public-private partnerships are needed?
Aimé SENE  Founder and President of the Senegalese Federation of Franchised Companies
Jean-Michel LAVOIZARD  CEO of ARIS Intelligence

Workshop 7  Migration and security challenges: what integrated responses?
Professor Ndioro NDIAYE  Minister Counsellor, President of AMLD
Ottilia Anna MAUNGANIDZE  Head of Special Projects – Institute for Security Studies
Christophe LUEDI  Head of the ICRC delegation - Dakar
Mohamed AMARTI  PLaw professor and Chair of the National Human Rights Council (CNDH) - Morocco

Workshop 8  Security, humanitarian crisis and development
Marie-Angélique SAVANE  International consultant – First female chair of the African Peer Review Panel (MAEP), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the African Union (AU)
Ryuichi KATO  Director General, Africa Department – Japan International Cooperation Agency
Jean-Marc CHÂTAINGNÉ  Ambassador, special envoy for the Sahel – Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs - France
Patrick YOUSSEF  Deputy Regional Director for Africa – ICRC
Atteib DOUTOUM  Secretary-General of the Chadian centre for strategic studies and analysis – Chad

Workshop 9  Economic and security challenges regarding the energy transition
Nana Oumou TOURÉ-SY  Coordinator of the UNDP regional platform for West and Central Africa
Bastien ALEX  Research fellow in charge of the Climate, Energy and Security program – IRIS
Manh LARGEMAIN  Environment and climate policy officer – DGRIS – Ministry of the Armed Forces - France

CLOSING SESSION  Tuesday, November 14th 2017

Report on work by HE Sidiki KABA, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad

Closing Speech by Mr Mohammed Boun Abdallah DIONNE, Prime Minister of Senegal
OPENING SESSION
FIRST HALF-DAY

Monday, November 13th 2017
Abdou Diouf International Conference Center

Moussa FAKI MAHAMAT
President of the African Union Commission

Masahisa SATO
State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan

Florence PARLY
Minister of the Armed Forces, France

Albert Pahimi PADACKÉ
Prime Minister of Chad

Ibrahim Boubacar KEITA
President of the Republic of Mali

Paul KAGAMÉ
President of the Republic of Rwanda

Macky SALL
President of the Republic of Senegal
I would like to express my gratitude to President Macky Sall and the Senegalese government for the warm welcome they have given me. In fact, a warm welcome comes as no surprise here in the land of teranga, which to me embodies tradition, hospitality, authenticity and flavour.

Over the years, the Dakar Forum has become a major platform for strategic thinking in Africa. It complements a number of other, similar initiatives that set the pace of the political agenda in Africa. I refer here to our annual peace and security retreat, which has just come to a successful close in N’Djamena. The theme this year was multilateralism. I also refer to the high-level Tana Forum on security in Africa, which takes place every year in Ethiopia, with the support of the African Union.

The Dakar Forum brings together specialists, academics, members of the academic community, civil society activists and political leaders, thus offering an opportunity for fruitful discussions. These discussions are informed by several sources: Lessons from the field, the innovative avenues opened up by scientific research, the freedom of expression afforded by civil society membership, and the experience gained from state governance.

Clearly, Africa is facing numerous security challenges. Nothing illustrates this better than the electoral and democratic misadventures and the armed dissidence that still plague some African countries, in addition to the pervasive terrorism and organised crime in various regions.

These security challenges are interdependent and multifaceted, and are driven by both cyclical and structural factors. All of them point, in one way or another, to an African ‘malaise’, caused by a complex combination of growing pains in the modern African state, and the consequences of poorly controlled social and societal change. The sometimes ferocious globalisation and deregulation accompanying this malaise have added to the complexity of the landscape.

The inability of the international community to look beyond its selfish interests and its penchant for dominating the weak makes it even more difficult to promote a peaceful and fairer world.

Within the framework of Agenda 2063, Africa has set itself the very ambitious target of silencing all weapons by 2020. We are just three years away from the deadline.

Given the complexity of the situations we are dealing with, there are doubts as to whether we can reach our target.

In most situations characterised by asymmetrical violence, peacekeeping teams, when deployed, struggle to adapt to the environment in which they are supposed to operate. They lack flexibility, and the restrictions placed on them by their mandates and their rules of engagement can hinder their ability to act. Sometimes, they are forced to devote most of their time and energy to protecting themselves rather than implementing their civilian protection mandate and supporting the enforcement of peace agreements.

This ‘powerlessness of power’ in the face of terrorist groups, criminals and other rebel entities seems today to be characteristic of conventional peacekeeping missions in African theatres.

Far from yielding to the temptation to question what has been achieved, I would like to stress that, in many situations, these missions have facilitated the implementation of political peace and reconciliation agreements and laid the groundwork for peaceful development in the countries concerned. From a humanitarian perspective, they have protected civilians and facilitated the delivery of humanitarian assistance, thus compensating for the absence of state authority.

In fact, the division of tasks between the African Union and the United Nations is gradually changing. In schematic terms, the former is carrying out peace enforcement tasks and dealing with threats to peace and security, while the latter is taking charge of long-term stabilisation efforts.

Innovative and customised forms of regional cooperation are being trialled. The aim is to pool efforts and resources, and to tailor military mandates to the situation on the ground.
The African Union has played a pioneering role in this respect, as demonstrated by its mission in Somalia and the creation of a regional force tasked with neutralising the Lord’s Resistance Army. The missions deployed in Mali and the Central African Republic, before they were taken over by the United Nations, followed the same logic.

The Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram and the G5 Sahel Joint Force are the most recent illustrations of what could be called “an African doctrine on peace support operations”.

It is most important and urgent that the United Nations adjusts the arrangements for financing peace operations so that it can provide the necessary support for these initiatives, thus enabling them to reach their full potential. Given the scale of the issues at stake, there is no longer any room for hesitation and excuses.

After all, these initiatives contribute to collective security. By implementing them, the African Union and the sub-regional bodies concerned are acting in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, which has the chief responsibility for maintaining peace and security worldwide. This responsibility must be met in full.

It is in this spirit that we have reached out to the United Nations regarding the provision of more predictable and sustained support for African peace operations undertaken with the Security Council’s consent. In practice, Africa would provide 25% of the funds required, while the United Nations would raise the remaining 75% through assessed contributions. Appropriate planning and consultation mechanisms would be put into place, and all necessary measures would be taken to ensure effective accountability in terms of compliance with human rights treaties and humanitarian law.

Unfortunately, very little progress has been made in this respect. I would like to thank Senegal for initiating the resolution that got this process started.

The response to current threats postulates closer cooperation between our Member States. Intelligence sharing and operational cooperation are vital to combat organised crime and terrorism.

Therefore, in the African Union, we have created several institutions to facilitate this type of approach. For example, the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism, the Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa.

The Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes on strengthening security cooperation in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa are both part of the same effort. We are unifying them to bring more coherence to our action.

Moreover, it is clear that the challenges associated with terrorism and organised crime cannot be sustainably addressed by a military and security-centred approach alone. These scourges are very often a manifestation of deeper problems, caused by a combination of poor governance, marginalisation, human rights violations, and many other factors.

In the long term, the solution lies in global and integrated approaches, judiciously combining enforcement action and development programmes to tackle crises at their roots.

Ladies and gentlemen,

African ownership is key to building the new collective security paradigm.

The ongoing reform of the African Union, led by President Paul Kagamé and his peers, aims to give Africa the political, legal and financial means to ensure its own independence.

Once completed, the reform will enable Africa to deal with its security problems more effectively.

As part of this process, we are doing everything we can to make prevention a priority in our peace-building strategies. Rather than resort to what I once referred to as the “deterministic management” of crises, we aim to reduce the risk of them occurring in the first place.

The challenges facing Africa in this area are well known. How can we improve political governance, and step up the fight against poverty and exclusion? The more we reduce these scourges, the more we will erode the conditions in which terrorism and crime thrive, and the more effective we will be in helping to build the peace we dream of for Africa.

Prevention is driven by a different motivation, that of our attachment to African solutions to African problems, far from foreign interference. Obviously, our insistence on this principle should not be construed as a rejection of the universal principles of democracy, human rights and good governance.

Besides prevention, we must also strengthen our mediation and facilitation mechanisms. They can be leveraged effectively to reconstruct the social fabric of communities afflicted by violence, exclusion and poor governance.

Throughout this multifaceted programme of work, Africa will remain open to the valuable contributions of its partners, including the United Nations, the European Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the International Organisation of La Francophonie, and the League of Arab States. We are currently reviewing our strategic partnerships for the precise purpose of enhancing them.

The trilateral meeting between the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations, inaugurated in September 2017 in New York, should reinforce the peace partnership and provide it with the resources needed to address common challenges.

A multilateral partnership cannot be built without clear recognition of the need for Africans to take ownership of their own affairs, and without unequivocal support for African leadership in the promotion of peace and security for development.

This is not just an emotional or sentimental request. It is a request for efficiency and consistency.

I am sure these principles will be properly reflected in the discussions at this Forum.

Thank you.
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honor to attend the Fourth Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to His Excellency, President SALL, and to all those who contributed to organizing this important annual meeting.

As we live in a world where a great number of people, companies, goods and capital move across the borders, no one can be indifferent to Africa’s peace and security. That is why I flew to Dakar, thirteen thousands kilometers from Tokyo. That is why Japan has been contributing to this Forum, since the first meeting in 2014.

Armed conflicts, terrorist attacks are happening in so many parts of Africa. I would like to express my deepest condolence to the people of Burkina Faso and Somalia, regarding the recent terrorist attacks on their territory.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Before sharing Japan’s actions in support of peace and stability in Africa, allow me to touch upon my own story. Before entering into politics ten years ago, as an officer of Japan Ground Self Defense Force, I served in the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Golan Heights as Commander of Transportation Unit. I was also dispatched to Samawa in Southern Iraq as Commander of Iraq Reconstruction Mission Support Team. Through these missions, as a practitioner of peacebuilding, I learned what is really needed to consolidate peace on the ground.

At the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, TICAD VI, held last year in Nairobi, the heads of States and Governments identified as one of the priorities, «Promotion of social stability for shared prosperity». We need to build a resilient society and institutions that ensure human security and leave no room for conflicts, terrorism and violent extremism.

In South Sudan, Japan dispatched the engineering unit of the Self Defense Force to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) for over five years until this May. Off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, Japan has been deploying Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer and aircraft for anti-piracy operations since 2009.

To contribute to social stability in the Sahel region, Japan has provided assistance totaling about 1.4 billion US dollars since 2013. Japan also contributes to human resource development in the area of peacebuilding by dispatching trainers and providing financial support of over 40 million US dollars to peacekeeping training centers in Africa.

Through these measures, Japan supports the realization of «Peaceful and Stable Africa» as articulated in African Union’s «Agenda 2063». With our eyes on TICAD 7 to be held in Yokohama in 2019, our contribution will continue.

Ladies and gentlemen,

More than half of agenda items discussed in the UN Security Council are those related to Africa, while there is no African permanent member in the Council. Japan openly supports Agenda 2063 which states clearly that by 2023, this historical injustice need to be corrected.

Turning to my region, we are facing North Korea’s relentless pursuit of nuclear and missile development, which poses an unprecedented, grave, and imminent threat to the security of the international community. We need to heighten the pressure on North Korea to the utmost level, including by fully implementing relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.
The main theme of this year’s Forum is «integrated solution» to a wide range of issues, including migration, climate change, humanitarian crises and cyber-security. Multi-faceted and people-centered approach toward Africa’s security is totally in line with the «human security» approach that Japan values, which focuses on protection and empowerment of each individual.

In conclusion, I sincerely hope that our joint endeavor for Africa’s peace and security will be further enhanced through the Dakar Forum.

Thank you very much.
Aujourd'hui s'ouvre le quatrième Forum de Dakar. Comme les précédentes années, les enjeux sont grands. La sécurité, la défense, la liberté, le développement : tous ces thèmes s'entremêlent et font de ce forum l'occasion unique de nous parler, parler franchement et de chercher des solutions pour agir.

Je suis heureuse de pouvoir être ici, parmi vous, et d'ouvrir cette quatrième édition du forum de Dakar. Au fur et à mesure des années, le forum de Dakar est devenu un événement attendu, espéré, aux échanges riches et aux conclusions concrètes.

Je souhaitais remercier le Président Macky SALL qui, le premier, a été à l'origine de cette idée, presque iconoclaste : réunir, dans une même salle, des membres de gouvernement, des représentants des ONG, des associations, des think tanks, des organisations internationales et de chercher, ensemble, des solutions pour la sécurité et la défense de l'Afrique.

Et le succès a tout de suite été au rendez-vous. Il est la preuve de l'engagement de chacun. Il est la preuve du choix judicieux du format de ce forum : chacun y est associé, aucune bonne volonté n'est écartée. Il ne se limite pas à un petit nombre d'acteurs mais s'ouvre sur l'Union africaine et bien au-delà du continent africain, sur le Japon, sur les pays du Golfe, sur l'Europe.


La France s'est immédiatement engagée pour le forum de Dakar, pour sa réussite et pour le succès des initiatives qui y naissent. Je suis venue vous dire que cet engagement est intact. La France n'abandonne pas ses partenaires et continuera à encourager et à aider toutes les actions positives pour la paix en Afrique.

Cette édition du forum de Dakar, c'est encore le fruit de longs travaux. Je voulais remercier tous ceux qui rendent possible, une quatrième fois, ce forum de Dakar. Je pense naturellement à l'engagement du ministre des affaires étrangères et sénégalais de l’extérieur, Sidiki KABA. Je pense aussi au Centre des Hautes études de Défense et de Sécurité dirigé par le général Paul NDIAYE, ainsi que l'ensemble des partenaires institutionnels et privés du forum. Ils ont rendu ce forum possible et participent eux aussi à l'effort pour la sécurité et la défense de l'Afrique.

Le temps des discussions va maintenant s'ouvrir. C'est un temps important. Je le souhaite riche d'idées, d'échanges, de différences aussi.

Nous discuterons d'une sécurité intégrée. Je crois que c'est la clé qui permettra la sécurité et la paix en Afrique. C'est la nécessité de faire une sécurité africaine pour l'Afrique.

Parler de sécurité intégrée, c'est faire une analyse lucide des menaces actuelles et à venir qui pèsent sur le continent africain. Une des forces du Forum de Dakar, c'est de savoir s'adapter à l'évolution des problématiques auxquelles le continent est confronté. Au-delà des problématiques incontournables du terrorisme, de la sécurité maritime et des migrations, nous parlerons aussi cette année de cybersécurité et de transition énergétique, qui sont moins fréquemment abordées mais qui, je le crois, méritent toute notre attention.

La sécurité intégrée, c'est affirmer que la coopération internationale est indispensable. C'est dire qu'il ne faut s'enfermer dans aucun modèle ; être pragmatiques, créatifs et juger chaque situation à l'aune du terrain. La conférence de cet après-midi sur l'appui et le financement des programmes de RSS en Afrique, sera l'occasion d'y revenir. Et certains workshops, particulièrement sur les dispositifs de maintien de la paix ou les évolutions des instruments de l'UE permettront d'aborder franchement ces questions.
La sécurité intégrée, enfin, c'est une approche globale. Une approche qui lie sécurité, défense et développement. Je suis particulièrement fière de voir les défis économiques, les enjeux de gouvernance et les questions humanitaires traitées aussi lors d’workshop demain.

Je sais que ce forum regorgera d'idées, d'initiatives, de volonté et qu'il sera l'occasion, une fois de plus d'aboutir à des solutions concrètes et adaptées pour la sécurité de l'Afrique.

Je vous remercie et je vous souhaite à tous un excellent forum !
En raison des contraintes d’agenda, son excellence Monsieur Idriss Déby ITNO – qui a répondu favorablement à votre invitation et qui aurait voulu participer personnellement à ce Forum afin de partager ses analyses et réflexions sur le thème de cette édition – n’a pu faire le déplacement et m’a demandé de le représenter à cette importante rencontre.

C’est à la fois avec un immense plaisir et un profond sentiment d’humilité que je prends la parole aujourd’hui devant ce parterre d’éminentes personnalités au nom du Président Idriss Déby ITNO. J’aimerais remercier le président Macky SALL pour son invitation et lui adresser solennellement les profondes gratitude de son homologue pour cette marque d’amitié.

Le monde fait face à des menaces de plusieurs ordres suscitant de grosses inquiétudes. L’Afrique est le continent le plus vulnérable et le plus exposé à ces menaces qui mettent en péril la paix et la sécurité. Ces dernières sont les conditions sine qua non du développement auquel aspire légitimement tous nos peuples à travers le continent. Qu’il s’agisse des conflits armés, du terrorisme, des turbulences post électorales caractérisées parfois par des contestations violentes, tous ces phénomènes constituent des défis actuels pour notre continent. Ils affectent dangereusement la paix sociale, font vivre perpétuellement dans l’angoisse et plongent nos populations dans le désespoir. Chacun d’entre nous ressent avec une émotion partagée les dégâts humains et matériels résultant des actes terroristes perpétrés dans nombre de pays dont le mien. Ceci vient renforcer la volonté du Tchad à lutter farouchement contre les terroristes sur le territoire national, et à voler à la rescousse d’autres pays frères du continent en proie aux obscurantistes et criminels de tout acabit dans la bande sahélo-saharienne. Il s’agit là d’une politique volontariste du président Idriss Déby ITNO, convaincu du danger que représente le terrorisme pour notre patrimoine commun : l’Afrique.

En dépit du lourd tribu humain, matériel et financier, consenti par l’armée tchadienne avec celle des pays membres du bassin du lac Tchad et du G5 Sahel et tous ses partenaires, nous sommes en passe de gagner cette guerre du bien contre le mal. Notre armée a l’honneur d’être en pointe face aux criminels qui n’ont malheureusement pas encore dit leur dernier mot, et qui nous entrainent sur un nouveau terrain tout à fait asymétrique.

Fort opportunément, pour lutter contre ce fléau, qui est la menace du siècle de notre point de vue, nous notons que l’Union africaine et ses États membres, malgré la modestie de leurs moyens, sont mobilisés et engagés. En témoigne par exemple les énormes sacrifices consentis par l’AMISOM en Somalie depuis 2004, en dépit de résultats plus ou moins mitigés. L’Afrique déploie également d’énormes efforts pour gérer les crises et conflits dont elle souffre en mettant l’accent sur la promotion d’une approche régionale des résolutions des crises sous-tendue par une architecture de paix et de sécurité qui commence à donner des résultats. Néanmoins, quel que soit l’engagement des uns et des autres, la complexité croissante des menaces, des crises et des conflits est telle qu’aucun État seul, qu’aucune organisation seule ne peut les enrayer. C’est pourquoi nous pensons que l’Union africaine a raison de toujours plaider en faveur d’un partenariat stratégique avec les Nations Unies pour faire face aux défis sécuritaires sur le continent. Il n’en demeure pas moins que la situation sécuritaire dans beaucoup de pays africains et dans certaines parties du continent reste préoccupante.

J’aimerais saluer ici, la caution politique des Nations Unies à la constitution de la force multinationale du G5 Sahel ainsi que le soutien financier de l’Union européenne et des États-Unis.

Vous mesurez l'importance du Forum et de son thème principal qui rencontrent l'adhésion du Président Monsieur Idriss Déby ITNO qui reste convaincu que les défis sécuritaires sont communs et que chaque État se doit d'aller au-delà d'un engagement proclamatif et prendre ses responsabilités dans le cadre d'une synergie d'actions nécessaire face au péril. Je n'ignore pas l'action des Africains qui, profondément conscients de leur responsabilité, font tout ce qui est à leur portée pour combattre ce phénomène, vecteur de régression à tous égards. Il demeure cependant que des solutions intégrées constituent le fondement de la sécurité durable à l'intérieur de nos États et entre nos États car s'il est de nos jours une vérité c'est que nos États sont de plus en plus interdépendants, tout comme les défis auxquels ils font courageusement face et qui sont devenus globaux et communs.

Est-il également utile de noter qu'il est un leurre de considérer le terrorisme comme une menace lointaine relevant de la responsabilité des États de la ligne de front car les terroristes nous rappellent tous les jours par leurs campagnes criminelles qu'aucun pays ni aucun continent n'est à l'abri de leurs menaces. Ce qui est en jeu c'est notre destin partagé, la liberté à laquelle tous les peuples aspirent légitimement. Tous les États épris de paix doivent s'unir pour contrer la menace dans sa base de gestation tout en œuvrant pour un environnement peu favorable à la radicalisation. C'est pourquoi, à notre sens, en plus de l'action militaire rendue incontournable, sans être exhaustif et pour nourrir la réflexion par rapport au thème principal du forum, une justice sociale plus affirmée et un État de droit vécu au quotidien par les populations participent aux solutions intégrées aux défis actuels de notre continent. D'autres éléments eux aussi indispensables doivent être mis en œuvre. Je parle ici du respect des règles du jeu démocratique et de la légalité constitutionnelle, la diffusion de la culture démocratique, la résolution des crises et des conflits par le dialogue, l'éradication du moins la réduction de la pauvreté, la lutte contre les changements climatiques, le renforcement de la résilience et la promotion d'une croissance économique profitant à tous.

Il nous faut impérativement passer à la réalisation tangible de ces objectifs pour le bien-être des populations comme moyen de relever les défis sécuritaires du continent, et ce, avec l'appui et la contribution sous toutes les formes des partenaires de l'Afrique. Mais comment agir avec efficacité sur ce terrain indispensable du développement pour nos peuples, alors qu'à son détriment, la lutte contre le terrorisme engloutit l'essentiel de nos maigres ressources surtout en ce qui concerne les pays de la ligne de front ? Telle est la problématique qui interpelle notre continent.

Je ne saurais terminer mon propos sans déclarer que le président Idriss Déby ITNO, Président de la république du Tchad que je représente ici, souhaite tous ses vœux de succès à ce Forum.
Laissez-moi vous dire avant tout mon plaisir d'être encore ici à Diamniadio dans ce merveilleux centre qui porte le nom d'un très grand Africain. Nous sommes tous très émus lorsque dans un mouvement d'ensemble de bon aloi toute la francophonie a tenu à lui rendre l'hommage du mérite avéré ? cher Président Abdou DIOUF.

Merci Macky de me convier encore une fois en ce haut lieu, pour partager avec tous nos frères, dont on vient de dire la qualité, qu'ils soient du monde politique, militaire, de la société civile ou de ces think-tanks, tous tendus vers le même objectif. Comment aujourd'hui envisager la problématique de ce fléau du terrorisme dont nos pays sont victimes, dont nos peuples sont victimes ?

Madame PARLY, vous nous avez rappelé l'horreur qui est tombé sur la France, sur Paris, ce 13 novembre, fauchant des vies innocentes ? alors même qu'elles étaient réunies comme il convient pour une soirée conviviale, qui à la terrasse d’un café, qui au Bataclan, qui dans un stade de football, bref tout ce qui fait vie normale. Cela a été empêché par ceux-là.

À ce sujet, j'ai du mal à parler d'homme, s'il est vrai que l'homme est doué de raison, laquelle amène à faire la différence avec la bête qui n'a pas de conscience, qui ne réfléchit pas, ou qui est censée ne pas le faire. Encore qu'aujourd'hui nous avons des exemples de bêtes avec des sensibilités différentes mais qui existent. Mais ces gens-là n'en ont pas. En tout cas pas de celles qui ont le souci de la vie humaine, et dès lors de protéger celle-ci.

Notre environnement aujourd'hui est fait d'un quotidien très lourd, très difficile. Je vous assure qu'à chaque appel, quand j'ouvre mon téléphone, je m'inquiète : que vais-je encore apprendre ? Ce visage, qui est juste en face de moi, mon frère représentant des Nations Unies au Mali, Annadif, aussi vit la même chose.

Un convoi pacifique voulait être porteur d’espoir dans le Nord du Mali sur un tronçon de route, qui tout au long connaissait la paix. Et, « paf » ! Un engin explosif improvisé vient d’ôter la vie aux passagers d'un car de transport collectif. Et on décline le nombre de morts, des exemples de bêtes avec des sensibilités différentes mais qui existent. Mais ces gens-là n’en ont pas. En tout cas pas de celles qui ont le souci de la vie humaine, et dès lors de protéger celle-ci.

Il faut avancer. Il faut surtout ne pas céder à la peur. Le terrorisme, sa vocation, sa mission, c’est de susciter la peur. Et nous, nous avons le dessein de nous assumer, le dessein d’être ! Des politiques dans tous les pays dignes de ce nom avec un instrument, un outil de défense, qui permet d'être à la hauteur !

Et quand nous demandons des moyens pour nous équiper à hauteur de nos souhait, on pousse des cris d’orfraie : quel désespoir derrière cela ? Mais pour nous, c'est bien le dessein de nous assumer, le dessein d'être ! Des politiques dans tous les pays dignes de ce nom ont un instrument, un outil de défense, qui permet d'être à la hauteur !

Nous sommes aujourd'hui en train de la hisser à hauteur ces souhaits. Faire en sorte, que lorsque nous enverrons des missions sur le terrain dans le Sahel, dans des zones dont nous savons la rudesse, nous puissions crapahuter sur les rochers du Kel Adrar comme ce fut le cas dans une autre vie qui nous a montré l'extrême difficulté. Mais on en est pas moins humains et, on voudrait s'assurer comme on dit dans les forces armées, confortable dont les populations ont besoin pour leur quotidien. Un chemin de transport de vie des êtres humains et des équipements. Sur cette route, un chantier a été brutalment interrompu par un incendie, après une attaque très triste comme toujours, de la base vie de l’entreprise. 21 camions neufs ont été brûlés.

Ceux-là ont-ils le souci du pays ? De son développement ? Que non ! Que non !

Dès lors on peut même penser que nous ne saurions avoir le même projet.

L'allée et venue entre deux villages, distant les uns des autres, comme il est coutume dans notre région, pour les foires hebdomadaires est aujourd'hui de l’ordre de la mission impossible. Surtout dans le centre du pays qui est une zone dite inondée, cette zone inondable du Macina. Il nous faut donc là, des moyens d'équipements, des vecteurs aériens. Notre pays est vaste, 1 240 000 kilomètres carrés.

En un convié par une mission de moyen. Vecteur aérien de couverture, moyens de surveillance. Tout cela aujourd'hui, est notre quotidien. Bien sûr, l'allée et venue entre deux villages, distant les uns des autres, comme il est coutume dans notre région, pour les foires hebdomadaires est aujourd'hui de l’ordre de la mission impossible. Surtout dans le centre du pays qui est une zone dite inondée, cette zone inondable du Macina. Il nous faut donc là, des moyens d'équipements, des vecteurs aériens. Notre pays est vaste, 1 240 000 kilomètres carrés.

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C'est un projet à triple vocations, que nous avons eu le bonheur, étant ancien du gouvernement du Mali, de convaincre, à l'époque le tout juste élu Président du groupe de la Banque mondiale de se départir de la prévention de nos banquiers par rapport au projet de barrage de Taoussa.

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Nous ne sommes pas des barbares, nous ne sommes pas des gens à islamiser. Dès le XIème siècle, nous étions connaisseurs de ce qu'est Tombouctou, quelle émettrice de lumière Tombouctou fut. De quelle lumière elle fut pour le reste du monde. Et un prosélytisme complètement stupide, c'est être d'une barbarie et d'une ignardise crasse. Ça veut dire que l'on ne sait pas la prétention de ces Huns d'un autre âge, d'un autre temps. Des Huns, H.U.N.S, parce que vouloir venir à Tombouctou dans arrêtant net à Konna La France, un de nos grands alliés, a stoppé ce qui aurait été l'hallali pour nous. Cette opération s'est ébranlée et l'Union Africaine a pris le relais.

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Nous ne sommes pas des barbares, nous ne sommes pas des gens à islamiser. Dès le XIème siècle, nous étions connaisseurs de l'islam et de la plus belle des façons. Donc le prétexte religieux de ces gens est bien fallacieux. Et, d'ailleurs, il a été très vite battu en brèche. C'est pourquoi cet homme, que nous connaissons, s'est retrouvé devant la Cour Pénale Internationale, que je sache, aujourd'hui, pour son action dans ce cas précis, où pour la première fois dans l'histoire mondiale, un crime contre le patrimoine culturel a été réputé tel et sanctionné de belle façon. Car quand on fait des autodafés, quand on détruit des monuments historiques de la qualité de ceux auquel on s'est attaqué à Tombouctou, on brise des pans entiers de la mémoire de l'humanité, de notre mémoire collective et nul n'a le droit de nous priver de notre mémoire collective.

Tout cela pour vous dire que, engoncés dans cette forêt inextricable de défis au quotidien, d'agressions au quotidien, nous nous sommes dits que nous ne pouvions pas continuer en l'état.

La force multinationale MINUSMA fait de son mieux dans un contexte difficile avec un mandat qu'il a fallu revoir au moins trois fois pour obtenir plus de robustesse. Mais, les convois de la MINUSMA restent toujours soumis à des attaques récurrentes et chaque fois les camps de la MINUSMA sont attaqués.

Chose curieuse, c'est notre armée malienne, dont certains grands esprits se sont gaussés, qui intervient. On l'a vu à Tombouctou et ailleurs ! Et pour moi, c'est une question de dignité. Je ferai tout ce que je pourrai jusqu'à mon dernier souffle pour que mon pays ait des moyens de défense à la hauteur de la menace. Mais pas seul. Cette forfanterie je ne l'ai pas. Je suis bien conscient de la modestie de nos moyens et mon frère du Tchad l'a dit : individuellement pris, aucun de nous ne peut faire face aujourd'hui à ce type de menace asymétrique.

C'est pourquoi les pays de la ligne de front, ces pays qui sont agressés quotidiennement ont estimé devoir trouver un nouveau moyen, un mode d'action plus efficace que par le passé. C'est cela qui a amené à la création du G5 Sahel, dont j'assure aujourd'hui la présidence en exercice. Et l'Idée, moquée, même raillée au départ, a convaincu de sa pertinence et l'opérationnalisation de la force conjointe est en train d'être faite sur le terrain.

Aucun de nos pays n'a les moyens aujourd'hui dans la situation où nous sommes en face de ceux qui nous agressent et dont nous ne savons pas les moyens, l'origine de ces moyens qui sont colossaux. Quand vous voyez ces colonnes de pickup armés de 14-5 et 12-7, dont nous savons le coût, le prix sur le marché, on se demande par quel miracle le ciel s'ouvre pour eux pour les ravitailler. Mais non, il n'y a pas de tour de magie. Comme dit, Majax, il y a un truc ! Oui chers amis, il y a un truc. Le truc c'est quoi ? C'est tout ce trafic dans le Sahel et le Sahara, et en particulier le trafic de drogue. Tel personnage, qui était guide de notre armée malienne, et qui se disait : Je vais ravitailler. On l'a vu à Tombouctou et ailleurs. Mais non, il n'y a pas de miracle. La drogue aujourd'hui est en circulation dans tout l'espace Sahel.

Il y a aussi les migrations forcées, le trafic de ces êtres humains qui vous pose problème Madame la Ministre, au Nord, nous le savons. Malgré l'amitié que tel ou tel pays peut avoir avec le nôtre, nous savons très bien que quelquefois c'est là un sujet qui s'invite dans nos débats internes. Sachez que nous n'en trions aucun orgueil. Je ne tire aucune vanité, aucun honneur de voir mes enfants aller se perdre dans le désert ou aller servir de nourriture à des thons en Méditerranée. Ce n'est pas la vocation que je leur souhaite. Donc c'est du trafic de ces êtres humains qui vous pose problème Madame la Ministre, au Nord, nous le savons. Malgré l'amitié que tel ou tel pays peut avoir avec le nôtre, nous savons très bien que quelquefois c'est là un sujet qui s'invite dans nos débats internes. Sachez que nous n'en trions aucun orgueil.

Bref amis, je ne voudrais pas prolonger mon discours. Devant cette assistance et ces qualités d'aéroplane que je vois ici, mes chers collègues, que d'ailleurs dans une envoûte rapide je n'ai pas salué. Paul, vous m'excuserez mais vous connaissez mon style. Macky en a l'habitude également. Je pense Madame PARLY que j'aurais dû vous faire l'hommage de saluer votre présence, et celle de Moussa, mon cadet, et de notre frère du Japon. Mais tel je suis. À vous tous qui me faites toujours le plus exquis accueil quand je viens au Sénégal. J'y reviendrai inch'allah !
I am very happy to be back in Dakar, and I would like to begin by thanking President Macky Sall, our host, for the invitation to join you here today.

As a contribution to our discussion, allow me to emphasise the simple point that insecurity flourishes where we fail to cooperate with each other adequately, building on whatever resources we might have.

Insecurity takes many forms, from terrorism to uncontrolled migration, to divisive politics, or even consequences of the failure to adapt to climate change. But whatever the challenge is, we can most successfully address it by working together.

First and foremost, that means coordinating among ourselves as Africans. If we allow others to bear the burden and to define our challenges for us and take responsibility for addressing those problems on our behalf, we have only ourselves to blame for the dismal results.

A major pillar of the ongoing institutional reform of the African Union is a more focused and assertive Africa. Another key pillar, inseparable from the first, is to pay for African institutions, including common security and defence mechanisms, as much as possible from our own resources.

However, African unity and resolve do not negate the importance of productive collaboration with our external partners. On the contrary. After all, on many critical priorities, such as counterterrorism, our interests are fully aligned.

Let me not take very long and close by mentioning another important point. The spirit of collaboration must extend beyond governments. Stability is built on a foundation of trust and rising prosperity from which all citizens benefit.

That is the logic behind our experience in our country that an inclusive and consultative form of politics in which citizens and the private sector are fully involved offers the best prospects for security and human development.

In closing, allow me to acknowledge the various partners who have contributed to the successful process of this forum, and also to once again thank you, Mr President, our host, for all the arrangements that have made our stay comfortable.

I look forward to our discussion. Thank you.
Allow me to begin by saying a warm thank you to my brothers, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and President Paul Kagamé, who are honouring us with their presence at this 4th Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa.

I know how busy your schedules are, dear friends. Thank you for coming.

To you, President Keita, I reaffirm our active solidarity. Senegal stands with its sister Republic of Mali, and fully supports its efforts to permanently restore peace and security in a framework of national unity and territorial integrity.

Peace in Mali means peace in Senegal, and peace across our sub-region.

That is why I applaud your brave efforts to achieve national reconciliation and combat terrorism within the G5 Sahel. This combat concerns us all, whether we are African or not. It deserves our support.

I welcome you all to Senegal and hope you have a pleasant stay.

I would like to thank our partner countries and institutions for their continued help and support in organising the Dakar Forum. It testifies to our shared vision of the security challenges in Africa, and of the sustainable solutions that we hope to deliver.

Moreover, peace and security are still among the main priorities of the African Union reform programme, under the leadership of President Paul Kagamé.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This year, we have chosen to focus on seeking integrated solutions to current security challenges in Africa.

As we know, the challenges are both numerous and complex. Therefore, a diverse range of complementary solutions is needed to deal with them effectively.

Obviously, in the first instance, a ‘boots-on-the-ground’ military response to terrorism is vital. We cannot give free rein to forces whose sole objective is to sow death and chaos.

But the military response must be a global one, based on solidarity, if we are to leave no sanctuary for terrorist organisations.

The risk today and in the years to come, is that terrorists defeated elsewhere will seek safe retreats in Africa, and will continue their criminal activities by attacking both local populations and foreign interests.

It would be a fatal mistake to underestimate that risk, or to assume that shifting the spectre of terrorism to a specific area would keep others safe from harm. Terrorism and its causes must be prioritised and tackled with the same determination everywhere. That is also what an integrated approach is. As long as any vulnerable areas remain, we will all continue to be in danger.

But, for the military response to be effective and cohesive, defence and security forces must be adequately trained and equipped, and must have clear and robust mandates. Which once again raises the issue of United Nations peacekeeping missions.
Traditional peacekeeping missions are not adapted to the new challenges. This is notably the case with MINUSMA in Mali, which has no doubt been one of the deadliest missions for UN peacekeepers.

It seems to me that the time has come to seriously rethink the United Nations peacekeeping doctrine. We cannot keep peace in areas where there is no peace to keep, where it first needs to be restored by fighting groups that operate exclusively through violence.

Secondly, sharing and coordinating intelligence is equally important. When the battle for intelligence is lost, the fight against insecurity and terrorism is doomed to fail. But intelligence is above all a matter for professionals. There is no room for drama or histrionics. To be effective, intelligence gathering requires a smart and discreet approach. It also requires public vigilance and patriotism.

Thirdly, we must give greater consideration to the risks associated with failed states. Whenever a state is weakened or damaged in some way, a vacuum is created and chaos and insecurity move in. A failed state is the perfect sanctuary for mafia-like networks and criminals, including those involved in illegal emigration, because there are no laws, no properly functioning authorities to oppose and stop them.

That is why ready-made solutions, designed and implemented without consulting Africans themselves, must be avoided. As we have seen in the Sahel, the consequences of such solutions are often worse than the problems they are intended to solve. As the sun doesn’t shine everywhere at once, every country has its own history, experience and specific characteristics, which must be taken into consideration.

Lastly, security challenges must be tackled continuously through education, training, employment and inclusive development.

This is absolutely essential, as poverty, ignorance and a lack of prospects for a better life encourage marginalisation, which leads to all sorts of frustration and increases the risk of violent extremism.

Bearing in mind these factors of instability, sustainable solutions to security challenges must include education, training, wealth-creating activities (particularly for young people) and support for disadvantaged areas.

In my view, equitable development and social justice are still necessary to ensure peace and security.

With this in mind, Senegal has introduced schemes such as community farms, family safety grants, universal health cover, and the Emergency Community Development Programme.

All of these initiatives have a common feature: They all aim to combat social injustice through inclusive development and territorial equity.

That’s what we call ‘Senegal with everyone and for everyone’.

I hope this fourth edition of the Dakar Forum will help to bring Africa’s priorities into sharper focus.

I wish you every success in your work here at the Forum.

Thank you.
PANEL OF HEADS OF STATES
FIRST HALF-DAY
Monday, November 13th 2017
Abdou Diouf International Conference Center

Macky SALL
President of the Republic of Senegal

Paul KAGAMÉ
President of the Republic of Rwanda

Moussa FAKI MAHAMAT
President of the African Union Commission

Albert Pahimi PADACKÉ
Prime Minister of Chad

Ibrahim Boubacar KEITA
President of the Republic of Mali

Florence PARLY
Minister of the Armed Forces, France

Masahisa SATO
State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan
The panel is moderated by Assane Diop (Radio France Internationale) and Zain Asher (CNN).

Assane DIOP (journalist)
The high-level panel of the fourth Dakar Forum includes of course the invited Heads of State and various other leading figures, alongside their Senegalese counterpart and Forum host Macky Sall. This fourth edition denotes a desire for peace, a desire for rapprochement with other African states, and a steadfast commitment to open diplomacy.

With the President of Senegal is Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, President of Mali. President, your country is a major front in the fight against terrorism, which calls for international and regional cooperation both on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena. One example of this cooperation is the G5 Sahel group, which you yourself chair. Also present is the Prime Minister of Chad, Albert Pahimi Padacke. As we know, Minister, your country stands at the forefront of the counter-terrorism effort, thanks to its participation in the multinational force fighting Boko Haram and in the G5 Sahel Joint Force project.

Zain ASHER (journalist)
Je vais m’adresser à Paul KAGAMÉ, président du Rwanda, qui va prendre la tête de l’Union africaine (UA) ;
À Moussa FAKI, qui préside la Commission de l’UA, dont l’un des plus importants mandats consiste évidemment à prévenir le terrorisme et à maintenir la sécurité sur le continent ;
À Florence PARLY, ministre française des Armées, qui est aussi l’un des alliés les plus importants de l’Afrique dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, tant en termes d’engagement militaire que financier ;
Et à Masahisa SATO, ministre japonais des Affaires Etrangères. Aux côtés de la Chine, le Japon compte parmi les plus importants alliés économiques de l’Afrique et une grande partie de son engagement vise à maintenir la sécurité sur le continent. Je vous remercie donc tous d’être ici avec nous.

Assane DIOP
The panel of Heads of State, the high-level panel, is opening the Forum this year. It will allow greater freedom of speech and will also perhaps feed the talks between the 700 or so military and civilian experts from around 40 different countries, who have been invited to take part in this year’s Dakar Forum. The general theme of this fourth edition is ‘Current security challenges in Africa: Perspectives for integrated solutions’. The different facets and strands of these challenges will be addressed in around fifteen workshops, conferences and public debates.

Zain ASHER
Ce sera donc une sorte de jeu de questions-réponses. Nous ciblerons les questions en fonction de vos domaines de compétences respectifs.
Let me start with a very simple question for the President of Senegal, Macky Sall. What do you expect from, and what are the stakes involved in this fourth Dakar Forum, the ‘age of maturity edition’ to use a phrase coined by France’s Minister of the Armed Forces.

Thank you very much. I believe this is the fourth edition of the Forum since its inception at the Elysée Summit in 2013. This is a very special Forum because, as we said earlier, it brings together heads of state and government, international organisations, the United Nations, the AU, ECOWAS, the European Union, and all our partners. We also have civil society members and academics, as well as the people responsible for implementing all these initiatives and policies, the armed forces and the security services. I expect the broadest and most appropriate solutions possible, given the diversity of people, skills and experience here today; I expect us to listen to one another and to make the most of the latest developments worldwide, so that the Dakar Forum is a real hotbed of ideas from which any country that wishes can draw inspiration.

In any case, a good deal of discussion has taken place, and this annual meeting gives us a chance to review what has happened from one year to the next, adjust the recommended solutions, and help all the stakeholders develop appropriate responses. I am hopeful that, in ten years at the most, we will have defeated terrorism for good. Of course, we can overcome the consequences of terrorism before that, and no doubt neutralise some radicalised forces. But tackling the roots of terrorism themselves will take time, and all efforts to do so must be extremely well coordinated. That’s why I will be speaking this afternoon about solutions in terms of education, training, and social inclusion, as well as a doctrinal response. As we said last year, we can’t allow fake Muslims to intimidate us with their unfounded principles. Islam has never been a religion of violence, otherwise we obviously wouldn’t belong to it. Why would a Muslim kill people, it’s absurd! The doctrinal response must come from religious leaders, from those who have the knowledge; they must find the courage to spread the true message of Islam, which is a message of peace, since Islam is a ‘middle-ground’ religion. The Prophet Muhammad practised Islam according to the Constitution of Medina: His legacy to us is an Islam of peace and tolerance, which has allowed non-Muslims, Christians and others to celebrate their beliefs in its very own mosque. We will not tolerate lies about Islam and its practices. I would like this to be taken into consideration in counter-terrorism efforts.

Thank you.
Following on from the question addressed to President Kagame, I would like to ask Moussa Faki this: How can we build a new relationship between the AU and international organisations like the United Nations, and thus redefine peacekeeping operations (PKOs), most of which, as we know, are conducted in Africa? How can we adjust this relationship to encourage the development of African armies capable of dealing with security challenges themselves?

We already cooperate with, and are members of, the United Nations. The AU has its own peace and security architecture, along with specific instruments and resources for dealing with peace and security matters. But obviously, as you say, the majority of PKOs are conducted in Africa: Considering past experience and, above all, new types of threat such as terrorism, we are going to have to re-evaluate our response. Thus, a number of continent-wide initiatives have been introduced. Take the fight against Boko Haram for example. We have supported the creation of a joint force by four or five countries, with the aim of providing a (sometimes urgent) response to terrorism, a phenomenon that simply doesn’t wait. Likewise, we support the G5 Sahel. I would also like to remind you that in 2013-2014, when I was Chad’s foreign minister, we met in Bamako to discuss the mandate of the MINUSMA mission and of the French forces supporting it under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. At the time, we suggested for the record that the United Nations should allow any African forces that were ready to do so to form a special brigade that would eventually replace the French forces, which are not intended to stay in Africa and defend it forever.
Assane DIOP • President Sall, what do you think is stopping this from happening?

HE Macky SALL
President of the Republic of Senegal

It could be the long-standing nature of PKOs. Today, we are looking at a different situation and, as some would say, a different destiny. We have no choice but to adapt and support African initiatives with United Nations resources, since the threat in itself is a threat to the very peace and security that the United Nations Security Council is tasked with preserving.

Zain ASHER • Monsieur le Premier ministre Albert PADACKÉ, comme votre pays est activement engagé dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, pourriez-vous simplement nous dire quels changements vous souhaitez voir sur le terrain en termes de ressources fournies par la France, l’Union africaine et les Nations Unies ? De quelles ressources supplémentaires avez-vous besoin dans votre combat très actif contre le terrorisme dans votre pays?

Albert Pahimi PADACKÉ
Prime Minister of Chad

As you pointed out yourself, Chad was the first country to intervene when northern Mali came under attack. It just so happens that there are no terrorists in Chad today. But our country is surrounded by a ring of fire; not only in Mali, where 1,425 Chadian troops are involved in MINUSMA, but also in southern Libya, which has gone up in flames. We have stationed troops on the border to stop the jihadis entering Chad from the North. We are also part of the joint force put together by the Lake Chad countries to combat Boko Haram and, as such, our troops are deployed in Nigeria, Niger and northern Cameroon, where they are guarding the border to prevent Boko Haram from entering the country.

They are also deployed on our southern border to prevent the infiltration of terrorists from the Central African Republic, which is completely unstable. We have sent in the army to secure the border. We have also joined forces with our neighbour Sudan against the well-known campaign to destabilise Darfur. In all, we have deployed almost 20,000 troops to combat cross-border terrorism and organised crime. The question now is, where is the money coming from? Schoolchildren in Chad, who no longer have any chalk or other school supplies? Sick people, who can no longer get the medication they need? The question we are asking is this: If Chad doesn’t get any support, how long is it going to be able to keep terrorism at bay?
A question for Ibrahim Boubacar Keita: Mali has been dealing with terrorism on a daily basis since 2013. Your country is host to a United Nations peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, which includes numerous African blue helmets. A Senegalese contingent of several hundred troops is expected soon. Mali is also host to France’s BARKHANE force, and parts of the G5 Sahel joint force will be arriving there shortly. In recent months, you have stepped up your efforts to win support for the G5 force, notably through trips to the United Nations, often with the backing of French diplomats and ministers. Why is it so difficult, and will you manage to get your interlocutors onside?

It is a country’s duty as part of the G5 Sahel to spread the message wherever it can—and must—be heard. By the way, since you mentioned it, we would like to commend President Emmanuel Macron for his commitment on our behalf, and for pursuing this project with such conviction and determination.

We went to the United Nations and told them plainly that “we are not beggars. We are talking about clear-sighted solidarity, an alignment of people, countries and interests. If by chance the dam were to collapse – for we see ourselves as a dam – there would be a surge towards the North, towards you. So you must help us, here and now, to strengthen the dam and make sure it cannot be breached. The international coalition’s activities in eastern Europe and the Middle East have caused a backward surge. So-called Islamic State is losing city after city, and that is going to create a backward surge towards the Sahel region. We must therefore be ready to stop this new invasion, this new threat”. That is what we are saying. I don’t understand why they are quibbling over giving us the money we need to carry out a joint task that is completely beyond our means. So far, we have received 110 million euros, to which a further 60 million dollars have just been added. That’s not very much compared with 423 million euros. Considering what we are trying to achieve together, it’s ridiculous: A much more substantial financial effort can and must be made.

In all, 50 million from the European Union, 50 million of our own sui generis funds (10 million per member country), and 108 million from President Macron in the form of equipment and funds, plus 60 million in bilateral aid confirmed three days ago by the United States Embassy in Paris; the United States won’t hear of a global contribution from the G5 Sahel, as they believe in the project but prefer a bilateral approach to aid.

These are the proposals on the table right now, a superbly equipped armada, unimaginable fire power. We don’t know how people do it. The armoured vehicles are there on the ground. All the other types of collective heavy weapons in Mali. And I’m talking to senior officers who know what I’m talking about. We also have very few aircraft, which are a heavy burden on Mali’s national budget. I had to fight hard to get six aircraft, as they provide psychological and moral comfort for people on the ground.

The government has used them recently to make short-hop journeys to northern Mali to comfort people there who were in absolute despair, who were starting to think they had been abandoned because they live in areas that can only be reached by helicopter. So we have problems, serious problems, and I think it’s high time that we stop seeing this situation as an exclusively Malian and sub-regional concern, and that we start seeing it as a concern for humanity as a whole.

The effort must be made today, so that everything that has been achieved in the Middle East won’t ultimately be in vain when it comes to the Sahel. That is our goal, and that is what we are continuing to push for. We are heading towards the same goal in the Gulf.
First of all, I would just like to say that France is fully committed to making a success of the G5 Sahel initiative and the joint force. I believe President Macron cited it as one of his top priorities at the Bamako Summit in July. Why? Because, as you know, France has deployed 4,000 troops in Mali alongside the G5 Sahel force. The terrorist threat remains an issue of great concern, as President Keïta has just pointed out. The purpose of the BARKHANE operation is to combat terrorism, and I think it has been relatively successful in that. It also aims to strengthen local forces in particular, to provide training and support for Mali’s armed forces. None of this would be possible without very substantial support from the international community, which I must say has been forthcoming; the United Nations is playing a key role through MINUSMA, and I would like to take this opportunity to commend Senegal for its very important contribution to this mission, which strives to enforce the Mali Peace and Reconciliation Agreement on a daily basis. That’s no easy task!

The European Union is also providing support through the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali, and is helping to train the Malian army. But we need to do more. That is why I and my German colleague organised a donor conference in Berlin last September to, as it were, rally additional financial support for the G5 Sahel joint force. In addition to this event, the European Union has pledged a contribution of 50 million euros; more recently, the United States decided to donate 60 million dollars through a bilateral aid agreement. But there is still a lot to do, which is why the resolution (or rather report) drawn up by the UN Secretary General in October 2017, regarding UN support for the G5 Sahel joint force, is such an interesting initiative. We hope that the proposals set out in the report will be very seriously considered.

Allow me to make one final remark: While financial support is, as the President of Mali pointed out earlier, very important, the need for operational cooperation is crucial. The BARKHANE force enjoys very substantial support from our European and American partners, who provide us with much appreciated assistance in terms of strategic transport, supplies and intelligence. I would like to thank them for that. However, Europeans must be in a position to act fast so that, if France ever needs to mount another operation like BARKHANE in Mali, we can work with our European partners from the outset, rather than do it alone. That, I think, is the main reason behind the European Intervention Initiative put forward by President Macron in September to further incentivise our partners.

Nous défendons le leadership de l’Afrique en lui apportant un soutien financier et militaire. J’estime que les problèmes en Afrique doivent être résolus par le leadership africain et c’est la raison pour laquelle nous soutenons l’Union africaine. Nous allons envoyer des représentants à l’UA en janvier prochain pour soutenir financièrement les initiatives africaines. Selon moi, il est très important de soutenir les mesures de responsabilisation, de transparence et de gouvernance du leadership africain. En effet, elles sont indispensables pour bénéficier d’un soutien financier, non seulement de la part du Japon, mais aussi des Nations Unies.

Assane Diop • Thank you, if you don’t mind, President Sall, I would like to come back to the fight against terrorism, which is placing an increasingly heavy burden on national budgets, especially in poorer countries.

Many of the countries confronted with terrorism have huge social and economic difficulties... With the idea of reforming peacekeeping operations still in mind, how can we finance African countries’ defence capabilities using funds provided by the United Nations? How can we reform the peacekeeping process and, again, directly help African armed forces?

I think this question can be answered on two levels. I would like to talk first of all about the African level. President Kagame is leading the reform process, and African countries must enforce the decision made in Kigali to fund the AU through a 0.2% levy on imports.

Some countries have started to enforce this directive, and Senegal will be following suit. I would like to take this opportunity to instruct my finance minister accordingly. The 0.2% levy will enable the AU and the President of the Commission to cover at least 25% of the cost of peacekeeping operations in Africa, perhaps even more.

We have the means to contribute to security in Africa, and Africans must not be found wanting in this respect; they must take responsibility for the continent’s security. Of course, we are not the cause of the conflicts. They have their roots in external factors such as religious manipulation or economic considerations, the aim being to create divisions and take control of the natural resources in some areas by stirring up internal wars and rebellions that degenerate into violence. That’s a fact.

Secondly, every effort must be made at the state level to create efficient national armies, as we know they are vital components of a truly effective and efficient continent-wide defence structure. It’s like a championship. National teams must be up to scratch, otherwise your global championship will be worthless. Therefore, individual countries must make an effort to equip their defence and security forces.

Especially since Africa has come so far. Don’t forget that, twenty years ago, none of our countries could invest a single dollar in military equipment. It was forbidden. At the time, under the philosophy of the Bretton Woods institutions on so-called adjustment policies, military expenditure was not allowed. We have some catching up to do, and this must be done by individual states. There can be no compromises.

Of course, we will be criticized for running up debts and widening the deficit, but an effective security and defence structure is a fundamental necessity that merits an investment of at least 1% or 2% of GDP. It will relieve the burden on our partners, and we will at least be able to take care of equipping and modernising our armed forces without our score being downgraded. Our deficit will simply exceed 3 or 4%. Why are we limited to 3% anyway? The 3% limit goes back to Maastricht, when the European Union was seeking to achieve monetary convergence. At the time, Germany’s deficit was taken as a reference. But how can the German deficit be applied to countries in Africa that are tackling terrorism and Boko Haram? It makes no sense.

This is where we have to appeal to the solidarity of our partners, the European Union, the United Nations and, above all, the monetary funds of the large countries on the Security Council. I do not believe that Africa’s defence will be ensured by external countries. I may be naive, but I don’t believe it. Wounds will be patched up, support will be provided, one or two countries will make sacrifices, as we have already seen. These countries, like France in this particular case, deserve a special mention for their work in Mali and Central Africa over the past five years; they will put their troops’ lives in danger and shoulder the cost alone.

But the situation is not sustainable. So, Africa must begin by taking responsibility for its own security. Our partners must support us in this, so that the cost of modernising our armies and our security and defence forces is borne by Africans themselves. Now, the EU and the UN may supplement the funds allocated to maintenance, remuneration and recruitment, but African countries must bear the brunt of the cost, starting by imposing a 0.2% levy on African imports to fund the African Union. I very strongly recommend this.

HE Macky SALL
President of the Republic of Senegal
Je souhaiterais poser la question suivante au président KAGAMÉ.

On a beaucoup parlé d’une solution militaire contre le terrorisme en Afrique. Il y a les troupes des Nations Unies, du G5, des États-Unis et de la France. Selon vous, faut-il vraiment se concentrer sur une solution militaire, ou plutôt sur ce qui pousse les jeunes vers le terrorisme, par exemple les inégalités économiques et les griefs personnels, en se mettant à leur écoute pour qu’ils aient le sentiment d’être entendus ?

Tout d’abord, il n’y a pas qu’une seule cause à ces problèmes. Les causes et les sources de ces problèmes sont multiples.

Une seule solution ne suffit donc pas. Nous avons besoin de solutions multiples, et d’autant d’initiatives pour s’attaquer à ces problèmes.

En fait, c’est pour cette raison que les pays doivent absolument collaborer. Ceux qui ne souffrent pas de ces problèmes doivent travailler avec ceux qui en pâtissent, car même si un pays est épargné aujourd’hui, il aura d’autres problèmes demain. Voilà pourquoi la coopération revêt une telle importance.

Comme je l’ai dit au début, il existe de multiples sources et causes à ces problèmes et l’approche à adopter ne peut donc pas être unique, ou seulement militaire. Nous avons besoin d’une approche basée sur plusieurs solutions. Nous n’avons pas le choix et devons choisir des solutions militaires pour faire face aux groupes armés qu’ils soient terroristes ou non les groupes terroristes ou autres groupes utilisent les armes.

Néanmoins, la situation dans son ensemble exige aussi que nous prenions du recul. Quelles sont les lacunes en termes de gouvernance ? Qu’est-ce qui suscite des griefs légitimes, ou même de simples ressentis ? Nous faisons face à des problèmes réels, mais aussi à des ressentis. Nous voulons nous assurer que ce qui est aujourd’hui un ressenti ne devienne pas une réalité demain.

Bien sûr, les inégalités dont vous avez parlé sont dues à différentes causes, mais certains s’en servent parfois pour justifier le besoin d’instabilité. Peu importe comment ces inégalités se manifestent, nous devons nous y attaquer. Cela passe par la gouvernance, par notre manière de résoudre les problèmes de développement. En fait, voilà pourquoi il est important de parler, comme nous le faisons, d’intégration ou de solutions intégrées, alors que vous parlez à la fois de sécurité et de développement.

Il est donc question de gouvernance, de développement, de sécurité… Tous ces axes doivent être pris en compte pour augmenter nos chances de relever la plupart des défis. Il ne faut pas insister sur un domaine aux dépens d’un autre, mais plutôt aborder chacun d’entre eux. Parallèlement, nous voulons que les pays agissent ensemble pour que ce qui affecte le vôtre aujourd’hui n’affecte pas le mien demain, en supposant que ce ne soit pas déjà le cas. Le plus important est de travailler ensemble, mais cette collaboration implique que chaque pays fasse aussi son maximum pour résoudre les problèmes des autres pays.
Assane DIOP • The crisis in northern Mali culminated in the conclusion of the Algiers Accords, under the auspices of your international partners: France, the United Nations, the African Union, etc. Where does the peace process stand now, considering the many obstacles to its implementation? In your opinion, will the successful conclusion of the peace process put an end to the daily acts of terrorism in Mali?

With a great deal of difficulty. Let’s try to pay tribute to Algeria, which agreed to host the Inter-Malian Dialogue. The dialogue, which took place in the fabulous setting of the El Aurassi hotel, lasted for almost eight months and resulted in a previously unimaginable rapprochement between those who hadn’t spoken to each other for years. They grew closer over couscous and tea. The end result was an agreement initialled in Algiers and signed in Bamako, to which we attach a great deal of importance.

As we have said, we intend to implement it without malice because it is in the interests of our country. Every clause, without malice.

It would be preferable if all parties showed the same commitment, sincerity and conviction, because there is no other alternative for peace in Mali. It would be preferable if we dropped the illusions that have been dangled in front of us, for example that northern Mali could become a tribal principality. I have been very clear that that is not going to happen. Inshallah, Mali will never be divided. I don’t think the people of Mali would allow it.

Geopolitical intelligence suggests that the majority would not even consider the idea. We must engage seriously—with determination, lucidity and loyalty—in implementing the Mali peace agreement. I think it will require new institutional measures: We have started the process by creating two new regions: Menaka and Taoudenni. For a country like Mali, with unfortunately very scarce resources, this has taken a tremendous effort. We began by setting up interim authorities, as a first step towards creating an administrative framework for the two regions. We have also tried, and I mean tried, to develop MOOCs, regional cooperation mechanisms and community centres. We have also mobilised Mali’s armed forces and other armed groups to secure public places, while getting people used to seeing them together.

This is important, essential; we also firmly believe that the state must resume its sovereign functions. Schools must reopen; that is something I personally feel very strongly about, as I know how important our schools and teachers are. I attach a great deal of importance to it. Kidal has already opened some schools. The governor of Kidal has already opened some schools in the past two months. He has transferred his authority to his replacement. There is no longer any belligerence between armed groups in Mali and the Malian army. It is important to emphasise that today.
Zain ASHER • J’ai une question pour Florence PARLY. M. KAGAMÉ a évoqué l’idée que les pays qui n’ont pas de problèmes devraient travailler avec ceux qui en ont, parce qu’un jour, ce sont eux qui rencontreront ces problèmes. Il est donc important que nous travaillions tous ensemble, mais avez-vous remarqué plus de coopération entre les nations africaines en termes de partage des renseignements et de formation ? La coopération entre pays africains est-elle plus intense qu’avant ? Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Florence PARLY
Minister of the Armed Forces, France

I’m going to give you an example, as examples are better than a long-drawn-out speech. The example is very simple: Today, on 13 November 2017, the G5 Sahel joint force is conducting its final operation. I would like to express my utmost respect for the G5 Sahel countries. It is an African initiative and a successful African initiative at that, since it is more than just a concept. It has become a reality and has stuck to even the most ambitious timetables. I remember at the end of January, I was with my German colleague in Niamey. We visited a worksite that would become the command post of the G5 Sahel’s operational force. So yes, there are practical examples that make us optimistic about how African countries are taking an increasingly autonomous approach to their own security. I think that’s the meaning of the story. The second remark I would like to make is that military cooperation should go hand in hand with substantial development support. The continuum between security and economic development must be ensured. In this respect, the G5 Sahel is not just a military cooperation initiative. It is also an initiative that aims to develop over time to encompass economic development. That is why it is so important that the international community gives it its full support.

Assane DIOP • The Chadian Prime Minister’s reaction to what was just said:

Albert Pahimi PADACKÉ
Prime Minister of Chad

African countries must work together if they are to defeat terrorism. Chad is deeply committed to the G5 Sahel. As I was saying, there are no terrorists in Chad, and yet we invest substantially in the counter-terrorism effort. If you look at Chad’s investment in counter-terrorism in relation to its GDP (bearing in mind that there are no terrorists in Chad), you will see that no other country in the world has contributed more, not even the United States of America. Thank you.

Assane DIOP • We would have liked to continue this debate, but I think the participants’ introductory speeches have also to some extent identified the challenges addressed at the fourth Dakar International Forum. The main focus, therefore, is on how Africa is taking ownership of its own security and also, of course, the great hopes for peace. Thank you very much for your attention.
FIRST HALF-DAY
Monday, November 13th 2017

"Defence, Security and Peace"

Plenary 1
Defence, Security and Peace: an integrated approach to defence, security

Conference 1
Support and financing of SSR programs in Africa

Workshop 1
Peace keeping: how to improve the UN / AU / EU / REC’s devices?

Workshop 2
Which evolution for the EU’s instruments regarding security in Africa?

Workshop 3
Cybersecurity and governance of information and digital space
Plenary 1
Defence, Security and Peace: an integrated approach to defence, security

SPEAKERS

Marcel DE SOUZA
President of the ECOWAS Commission

Jean-Pierre LACROIX
United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Koen VERVAEKE
Managing Director for Africa – European External Action Service

Xu JINGHU
Special representative of the Chinese government on African affairs
The first pillar of a successful defence, security and peace strategy is risk and conflict prevention.

Prevention consists, above all, in mediation and dialogue. Take Gambia, for instance: When a conflict erupted, President Ernest Bai Koroma travelled there twice; when it became clear that the mediation and negotiation phase had come to an end, the President moved on to the second and most expensive stage: conflict management.

Conflict management often means sending in the troops, and that comes at a cost.

It is followed by conflict resolution, that is to say reconstruction.

The first step is to re-establish the defence and security system to enable the country to deal with conflicts; the next step is economic recovery: providing education, healthcare, an electricity supply and so on.

Public frustrations must be ironed out so as to avoid creating fertile ground for terrorism.

Reducing poverty, creating jobs for young people and, above all, improving the population’s general well-being play an essential role in fighting terrorism and violent extremism. A balance must be found between these important factors.

It would be pointless to solve the problem of terrorism and violent extremism without addressing social and economic development, improving the well-being of the population, and protecting human rights.

Let’s talk about Mali. In Mali we have MINUSMA, which is a peacekeeping force. When we met the United Nations Secretary General in September, we told him that we also need a peace enforcement force. The MINUSMA force—and I am delighted to see our brother, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, here with us today—comprises ten thousand troops, including nine thousand from ECOWAS countries; only a thousand come from other countries.

If you add the 4,000 troops in the Serval force, that makes 14,000 altogether. Compare that to the 240,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan.

They say, ‘we are already doing a lot’, and it’s true that a tremendous amount of work has been done. The Serval force has helped stop the jihadi advance. But the 14,000 troops in Mali must be considered in light of the 240,000 troops that have been in Afghanistan for years; it is important to retain perspective. We would like to be able to pool our strengths. Africa must realise that it cannot rely completely on others. We must understand the necessity of pooling our resources, combining our strengths and acting together, because no country or regional economic community can deal with the upsurge in violent extremism alone. We have to be aware of that.

It is up to us to make our strategic choices, define our priorities, and request international assistance. The United Nations give us a lot of support. The European Union gives us a tremendous amount of support. They do support us. In my view, they have made a considerable effort, but there is still much left to be done. We must stop the forces of evil in their path, as they wreak death through Boko Haram or the so-called Islamic State. In any case, ECOWAS is trying to exercise leadership and achieve results in West Africa.
Getting results is neither easy nor straightforward. The fight against terrorism is multifaceted and takes many forms, but integrated solutions are needed to achieve sustainable peace. This is what I call the security imperative, intertwined closely with the imperative of social and economic development and poverty reduction.

Thank you.
I would like to make five points, based very broadly on potential solutions.

The first and most important point is that we must work together and adopt the right approach.

The second is that we must rebuild and strengthen states.

What do I mean by working together and adopting the right approach? If we look at the situations where Peacekeeping Operations are deployed today, very rarely, if ever, is the peacekeeping team the only stakeholder.

More and more often, we are working alongside other stakeholders: Political stakeholders (such as the African Union, the European Union, influential states and other neighbouring states), as well as national and regional operations. We have to make the most of the complementarities and synergies.

And none of these situations are, strictly speaking, matters of purely national concern. Mali of course has its own specific challenges and political problems, but at the same time, most of the challenges it faces are regional in nature.

So, to tackle the situation effectively, bearing in mind that it affects the whole of the Sahel, we must take a step back and look at it from the best angle (in the photographic sense of the word).

That is why initiatives like the G5 Sahel are so very important, because they ensure that problems are addressed at the right level. However, it is also important to ensure that the different stakeholders operate in a complementary manner, and that they generate as much value added as possible. This is not necessarily easy, as it means clarifying and understanding what each is able to do.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations often have relatively strong mandates, but they never go so far as to enforce peace.

Several of our operations play an important role and deliver value added in terms of protecting civilians and saving lives, in many situations contributing to and restoring stability. There is another argument that is perhaps more difficult to assert, but which is equally relevant: UN operations play a key role in terms of containment.

Only, it is not sustainable. Containment is not a permanent solution. There must be a possibility of resolving the situation; political processes must move forward, which is why the United Nations gives precedence to political strategy. But again, moving political processes forward requires teamwork, especially when the international community—and often the Security Council—are divided. So, we must join forces with all those able to exercise influence in these circumstances. In African situations, the African Union and sub-regional organisations play an absolutely vital role in providing the critical mass needed for us to move forward, convey the right messages in a cohesive, consistent manner and, where necessary, exercise pressure on the appropriate parties.

My second point is that we must increase our options. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations meet certain needs and align with certain mandates, but, as we have said before, when it comes to enforcing peace and actively combating terrorist groups, other types of instruments are required.

That’s the whole point of our current actions, which we must continue to pursue even if we don’t yet have a large enough political consensus either within the United Nations or, in some ways, in Africa.
Clearly, as recent discussions in the Security Council have shown, we must continue our work to support the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Standby Force.

This is in keeping with the recommendations made by the Secretary General, namely that we must support sub-regional forces like the G5 Sahel Joint Force. We have put forward some highly ambitious proposals as to how the United Nations might support the G5 Sahel, which are currently being discussed by the Security Council. The future lies in the complementarity between peace enforcement, counter-terrorism and extremism, and UN peacekeeping missions, which will still have a role to play going forward.

But we must increase the range of options available to ensure that we have an appropriate instrument to deal with each state of affairs, given the specific nature of individual situations.

Thirdly, we must improve our tools and do what we do even better. This is an absolute priority when it comes to peacekeeping operations: We know what the difficulties are, and we know that they are exacerbated by dangerous security environments and by elusive adversaries who sometimes have no other agenda than to prey on others; we must not be afraid to address these new constraints. As is often the case, we are operating in environments where there are large numbers of traumatised civilians, and very many displaced persons and refugees. Therefore, we must be more responsive, less static and more mobile; we must have adequate equipment, which is so often lacking. It is a long and difficult task requiring shared responsibility.

The United Nations is making every possible effort to mobilise resources, but troop-contributing countries must follow suit. I think we have made progress; above all, I think there is a better understanding of what peacekeeping operations are all about, the challenges involved, how they are tackled, and the best solutions to be implemented.

In two days’ time, UN defence ministers will be discussing these issues at the Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference in Vancouver, Canada, which will be an opportunity for states to make new announcements and commit to participating in peacekeeping operations. There are now more countries involved, which means there is more supply and slightly less demand; however, there are still significant shortages of rather specific resources such as helicopters, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance units, and rapid response and counter-explosive units. Therefore, further effort is required.

I would add that educating, training and supporting troop-contributing countries is important and, in my opinion, countries with sufficient financial and technical resources have a special responsibility to help. We strongly encourage any country that can to support troop-contributing countries in this area, as the latter have less capacity but are willing to engage (or remain engaged) in peacekeeping operations.

The fourth point, which I believe is of fundamental importance, is that together we must—or will eventually have to—do more to tackle some of the determinants of conflict, which play a major role today. Numerous measures are already being taken to tackle radicalisation, and I know we will be talking about this later in the Forum. However, it is not the only factor. We also need to consider illegal activities, illegal trafficking and criminal activities, which are sometimes the biggest contributing factor to conflict, bigger even than political and other divisions. Again, steps are being taken; several actions have been implemented through the United Nations, which has a responsibility for such issues.
But I think we will have to go further; I think real concerted action is needed to combat radicalisation which, again, is a major factor of conflict. There are other determinants which were mentioned this morning, such as the fight against climate change which, as we see every day, has a major impact on conflict levels.

Fifthly, and all the points I have mentioned are intertwined, we must continue and increase our support for rebuilding and strengthening states. It is the way forward towards truly sustainable regulations. Justice and reconciliation are important but depend on the existence of adequate state infrastructure. Strengthening and rebuilding states is the key to ensuring sustainable peace and raising the prospects of withdrawing our troops.

The United Nations does what it can when it can, but it must have the political space to act. It works in partnership with other actors like the European Union, which plays an important role in rebuilding security and justice institutions. In Haiti—which, although not in Africa, is an important operation for us—the new UN operation will focus on the justice, law enforcement and prison systems. We are taking similar measures in the Central African Republic and, to a certain extent, in Mali; they really are the key to sustainable stability.

Again, the development of partnerships is fundamentally important in this area, as I think they facilitate a successful transition.

United Nations support for peace efforts obviously goes much further than these brief points, and we are working (I believe very harmoniously) with the African Union; the atmosphere of cooperation really is excellent, and we are all aware of the fact that, if we work together, we will succeed.

Thank you.
It is a great honour for me to speak to you today at this opening session of the fourth International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa. I bring with me a message of friendship and commitment from the High Representative Federica Mogherini, who is currently tied up in Brussels, carrying out crucial work on the future of European defence. I would like to thank President Sall and the Forum organisers for inviting the EU.

With just a few days to go until the AU-EU summit, I am delighted that Senegal and this Forum are following through with their commitment and thus making a vital contribution to the strategic dialogue between our two continents. The year 2017 will no doubt be a turning point in our relationship, as we have been working for several months on redefining our partnership for the next few decades. The wellbeing of our populations and the stability of our countries are at stake, and the time has come to enter a new era of reciprocity and efficiency. With this in mind, we published a joint report in May, specifying our objectives and confirming that we will be leading the work in Abidjan.

The attacks in Europe over the past year are a reminder that cross-border cooperation is of the utmost importance. The attacks in Africa—and let’s not forget that Africa has suffered more terrorist attacks than any other part of the world—are a reminder that we are all fighting the same battle. Today, security is a truly global challenge. Never before has the notion of interdependence between our two continents been so pertinent. It sets us apart from Africa’s other partners. For Europe, investing in security in Africa means investing in our own security, and vice versa. The European Union has now understood this and taken it into account, which is why it is fully engaged in supporting peace and security efforts in Africa. The first step is to further improve our instruments (1) and raise our ambitions in terms of defence (2).

The AU-EU Summit in Abidjan should take our defence and security partnership to an even higher level. It is more important than ever that we, Europeans and Africans together, take charge of our own security. There cannot be a sustainable solution to terrorism, trafficking and organised crime without stable, dependable and long-term partnerships. Now more than ever, Africans must be active agents of their own security, and we must find the best way of coordinating our actions with theirs. That is what we understand by the motto ‘African solutions to African problems’.

Europe was the first to establish a peace and security partnership with the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and it is still their biggest partner today. Over the years, the African Peace Facility (APF) has become one of the main instruments of Africa-EU cooperation in the area of peace and security. More than 2.5 billion have been allocated to the APF since 2004. These funds have been used to consolidate the African peace architecture and support peace missions carried out by the AU and RECs. Examples of this support have been seen in Mali, the Central African Republic and Somalia (AMISOM), as well as in Guinea Bissau, the Lake Chad Basin against Boko Haram and, more recently, with the G5 Sahel Joint Force. The EU also supports less visible African mediation initiatives, in Sudan for example, such as the early warning system and the standby force.

But neither the APF nor Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture were designed to support the fight against new cross-border threats and terrorism. We must adjust our working methods to better meet the needs of the ad-hoc group of Lake Chad and G5 countries that are uniting their efforts against a common enemy.
Improving our instruments also means seeking fair and sustainable financing solutions. On Africa’s side, it is vital that every effort is made to create a peace fund in accordance with the proposals put forward by Donald Kaberuka. On Europe’s side, we must engage in important proactive talks within the context of the next Multiannual Financial Framework and the ‘Post-Cotonou’ partnership to ensure that the Union has the financial resources it needs to conduct its external actions. Together, we must also talk about the discussions on predictable funding for African peace operations to New York.

Responding to crises after the fact is not enough. Too often, we have seen conflicts reignite because they had not been fully resolved. To achieve ‘sustainable’ security, greater integration is needed between development aid and security assistance. The security-development nexus—the relevance of which is no longer in any dispute—must now be given concrete expression on the ground. In recent years, Europe has implemented integrated security and development programmes in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Central African Republic. These regions have all received support from the European Union and its Member States in the form of development aid, budgetary support and—as an important first step—security assistance. We have created new instruments so that we can respond to needs faster and in a much more targeted manner. Thus, the Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration in Africa has, since its inception in 2016, already allocated almost €2 billion to supporting cross-border cooperation, increasing state presence in remote regions, and creating jobs for young people, particularly in the agricultural sector and in areas of high migration.

The ‘Alliance for the Sahel’, founded by the EU, France and Germany, aims to take this integrated approach to a higher level. We are helping to organise a conference in Brussels in December to support the efforts of the GS Sahel.

It is no coincidence that the EU and its African partners have decided to devote the next summit to young people, who are Africa’s greatest resource.

This incredible reservoir of energy, innovation and ideas is also a major challenge. To prevent crises and find sustainable solutions, we must increase the resilience of African society. We must also focus on human development and economic growth to facilitate global stability. Young people, inclusive societies and job creation must be at the centre of our efforts. The new European Investment Plan for Africa—a €4 billion contribution to leverage over €40 billion of investments—provides the motivation and the guarantees needed for European companies to invest in Africa, especially in areas that need economic growth as an antidote to instability.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has gradually become established as the Union’s ‘toolkit’, and is a key component of a broader political engagement in crisis response. Half of our 35 civilian missions and military operations are deployed in Africa: Executive military operations, and training and advisory missions.

Therefore, numerous avenues and projects are being pursued in the realm of Euro-African security cooperation, but before I conclude, I must talk to you about the future of European defence. Indeed, how can we even think about acting effectively on the African continent if we are unable to build a sufficiently ambitious and robust defence and security system at home.

In June 2016, the EU’s global strategy on foreign and security policy set the ambitious goal of creating a more credible European defence. In response to an increasingly unfavourable environment, the EU and its Member States have set a new level of ambition for EU defence and security policy. As a result, they have access to more and more internal and external coordination tools, enabling them to take better account of the growing links between internal and external security. At the same time, the growing cooperation between Member States within the frame of the global strategy should naturally lead to greater cooperation with international partners.
In practical terms, this new political momentum on security and defence is built around several objectives:
– Support cooperation between the Member States in developing defence capabilities;
– Develop EU crisis response mechanisms and structures;
– Place greater emphasis on early warning systems, prevention and resilience by adopting an integrated approach;
– Strengthen the link between internal and external security;
– Develop a more strategic use of CSDP missions and operations;
– Cooperate with our international partners.

Building a better European defence system means making more effective use of resources and developing our capabilities to keep European citizens safe and step up security worldwide. However, it also means that we must work on becoming an even more reliable partner to our friends and neighbours, starting with the United Nations, NATO and other regional organisations, especially the African Union.

Ladies and gentlemen, my dear friends,

Europe is now fully engaged in neighbourhood stabilisation, as that is indeed how we see the African continent: As friends and neighbours.

This fits with the ambition expressed jointly by High Representative Federica Mogherini, President Moussa Faki and Antonio Guterres at the last United Nations General Assembly. Wherever possible, we must work together on the ground to make our actions more effective.

No other power in the world has come close to matching our commitment to Africa. We are working alongside the African Union and the United Nations to ensure the continent’s security, with the direct support of security forces in Africa. And we are working together to promote growth across Africa, starting with the areas that need it most.

Once again, I would like to thank President Sall of Senegal and all those who have helped to make this latest edition of the Forum a success.

I have no doubt that the work beginning today will show, once again, that the only way to improve security in Africa is through continual consultation and discussion.

Thank you.
It is a great pleasure to be here again at the Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa. First of all, on behalf of the Chinese government, allow me to congratulate you most warmly on holding this Forum. I would also like to convey our great appreciation to the Senegalese government for its hard work in making the event possible, and for the warm welcome and hospitality we have received.

Since its inception four years ago, the Forum has been actively committed to promoting collective wisdom and creating synergies to maintain peace and stability in Africa, which is highly appreciated and broadly supported by the international community.

In recent years, the overall situation in Africa has been one of peace, stability and development, with a steady improvement in the political and security climate, sustained economic growth, and regular progress in the integration process. Africa continues to have a growing role and voice in international affairs. At the same time, however, a number of burning issues have stirred up local unrest; terrorism and insecurity at sea have heightened instability, and traditional security issues are becoming entangled with non-traditional security issues. Some African countries are entering a period of socio-economic transition, and are experiencing growing social tensions and complex political changes. So, Africa is facing an increasing number of challenges in terms of peacekeeping and stability.

Achieving peace and stability in Africa has been a hard-won battle. China sincerely hopes that Africa will continue to resolve any threats and challenges encountered during the peace and development process; it urges the international community to give greater recognition to Africa's commitment and aspirations in this respect, to further engage in peace and security matters on the continent, and hence support Africa's efforts to maintain and reinforce the momentum of peace and development.

Profound and complex changes are taking place in the world today, and countries have never been so closely bound together or so interdependent. No country is isolated from the international community, and none can tackle the various security threats alone. It is therefore in the international community's interests to support Africa in its efforts to address security challenges and achieve sustainable peace.

China believes that the international community must abide by the following principles when engaging in peace and security affairs in Africa:

Firstly, Africa's autonomy and leadership role must be respected. Africans have a greater knowledge and understanding of African affairs than anyone else. We must trust in their wisdom and their ability to sort out these problems themselves. The international community must respect Africa's efforts to deliver African solutions to African problems. In particular, it must support African countries in strengthening their ability to maintain peace and stability, and provide them with any assistance required. This must be done in a manner that is acceptable to Africa, instead of taking over from Africans and interfering rudely in their affairs.

Secondly, the UN and the AU must continue to play a central role. The UN is at the heart of the international collective security mechanism, while the AU is at the heart of the African collective security mechanism. It is important to ensure that the UN and the AU play their full role in dealing with 'hot spots' in Africa, to adhere strictly to the basic principles of international law and international relations, and to firmly oppose unilateralism while effectively improving the efficiency and outcomes of UN and AU peacekeeping operations in Africa.
Thirdly, an integrated approach must be adopted, which addresses both the manifestations and root causes of problems. Instability and conflict have their roots in poverty and under-development. Development is the key to solving all problems, including that of security. We must give greater consideration to development in Africa, and support African countries in promoting cohesive social and economic development and strengthening unity and integration between different ethnic groups and tribes to eliminate sources of instability.

As an active supporter and promoter of peace and security in Africa, China provides ongoing support for African efforts to maintain peace and stability. In accordance with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, China adopts an objective and impartial approach. It takes advantage of its long-standing friendship with African countries to promote peace and encourage negotiations with a view to finding political solutions to dealing with hot spots. It is constantly reinforcing its peace and security cooperation with African countries, the AU and sub-regional organisations, and gives priority to supporting efforts to enhance African security and defence capabilities. In September 2015, President Xi Jinping announced that the Chinese government would provide the AU with 100 million US dollars in military assistance between 2016 and 2020. The Chinese side is actively implementing this measure, and has signed a framework agreement with the AU regarding the release of the first batch of funds. China plays an active role in UN peacekeeping operations. It provides more troops for these operations than any other of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and is the world’s second biggest financial contributor to peacekeeping. China always supports justice for Africa within the Security Council and other multilateral bodies. During its presidency of the Security Council last July, China proposed an open debate on ‘enhancing African capabilities in the area of peace and security’. China is also increasingly involved in African development; it supports economic development, social well-being improvements and job creation in African countries, with a view to promoting long-term peace through sustained growth.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held recently in Beijing. The Party’s general secretary, President Xi Jinping, emphasised in his report that China would work on promoting a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, fairness, justice and win-win cooperation, and on building a community of common destiny for all humanity. China is prepared to work with the international community to increase support for Africa in its efforts to promote peace, stability and development, thereby contributing to a world of sustainable peace, general security and shared prosperity.

Thank you. I wish the best of success to this conference.
Conference 1
Support and financing of SSR programs in Africa

CHAIR
Mpako FOALENG
Security Sector Reform advisor – UN

SPEAKERS
Eboe HUTCHFUL
Professor of Africana Studies, Wayne State University and Executive Secretary, African Security Sector Network (ASSN)

Bruno CLÉMENT-BOLLÉE
SSR expert

Oswald PADONOU
International relations and security affairs programme manager – Konrad Adenauer Foundation
Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a public policy process with an operational focus, involving the rationalisation, training, professionalisation and democratic governance of security forces. It implies a multidimensional approach to security, in which security systems are reformed by strengthening institutions and the rule of law. It therefore involves a broad spectrum of public- and private-sector, civilian and military, and national and international stakeholders. The objectives of SSR programmes are widely promoted within international and regional bodies. However, experience has shown that there are several obstacles to the implementation of security sector reforms in Africa. These obstacles are related to the lack of consideration for specific national circumstances, problems of coordination between the various parties involved, and the crucial issue of financing, given that the reforms are very costly to implement.

Security sector reform is a major prerequisite for sustainable peace in Africa, and a priority component of any conflict prevention or peace consolidation strategy. States use it as a means to evaluate and enhance the efficiency and stability of their institutions in terms of security and justice.

Approaches consisting in the assimilation of models and the importation of ideas and values—which are connected, among other things, with the temptation to obtain economic rents—are no longer adequate for the long-term monitoring of SSR in Africa, because the process is locked into project cycles independently of political variables, economic constraints and public expectations.

SSR is relevant to all states

International attention always focuses, with good reason, on vulnerable states, or states in post-crisis situations. However, all states need to adapt their national security systems to the new strategic context that has been taking shape in Africa since the end of the Cold War. This includes stable states, as well as those in a crisis or post-crisis situation seeking a return to stability. The former are striving to adapt their security systems to the level and nature of the threat, which have changed considerably. The latter must more urgently, substantially and—in some cases—completely restructure their crisis-torn security systems. The widely shared perception of SSR as a means of consolidating post-conflict peace must be extended to encompass good governance and conflict prevention. SSR is nothing other than a rejection of immobility, the status quo, and the short-term management of defence and security forces. It is a never-ending process, which must be continuously reviewed to ensure that the defence system keeps pace with changes in the threat environment.

The SSR process must be led by the state concerned

SSR processes are closely monitored, supervised and controlled by the international community. The UN claims to be the guardian of the SSR doctrine, while the African Union seeks to provide guidance and direction, notably through the SSR policy framework adopted in 2013. The EU is adapting its technical and financial strategies and instruments to SSR processes; it has, for example, made adjustments to its current missions in Africa (the EUTM and EUCAP missions, which are intended to reinforce national defence and security mechanisms). However, this commendable activism conceals a certain inflexibility in the rules governing SSR processes. This inflexibility is further increased by the unspoken but underlying principle that ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’. Where is the voice of the concerned state in all of this? While the definition of SSR varies, one particular principle is unanimously accepted: The importance of taking ownership of SSR processes, which is a prerequisite for their success. The notion of a state ‘benefiting’ from external support is no longer tenable. SSR must result from a national decision and commitment, and be based on the principle of national ownership (and even leadership). It is necessarily an endogenous process, as underlined in UN Security Council resolution 2151. External support for SSR must comply with the national policy on security and security sector reform. If such a policy has not been clearly defined, external partners may only help to support its development.
A necessarily multi-sectoral and multilateral process

Most African states are unable to bear the financial costs and provide the necessary expertise alone. SSR processes are costly, and the level of effort required is virtually unattainable for these states, especially when it is detrimental to other equally important sectors such as education, development and healthcare. Support from external partners such as the United Nations and the European Union is both necessary and justified, provided that the ‘sacred principle’ of ownership is adhered to strictly. It was with this in mind that the African Union asked its member states to allocate part of their national resources to SSR, arguing that ownership is neither viable nor realistic if the financial burden of the reform process falls exclusively on external actors and partners. There must therefore be a clear separation of roles between international partners and the countries concerned. Hence, a dialogue must be established within a relationship of trust and transparency, with the aim of creating a solid consultation framework that encourages international partners to support reforms with respect, rather than try to force them through.

The SSR process must be approached in a holistic manner. Indeed, security is a key aspect of stability in the broadest sense of the term, which comprises many other equally important aspects; for example, poverty and democratic deficits lead to violence and weaken state authority. Thus, SSR encompasses such a broad range of actions that it is almost impossible to calculate the cost of the process in advance, due to the large number of stakeholders and sectors involved.
Workshop 1
Peacekeeping: How to improve UN/EU/AU/REC provisions

Chair
Ramtane LAMAMRA
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs – Algeria

Speakers
Jaïr VAN DER LIJN
Head of the Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme, Senior Researcher - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

François Louncény FALL
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Central Africa

Mariam MAHAMAT NOUR
Member of the African Union Reform Steering Committee chaired by President Kagame
The year 2017 has seen the development of several new initiatives likely to significantly change peacekeeping strategy in line with the new international context and new threats, particularly terrorism. Africa lies at the crux of the issue: 8 of the 15 UN PKOs are in Africa. With a budget of US$8 billion for the 2016-2017 financial year, the PKOs together mobilise 44,000 African troops and police officers. To provide high-calibre human resources, African countries often need financial and technical assistance, particularly from the UN and the European Union (EU). Despite pressure from the new American administration to reduce the USA’s financial contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, regular, long-term funding is vital to consolidate peace in Africa. The United Nations has a more sophisticated peace and security partnership with the African Union (AU) than with any other regional organisation. The EU supports the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in their peacekeeping endeavours, having funded African-led operations to the amount of €2 billion since 2004, via its African Peace Facility (APF).

Redefining the remit of the AU and the RECs, in line with the essential role played by the UN and the EU

More so than any other continent, Africa continues to face arbitrary internal divisions imposed by history having a tremendous impact on populations, which are increasingly isolated from each other and from the rest of the world. It is also at the centre of peacekeeping and security efforts: The majority of peacekeeping operations are deployed in Africa, and they are large-scale, long-term operations.

Therefore, a completely fresh approach is needed to address new peacekeeping and security challenges in a sustainable and appropriate manner. Some measures, such as universal access to justice and the establishment of effective institutions at all levels, are of course essential. However, it is now imperative to clearly define the role of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union (AU) in managing conflicts and transforming peacekeeping in Africa. The question then is, what is required of African and external stakeholders, and what kind of cooperation would be the most effective. The AU Heads of State adopted an important report on this question in Kigali, in 2016. The report, which was drawn up by Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame, contained innovative and pertinent proposals and solutions to improve the distribution of tasks between the AU and the RECs. The division of tasks between the UN and the AU is also being reviewed, the main goal being to increase African engagement, including in terms of financing peace operations. This must be done without excluding the EU, an important contributor with close historical and geographical ties to Africa, which is directly concerned by insecurity factors on the continent.

Real interdependence

Sub-Saharan Africa’s ability to provide equipment and funding for defence is limited. African countries contribute very little financially to AU and UN operations in Africa. They still rely on external actors and support to maintain peace in their territories. However, at present, 67% of the troops engaged in peace operations in Africa are African, reflecting a significant step forward in recent times. Operations in the African theatre would not be possible without the material, operational and financial support of external (mainly European) actors, but neither could they be conducted without the participation of African troops. According to the experts, this interdependent relationship is likely to continue, even though new measures are being taken to even the balance and build a fairer and therefore more effective partnership.

The role of African regional organisations

There is a broad awareness now of the need to strengthen and improve UN, EU, AU and REC provisions. However, this must not overshadow the important role played by regional organisations in managing crises in Africa. For example, ECOWAS has managed some severe crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and, more recently, Gambia, and the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) has facilitated peace agreements in these countries. The RECs played an important role in initiatives such as the Arusha Peace Accords intended to end the civil war in Rwanda, and the Sun City Agreement following the Second Congo War; the UN Security Council did not approve these agreements until later.
Workshop 2
What changes are needed to the EU’s instruments to support security in Africa?

CHAIR
Comfort ERO
Crisis Group’s Africa Program Director

SPEAKERS
Brigadier General Rainer MEYER ZUM FELDE
Senior Fellow at the Institute for Security Policy, Kiel University (ISPK) and Visiting Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Koen VERVAEKE
Managing Director for Africa – European External Action Service

Cyriaque AGNEKETHOM
Director of Peacekeeping and Regional Security – ECOWAS
The fifth AU-EU Summit, which is scheduled to take place in Abidjan on 29 and 30 November 2017, aims to give ‘fresh impetus’ to the strategic partnership with Africa, which was established in 2007 and made the EU a key partner for the African continent. In view of the new security issues facing Africa, the European Union and the African Union aim to ‘reshape and deepen the Africa-EU partnership’. This partnership is equally strategic for Africa and for Europe, insofar as the threats are the same and affect security on both continents.

The European Union has supported security in Africa since it signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, by:
• conducting 19 civilian and military operations (five of which are still ongoing);
• providing funds of over €2 billion since 2004, through the African Peace Facility;
• further developing its programmes to support the fight against terrorism and radicalisation;
• providing substantial support for the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture;
• stepping up support for regional strategies;
• implementing a programme of support for security system reform.

The main purpose of such measures is to strengthen the strategic security partnership between the AU and the EU, and also to improve intervention capabilities through financial and technical support from the EU. The European Union has rationalised, reinforced and adjusted its approaches to reflect the new realities set out in the 2063 Agenda, the APSA 2016-2020 roadmap, and the Kagame and Kaberuka reports, the goal being to boost Africa’s defence and security capabilities.

Serious and ever-numerous challenges

To assess the changes needed in the European Union’s instruments to support security in Africa, it is important to understand the changes in the relationship between the EU and Africa in recent years. The impact of Brexit on Europe’s Africa policy, Germany’s growing involvement in the Sahel countries, the question of European financing and of the African Union’s financial self-sufficiency, and diverging approaches to security must all be taken into consideration.

The European Union is still one of Africa’s most important partners, both at the regional level (through ECOWAS) and continent wide (via the African Union). Since 2004, the EU has donated over €2 billion to support the AU’s activities; therefore, African countries monitor its participation with a great deal of interest. So, the theme of the Abidjan summit on 29 and 30 November—the changes needed in EU instruments to support security in Africa—is more relevant than ever.

To invest in security in Africa is to invest in security in Europe

Although the EU’s financial support is vital, it would be short-sighted to regard Europe primarily as a technical and financial partner, rather than a political stakeholder directly concerned by peace and security issues on the continent. The instruments as they stand now and as they are evolving must be analysed in light of changes within the EU and in the various parts of Africa, and the decision to use them must be politically rather than technically driven.

Moreover, one of the main problems lies in coordinating the instruments with political leadership on the European and African continents. It is also important to build on existing measures rather than needlessly disperse the resources from the EU, even if Africa hopes to gradually break away from its financial reliance on Europe.

Neither must the EU’s aid be confined to peace and security alone. Military intervention should not be the only means of action. Indeed, security and development are both essential factors, which must be given equal attention to prevent the emergence of more complex problems in the long term. Security issues should therefore be approached from a proactive rather than reactive perspective.

Furthermore, cooperation between all EU actors is vital, since they will be facing the same threats in the future if security efforts in Africa fail. The Member States must implement a detailed and coordinated action plan, leading to joint, fair, and therefore more effective action in Africa.

Lastly, political changes within the EU affect its modes of action in Africa. It is worth pointing out that Germany and France have very different relationships with Africa; consequently, Germany’s involvement takes the form of financial support for European action in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region. Because security threats in Europe are closely tied to migration crises, supporting African development is one of the best possible means of making sure that Europe stays safe.
Workshop 3
Cybersecurity and the governance of information and cyberspace

CHAIR
Moctar YEDALY
Head of the Information Society Division - The African Union Commission

SPEAKERS
Colonel François OUEDRAOGO
Head of the National Intelligence Agency – Burkina Faso

David SCHARIA
Chief of Branch, Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), Security Council – United Nations

Commissioner Augustin Mousso OCHOENI
Head of the Cybercrime Prevention Unit – Digital Information and Evidence Division – Côte d’Ivoire

Commissioner Papa GUEYE
Commissioner Papa Gueye – Head of the Special Cybersecurity Division – Senegal
Massive government investment in digital development (infrastructure, eadministration) and the surge of new uses enabled by mobile internet have opened up unprecedented development prospects for Africa. However, poorly controlled hyperconnectivity has opened the door to new and constantly changing vulnerabilities and threats. Therefore, controlling cyberspace through the introduction of cybersecurity policies is now becoming a vital component of national security strategies.

Whereas cybercriminals in Africa have previously targeted economies in the North, they are now becoming more organised and are directly attacking local economies, resulting in major financial consequences. Cybercriminal organisations are made up of highly skilled people with national qualifications, who have become frustrated by the lack of opportunities in the labour market, especially in North Africa. In addition, the proliferation of offensive tools freely available on the Internet and the Darknet is spurring an upsurge of increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks.

Despite the increase in national initiatives to prevent cybercrime in Africa, the governance of cybersecurity is still too often inadequate, and is split between national digital development agencies, telecoms regulators and national personal data protection commissions. The creation of national Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) was the first step towards developing operational cybersecurity capabilities, but has been slow to translate into concrete action.

Several African countries have signed up to the European Council’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which aims to harmonise legislation on cyber attacks, improve investigation techniques and promote cooperation between countries. However, it is not yet in operation due to delays in incorporating it into the various national bodies of law in Africa.

In 2014, the African Union also adopted a convention on cybersecurity and personal data protection (the Malabo Convention). It provides for public awareness measures and training for stakeholders, but has not yet been brought into force.

Appropriate resources for tackling new threats

The process of digitisation is sweeping across all business sectors, gathering momentum as it goes. As a result, the data collected, processed and shared using new communication technologies is becoming increasingly valuable. It is central to some major strategic issues in both the political and economic spheres. Naturally, this raises the question of how to ensure good governance and thus establish a framework in which cybersecurity can develop intelligently. Each country must develop a cohesive and global national strategy, taking into consideration the policies of their neighbours through a multilateral consultation process.

Governments must establish new and appropriate legal frameworks. Indeed, as things stand today, it is very difficult for a country to prove that it has been the victim of a cyber attack originating from another country. Hence the introduction of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). CERTs are tasked with regulating the telecommunications sector, the use of personal data, and communications between law enforcement units; they play a vital role in handling cyber threats. Nonetheless, the lack of cooperation between different entities means that information is not being shared effectively. Moreover, international cooperation instruments (Interpol, letters rogatory, etc.) need to be adapted. Therefore, legislation and resources must be harmonised to ensure a swift response to threats.

Several initiatives have been taken. The Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) has, with the collaboration of Facebook, Google, Twitter and Microsoft, developed terms of reference that enable these four major companies to remove terrorist content and share information on potentially dangerous accounts with other digital platforms. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Association of Prosecutors have introduced a programme enabling researchers and public prosecutors in various countries to improve their capacity to collect, process and share digital data. The purpose of this initiative, funded by France and the United States, is to facilitate the exchange of data between African countries.
Can cybersecurity play a key role in African development?

Can cybersecurity and new technologies be used to stimulate development on the African continent, which is lagging a long way behind in this area? The identification of people and goods is inadequate, which causes security problems. Furthermore, because African countries have fallen behind in this sector, it is all the more difficult to control cyberspace, bearing in mind that the volume of data to be processed is expanding every day. Therefore, it is vital that African countries draw up national cyber strategies, and that they plan how they are going to enter the digital society. They must find a way of translating technical speak into political speak, so that decision-makers can address the issue. It is equally important that they involve decision-makers in a ‘top-down’ approach to ICT, and that they strengthen capacities and organise research and expertise in this sector.

They must have a thorough understanding of the sector, build capacity, and develop codes specific to the African continent. Of course, this will require legislation to protect personal data, as well as national civil registration strategies to properly identify threats.

« L’homme et sa sécurité doivent constituer la première préoccupation de l’aventure technologique comme nous l’enseignait Einstein. »

Commissioner Papa GUEYE

« Il est très important que nous en tant que techniciens trouvions les moyens de traduire les langages techniques en langage politique pour que les décideurs puissent se les approprier. »

Colonel François OUEDRAOGO
SECOND HALF-DAY
Tuesday, November 14th 2017

Terrorism and violent extremism

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Terrorism and the need for integrated solutions

Conference 2
The Defence and Security continuum: an integrated approach

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Plenary 2
Terrorism and the need for integrated solutions

SPEAKERS

Mohamed DIANE
Ministre de la Défense nationale – Guinée

Jan FIGEL
Envoyé spécial de l’UE pour la promotion de la liberté de religion et de conscience dans l’action extérieure de l’UE

Mahamat Saleh ANNADIF
Représentant spécial du secrétaire Général des Nations Unies pour le Mali et chef de la MINUSMA
I will not be talking to you today about terrorism and violent extremism, which were broadly discussed at yesterday’s opening session of this fourth International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa, particularly by his Excellency Macky Sall.

Instead, I will focus on the actions and initiatives taken by my country in the context of the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad for inviting us to take part in this Forum.

Ladies and gentlemen, the theme that brings us together today is a matter of concern for us all. Besides being the theme of this Forum, terrorism and violent extremism are a daily reality for our respective governments and peoples. Therefore, it is imperative that the solutions proposed are adapted to the situation on the ground. Rich or poor, no country is spared from terrorism and violent extremism. Therefore, we are convinced that the first step is to attack the evil at its roots: Inequality, poverty and youth under-employment.

As we said recently at the CEN-SAD defence ministers’ meeting in Abidjan, only through global and integrated action can we effectively combat the violent acts of terror perpetrated by extremists. President Alpha Condé, the current Chairman of the African Union, very often says that terrorism cannot be defeated without first tackling the underlying causes that I mentioned earlier.

If we win the battle for development, if we achieve a fair distribution of the wealth we produce, then we will emerge victorious from the war that has been thrust upon us; it is now an accepted fact that, to prevent terrorist organisations from growing in numbers and strength, the conditions that enable them to thrive—and even to exist in the first place—must be stamped out.

We should therefore work on cutting off their main source of funding, in particular by combating illegal trafficking.

Security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea is intended to increase state security, and also to help prevent terrorism and violent extremism in our common space. Of course, we do not confine ourselves to prevention; we also take action where necessary. Thus, by means of bilateral cooperation agreements, Guinea has obtained the necessary support to put together three successive battalions, and has engaged almost 3,000 troops in the MINUSMA peacekeeping force in Mali (Kidal, to be more exact). These troops are our contribution to defeating terrorism and thus securing stability and consolidating peace in our sister country.
Ladies and gentlemen,

To wipe out terrorism and violent extremism for good, Guinea concluded that a specific legislative framework was required. Hence, a bill relative to the prevention and repression of these two evils was drafted and presented to Parliament for adoption. The bill covers every aspect of terrorism. To prevent religious extremism, the General Secretariat of Religious Affairs has, to date, trained 500 imams and religious preachers in the context of cooperation with Morocco. The General Secretariat of Religious Affairs is tasked with identifying and monitoring religious organisations operating in Guinea, particularly in regard to the construction of mosques and schools, and the provision of health care services on the ground. So it is taking steps to monitor the messages preached and the sermons delivered at all religious gatherings, while organising public communication, information and awareness campaigns on terrorism and violent extremism.

Guinea’s government is also working on building defence and security capacity in intervention units and the intelligence services, prior to setting up special units within the police, the gendarmerie and the army, capable of responding rapidly to events all over the country, with the support of our partners.

For efficiency reasons, the Guinean government has decided to align its counter-terrorism strategy with that of the sub-region. Therefore, we have also followed the example of Senegal and trained thousands of young people through the department for development action, with the aim of making them less vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.

We are also installing scanners at some border crossings. We have done all of this despite the devastating consequences of the two-year Ebola epidemic and despite the inadequacy of our resources, as we believe that rhetoric is no longer enough. It’s time to take action. We are fully aware that the battle will be long and hard, considering what is at stake. But I strongly believe that we can overcome these threats.

We must face up to our responsibilities if we are to rid the world of this modern-day scourge.

Thank you.
Thank you for being here together and for the opportunities and the honor to speak to you today, as the first special European Union special envoy on promotion of freedom of religion and believe outside of the European Union.

In my speech, I will address three issues: EU approach to resilience, EU approach to counter-radicalization and the third one is about Freedom of Religion or Belief and interreligious dialogue.

This year in June, the EU presented a new strategy for more resilient states and societies around the world, promoting a more structural and long-term approach to vulnerabilities, with the aim to prevent them to turn into crisis.

It is based on the EU global strategy, which speaks of resilience as «broad concept encompassing all individuals and the whole of society» that features «democracy, trust in institutions, sustainable development, and the capacity to reform». Support to resilience at all levels is also an integral part of the new European Consensus on Development.

The European Union's unique contribution to stability in the Sahel region is a good example of this resilience approach: European humanitarian aid helps to manage the immediate crisis of displaced people, while our development cooperation tackles the longer-term root causes of poverty, by supporting complementary actions for job creation, access to education, governance, health and climate mitigation.

In addition, the EU is a security provider to the region. The EU supports the G5 Sahel Joint force, with the aim to fight terrorism and enhance cross-border cooperation. All of these actions support the resilience of the region.

Identifying and building upon existing positive sources of resilience is as important as tracking and responding to vulnerabilities. Such factors may take the form of institutionalised or informal democratic and good governance or justice systems, non-state institutions and organisations, embedded cultural norms and practices or ad hoc community-driven solutions that complement state capacities or compensate for their absence. Ladies and gentlemen, Resilience has to be addressed at multiple levels – state, society and community. This is an important aspect in the context of the specific challenge of strengthening the resilience of societies against terrorism and violent extremism.

Secondly, our approach to counter radicalisation. As we all know, radicalisation is the first step potentially to violent extremism – but there is no automaticity. Addressing the causes of radicalisation and terrorist recruitment is a key priority for the EU. The pull and push factors that determine the drivers of radicalisation classically can be structural, individual and enabling factors; they are on the one hand almost everywhere identical, but at the same time also much depend on specific local circumstances. Radicalisation happens locally but concerns whole societies and leaves roles and responsibilities for each, also governments.

The EU’s counter-radicalisation strategy was updated in 2016 and now lists the following measures requiring action: first, still the need to understand; second, the need to bring justice and security to all. The third, the need for voices of mainstream and common values to prevail; the fourth, the need for governments to enhance their communications; the fifth, the support to counter narratives. Sixth, engagement with front line professionals such as teachers, psychologists etc. Seventh, the building of resilience; eight the countering of online radicalisation and ninth, reinforced rehabilitation and disengagement programmes.
This strategy is firmly rooted in the UN framework and standards set, notably the UN Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Action Plan to which we actively contributed and that the EU fully subscribes to and seeks to implement. The EU also gets inspiration of the work it does within the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) that has adopted an important document, the ‘Lifecycle of Radicalisation’ Toolkit with 9 best practice documents for each of the three phases of radicalisation: prevention; detection/identification, rehabilitation/reintegration as well as cross cutting aspects.

In its conclusions of 19 June 2017 on EU External Action on Counter-Terrorism, the European Council recalled that «The EU is particularly well positioned to counter terrorism and violent extremism in a unique and integrated manner with the extensive set of instruments at its disposal. These instruments allow the EU to address the root causes of radicalization, to support social and economic development, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights.»

The EU mainstreams CVE into assistance programmes. Priority countries at present are the MENA region and the Arab world, but we also very actively engaged in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region. Main efforts consist in raising awareness of counter radicalisation, empower youth and women and provide training and mentoring where needed.

The EU is also part of a small group called ‘Donor community of Practitioners on Development and PVE’ led by Denmark and the United States that seeks to identify best practice in external assistance to resilience.

In the conclusions of 19 June, the Council of 28 EU countries also called «for increased engagement in the field of P/ Preventing Violent Extremism, including at the global level.» and for particular focus to be placed on the role of women, youth, civil society, victims of terrorism, and religious and community leaders as change agents in society.

Investment in prevention is key and most urgent; involvement of front line practitioners too. The use of credible voices has proven very efficient; and only a multi-agency and whole society approach bring tangible results.

The third point a want to speak about is Freedom of Religion inter-religious dialogue.

The last united nations general assembly resolution on freedom of religion and believe, in addition to maintaining the updates of previous years, explicitly refers to the importance of a comprehensive and inclusive community-based preventive approach, to fight against acts of terrorisms.

An inclusive and participative approach to resilience against terrorism and violent extremism necessarily includes religious leaders, as these influential agents of change in their communities are best placed to counter religious justifications for violent extremism. In many times, these leaders have great authority and even longer mandate than many political leaders, and they can make a difference.

The EU supports initiatives in the field of intercultural and inter-religious dialogue in the spirit of openness, engagement, and mutual understanding, including in the framework of UNESCO, the UN Alliance of Civilisations, the Anna Lindh Foundation, and the Istanbul process.
Inter-religious dialogue to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and build mutual trust goes hand in hand with the protection and promotion of Freedom of Religion or Belief. EU is determinate to promote, in its external human rights policy, freedom of religion or belief as a right to be exercised by everyone everywhere, based on the principles of equality, non-discrimination and universality. The limitations to FORB are in accordance with international standards and must be strictly interpreted. Limitations for other reasons, such as national security, are not permitted.

The most specific EU financial tool with an explicit commitment to promote FoRB is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The EIDHR now covers FoRB-related activities in all regions of the world with around 40 FoRB related projects, accounting for more than 15.000.000 euros. Moreover, the 2017 global call for proposals will also address freedom of religion and belief, including the promotion of dialogue, and emphasising the role of religious and other leaders in these processes.

The EU is strongly committed to continue to engage with international organisations in this area. Examples of cooperation are the Marrakesh Declaration of January 2016, which was a significant development in taking forward the principle of affirming the rights of religious minorities in Muslim countries and the Rabat Action Plan.

The EU believes that Freedom of religion or belief is fundamental Human Rights, which needs to be upheld for all and everywhere. This fundamental rights is so important because it is about human dignity which is at the core of the human rights agenda. Freedom of religion or belief is more important for societies and for good governance than for religions. History shows that religion always survive even in totalitarian regimes while societies suffer from divisions and persecutions. Peaceful and cohesive societies require this fundamental freedom to thrive.
Dear friends and delegates,

Terrorism, at least beyond the specific problems facing Africa, is a reality and a challenge all over the world. Everyone agrees that it requires a global response.

Unlike my two predecessors, the first of whom spoke on behalf of the European Union and the second on behalf of his country, I am going to speak on my own behalf.

I remember about ten years ago, we were trying to define terrorism. I myself took part in several meetings within the African Union and other organisations.

Today I’m in Mali, grappling with terrorism every day; and regardless of how we define it, it has become a fact of life not just in Africa but in other regions as well.

I am one of those people who believes that we cannot really resolve terrorism until we have understood its true causes. I’m afraid that the remedies we are using right now may be no more than ‘sedatives’, solutions dictated exclusively by the balance of power. But the problem itself is likely to continue.

Some of the real causes of terrorism have been identified and are well-known—poverty, underdevelopment and injustice have been mentioned—but are we really implementing the right responses? I have to say I’m not sure. In my view, prevention is extremely important, and the fight must go on.

I see radicalisation at work every day in Mali. It is affecting more and more young people. They are leaving the country to join terrorist groups, and you have to ask yourself why?

In Europe and the West, the problem is often linked with radical online content, which causes young people to change overnight. In any case, the danger is real.

I hope that our talks will yield some solutions, not just theoretical but based on our everyday reality. I am happy to consider any solution or idea that would help us to move forward, as it is extremely important to see and understand this evil in all its dimensions.

We have to go further than we did in the 2000s, when we sought to establish who was a terrorist and who wasn’t. At present, daily events have completely outpaced this tired old debate.

Thank you.
Conference 2
The Defence and Security continuum: an integrated approach

CHAIR
General Jean-Paul PALOMEROS
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, CEIS expert

SPEAKERS
General Cheikh GUEYE
Chief of the Defence Staff – Senegal

General Grégoire de SAINT QUENTIN
Deputy Chief of Operations – France

Major General Meissa NIANG
Head of the Gendarmerie and Director of Military Justice – Senegal
Whereas defence and security coordination used to be reserved for exceptional circumstances (states of emergency or special missions), the defence and security continuum is a matter of course in today’s world. Security challenges such as terrorism, piracy and large-scale trafficking call for hybrid solutions involving both the military and internal security forces.

Coordination between internal security forces and the armed forces should be organised around their respective specialisations, and their actions should be managed at the highest level. A specially dedicated structure combining both the military and internal security forces would ensure coordination and cooperation in the interests of efficiency.

Lastly, the security-defence continuum must be established at regional level. The enemy is transnational by nature, so the response must basically be regional too. Operational coordination is felt to be essential.

Establishing a defence-security continuum to protect the national territory

In the past, the separation of defence and security forces was regarded as a foundation of the rule of law. Today, civilians, military and paramilitary forces are targeted indiscriminately; terrorists and criminals act within a transnational framework, often undermining the actions of the regular armed forces. In fact, neither the defence nor the security forces are capable of adequately protecting civilians and state interests on their own. That is why they must work together. The principle of continuity between security and defence is now a structural feature of public policies in French-speaking states.

The complex, changing and dangerous nature of threats such as terrorism and piracy has driven several countries to rethink and reconcile their security and defence strategies.

However, there is nothing new about coordinating defence and security. The gendarmerie is the very embodiment of the defence-security continuum, as it is a military force charged with conducting internal security missions.

Complementarity does not mean competition

In the fight against terrorism, no-one can claim to have exclusive control of defence. Concerted and integrated action is required, but individual responsibilities must be clear.

While the chief task of the armed forces is to protect the integrity of the national territory, the evolving threat environment now requires them to protect civilians and institutions too. And while internal security is above all the responsibility of the police, the armed forces have the capacity to take decisive action against a broad spectrum of threats in support of and in addition to the action taken by law enforcement officers, if the threat has a military dimension – for example, armed terrorists or insurgents undermining the integrity of the state.

The defence-security continuum raises several challenges. Firstly, difficulties may arise due to each actor using different working methods and tools, and to the absence of a common understanding between actors engaged in joint action on the ground. From an operational perspective, the lack of a common procedure can be a significant challenge, even though the legal framework is often clearly defined. There is another constraint connected with conducting operations on the national territory, i.e. among members of the public. In this context, the use of force is problematic as it could endanger civilians. Special emphasis must therefore be placed on crisis communication and the management of sensitive information, given the involvement of civilian populations.

To be effective, military intervention must be integrated upstream and at the highest level into the overall internal security strategy. This degree of synergy can only be achieved through permanent management and coordination mechanisms.
Preserving the original mandate of the armed forces

The need to preserve forces for external interventions—in terms of troop numbers, operational readiness and operationalisation—must always be borne in mind. The armed forces must have the capacity for rapid deployment in external environments.

The impact of internal engagements on the capacity of the armed forces must not be ignored, since a sustained and long-term engagement at home can disrupt the activity cycle and have a negative effect on the operational readiness of units. To make progress, we need to strike the right balance between internal defence and external intervention.

« Dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, personne ne peut dire qu’il a le monopole de la défense. Il faut des actions concertées et intégrées pour lutter efficacement. Il faudra travailler ensemble en gardant à l’esprit la distinction des responsabilités. »

General Grégoire DE SAINT QUENTIN
Intelligence as the basis of collaboration

Lastly, regarding the practical implementation of the continuum, the first priority is collaboration through intelligence. Information must be collated by a physical entity, and transmitted in real time for greater efficiency. Any military action within national territories must be based on reliable information. The data transmission system must therefore be highly coordinated and secure.

« L’usage de la force devient délicat car elle est susceptible d’être utilisée à l’encontre des populations (...) Dans un tel environnement, la maîtrise de la violence devient un enjeu important et impose des conditions restrictives à l’utilisation de la force pouvant impacter l’efficience de l’intervention. »

Major General Cheikh GUEYE
Workshop 4
Resilience and constitutional state against terrorism and violent extremism

CHAIR
Mohamed EL HACEN LEBATT
Principal Strategic Advisor to the President of the African Union Commission

SPEAKERS
Florent GEEL
Director of the Africa Desk - FIDH

Michelle NDIAYE
Director of the Africa Peace and Security Programme developed by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University, and Head of Secretariat for the Tana Forum on Peace and Security in Africa

Bacre Waly NDIAYE
Lawyer, UN Special Rapporteur

Jean-Daniel BIELER
Former ambassador; Human Security Division special advisor - Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
The last ten years or so have seen a significant surge in violent extremism and terrorism in Africa, testing the resilience of states. It is estimated that terrorist groups are responsible for almost half of the atrocities committed against civilian populations. Of course, the states’ first response to these atrocities is to step up security. However, highly repressive actions that breach both human rights and international law can be counter-productive. Authoritarian excesses by national armed forces increase anti-state sentiment in areas where local conflicts combine with under-development. This anti-state sentiment provides fertile ground for violent extremist ideology, and allows terrorist organisations to present themselves as an alternative and a means of protection against a state that is perceived as a source of danger.

On the other hand, promoting and strengthening the rule of law is consistent with a long-term strategy to improve the resilience of the state, and to increase its legitimacy and its control over the country; consequently, it is an essential means of combating terrorism more effectively.

Enforcing the rule of law and building resilience to terrorism and violent extremism are familiar subjects. It is widely agreed that there are two possible responses to these phenomena. A security response, in that states must be sufficiently well armed, both literally and figuratively, to deal with a threat that defies the world’s biggest powers. The security response consists in identifying and destroying the enemy through anticipatory and preventive measures, and preventing it from having safe havens or support bases on different continents and from partnering with other violent organisations. However, many believe that this type of response is no longer sufficient.

A second, political response is required, based on an economic system which is inclusive, participatory, fair, and morally and ethically acceptable, and is designed to erode the conditions in which terrorism thrives.

The dangers of placing too much emphasis on security

The positioning of defence and security forces is crucial. On the one hand, their mission is to combat terrorist forces. On the other hand, they must not in any way contribute to the development of terrorism. To address these threats, national authorities have adopted a number of oppressive laws which, driven by a surge of national assertiveness, grant greater freedom of action to governments in the interests of efficiency. It must be stressed that these political measures—which include extrajudicial killings by drone and the torturing of prisoners—are counter-productive, as they are creating a new generation of terrorists. It is a radical approach to dealing with terrorism, which is producing harmful results. Indeed, it is very tempting to resort to violence when tackling terrorism. However, victimisation offers fertile ground for terrorism and, rather than curbing it, may contribute to its development. The growing militarisation of the fight against violent extremism—through the involvement of states, proxy fighters and militia—is creating increasingly violent societies and areas, and thus exacerbating the problem. The strategy of armed terrorist organisations is to topple states in order to take their place.

We must balance the urgency of stopping them (with all the attendant consequences) against the necessity of tackling the root causes of terrorism over the long term.

Resilience, a positive and dynamic virtue

Building resilience is very often regarded as a form of ‘palliative care’, a battery of measures to make up for the lack of an effective security response, once all other options have been exhausted. Now, the resolutely positive concept of resilience is the direct counterpart of the rule of law. The resilience of a state is something that is built, evolves and becomes stronger over time. Because it is dynamic, it may be difficult to put into place. Indeed, the principles of prevention are difficult to enforce when combating terrorism and violent extremism, and, more broadly speaking, when dealing with violent conflict. They are confronted with unique and complex local circumstances, and with the urgency of violent situations where the temptation to resort to exclusively security-based responses is great. Strategies to combat terrorism and violent extremism rarely address how to promote the rule of law and protect human rights, even though these are crucial questions. Indeed, terrorist organisations are opposed to the state and are intent on destroying it, but promoting the rule of law strengthens and legitimises it. A state that wishes to maintain law and order and ward off those who aim to destroy it cannot act like a terrorist organisation itself. Therefore, careful consideration must be given to the judicial system, which must be fair and stand up to impunity. Resilience strengthens states, while terrorism feeds on their weaknesses. Therefore, establishing a resilient rule of law is the first answer to terrorism.
Acting at local level first

Above all, building resilience means openly addressing the causes, conditions, development, consequences, and internal and external links of violent extremism. It also means trying to understand how violent extremists perceive their environment and their relations with local populations, and how their message may feel refreshing and hopeful to some individuals, and offer a vision of the future, with the ultimate goal being to single them out.

The first victims of terrorism are not states; they are people. States derive their legitimacy from the people they represent, and to whom they are accountable. They must therefore pay greater attention to local communities. The latter are not only a potential source of support, but they can also spearhead the fight against terrorism. Terrorist organisations may attack communities, but they also provide them with business, medical and even legal services. It is therefore vital to eradicate the social, political and economic causes of marginalisation, which push the most vulnerable communities, especially the youth, into the arms of terrorist organisations. Furthermore, the public must not regard security and defence forces as enemies. The latter are often feared and looked upon as a factor of violence; this drives people, out of desperation, to seek protection from armed terrorist groups and extremists, who then take advantage of their protective role.
Workshop 5
The fight against terrorist financing

CHAIR
Mahamat Saleh ANNADIF
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Mali and Head of MINUSMA

SPEAKERS
Pierre LAPAQUE
Regional Representative for West and Central Africa - UNODC

Abdou CHEFOU
Head of the anti-terrorist investigation and organised cross-border crime division - General Directorate of the National Police of Niger

Docteur Tafsir HANE
Research fellow
Workshop 5
The fight against terrorist financing

The adoption on 17 December 2015 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2253, which contains measures to suppress the financing of terrorist groups, is an important strategic aspect of the fight against terrorism. It was introduced in an effort to cut off the numerous financing channels of terrorist groups.

While terrorist groups derive some of their financial resources from funds transfers, they are also known to be involved in the trafficking of drugs such as cannabis, cocaine and psychotropic substances, either directly or at least by protecting the traffickers. Organisations connected with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are among the wealthiest, and drug money accounts for a substantial proportion of their resources according to UNODC (annual report 2017); however, we do not, at this stage, have sufficiently detailed information on this illicit revenue.

For their part, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) are working together to identify the methods used by terrorists to collect, move and use funds. The exchange of financial information at the sub-regional level is therefore an important counter-terrorism tool. At the same time, the harmonisation and reinforcement of legal frameworks would align with new transnational trends.

Analysing sources of financing
The multiform and even changing nature of terrorist financing is one of the main difficulties encountered. There are many sources of terrorist financing and any attempt to put a figure on it is, more often than not, based on speculation. Hence the necessity of tracking financial flows, locating their sources, and integrating national, regional and international approaches and strategies in the interests of efficiency.

We must also define exactly what is meant by ‘terrorist financing’. Who and what is being financed? Terrorist fighters have strong links with organised crime, notably through the trafficking of arms and people. For example, it has been proven that organised crime groups pay AQIM to protect their goods traffickers in the Sahel region. Furthermore, armed terrorist organisations willingly engage in the region’s drug trade. This permeability between terrorism and crime makes it extremely difficult to track terrorist financing. There are other forms of financing as well. Micro-financing—through legally obtained funds (donations, remuneration, sales proceeds, etc.), ‘revolutionary tax’ (which terrorist organisations collect by force from local inhabitants) and misappropriation (armed robberies, counterfeiting, ransoms, etc.)—is an important source of financial support.

An appropriate response to an ever-changing phenomenon
One of the main problems in tackling terrorist financing is the lack of effective institutions. Consequently, attention is too often focused on the terrorist act itself. We need to adopt an approach based on risks and prevention, and on reducing the terrorists’ means of action. Moreover, it is important to combine counter-terrorism intelligence with financial intelligence in order to increase the capacity of the authorities to combat terrorist financing networks. The creation of a ‘legal basis for the spontaneous exchange of information’ is a necessity, as it would facilitate communication between different organisations, such as intelligence services and criminal prosecution authorities. It is also worth pointing out that the share of the informal sector in African economies is still very large, which makes it hard to get hold of financial information.

Lastly, because terrorist organisations are constantly evolving, new and more effective solutions are needed. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has already made several recommendations, such as ratifying and implementing the United Nations’ instruments, incriminating terrorist financing and money laundering in terrorist activities, or ensuring that countries in the region report suspicious, terrorism-linked transactions to each other. The Egmont Group—an informal international network of intelligence units aiming to improve cooperation against money laundering and terrorist financing—supports the proposals put forward by the FATF, and also proposes to promote the creation of financial intelligence units which all comply with the same international standards and have the same operational approach. An integrated and multilateral approach is therefore vital to combat terrorist financing.
Workshop 6
Maritime security and safety in Africa: International challenges

CHAIR
Commander Cyrille-Serge ATONFACK GUEMO
Maritime security/safety expert, technical advisor
to the Ministry of Defence – Cameroon

SPEAKERS
Mathurin HOUNGNIKPO
Strategy and security advisor -
National Security Council of Côte d’Ivoire

Admiral Hervé DENYS DE BONNAVENTURE
Deputy Director of International Relations and Strategy –
Ministry of the Armed Forces – France

Barthelemy BLEDE
International maritime safety and security consultant
 Workshop 6
Maritime security and safety in Africa: International challenges

Maritime insecurity is depriving African countries of revenue that is crucial to their development, and is affecting the safety of African people as a whole. Trade and business activities such as fishing and offshore hydrocarbon extraction are being disrupted by illegal fishing and piracy, while the development of trafficking is destabilising local socio-political systems. Overfishing and pollution are causing serious food crises. The trafficking of arms, human beings, drugs and medication is fuelling the development of Mafia-like networks. These issues, which affect coastal countries in particular, have more or less direct repercussions for the entire continent, as maritime insecurity is disrupting supply chains to hinterland countries.

In January 2009, coastal states in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea regions adopted the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which aims to promote international cooperation in repressing piracy and supporting piracy victims. At the Yaoundé Summit in June 2013, the leaders of the ECOWAS and ECCAS member states adopted a similar code of conduct. However, a shortage of resources has delayed the introduction of the code of conduct, and the operationalisation of the Yaoundé architecture.

Finally, special attention may also be accorded to port facilities, which — while they provide gateways to the wider continent and generate substantial wealth — are also a source of risk. They are crucial points of contact between sea and hinterland, and generate a significant proportion of government resources. They crystallize many security issues such as trafficking, and illegal immigration and human trafficking networks. They are also vulnerable to terrorist attacks and to industrial security threats.

African resilience to maritime insecurity

The 2000s saw a resurgence of maritime insecurity along the coasts of Africa. To counter this threat, the African states joined forces to adopt various principles of proactive law, with the help of their European allies. Thus, in 2013, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct on the repression of illicit maritime activity in the Gulf of Guinea was adopted; it would result in a maritime security structure encompassing 25 ECCAS and ECOWAS member states. Previously, in 2009, the Djibouti Code of Conduct was adopted to repress piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Gulf of Aden. At the same time, the African Union was pursuing two paths: the first led to the adoption of a maritime strategy in 2012, with a focus on security and economic development. Four years later, in 2016, the Lomé Summit would address maritime security and safety issues, as well as development in Africa. These initiatives reflect the African continent's commitment to resolve security problems; however, their implementation is being delayed by a lack of funding and of strong political will.

This gives rise to a number of questions: How can international trade development be promoted and secured within the maritime space? How can the overall fight against maritime insecurity be made more effective, beyond just the issue of piracy? How can the role of international partners in the maritime security policies of coastal states be increased?

Maritime safety is dependent on the environmental context

In East Africa, the depletion of fishery resources and the deteriorating working conditions of fishermen have forced the latter to seek alternative income sources. Naturally, they have turned to piracy. This has had repercussions not only locally but globally as well, since military measures have been taken to stabilise the trade route between Asia and Europe.

Other studies have shown that the Gulf of Guinea is one of the most polluted gulfs in the world, and that 30% of the fishing activities carried out in the region are illegal. Over the next 40 years, the gulf’s maritime resources will decrease substantially, while its population will double. These future problems can only be prevented by enhancing the ability of neighbouring states to intervene on the high seas to protect the marine environment and resources. The only way of achieving this dual objective is to promote information sharing between coastal states, and increase intelligence capacity. At the national level, cross-ministry cooperation is vital. Unless navies and customs services work together, no progress can be made on these issues.
Landlocked countries are affected by maritime security problems

It is important to sensitise landlocked countries to these problems. Lakes, rivers and all inland waters also need to be monitored and secured. The difficulties encountered at sea are the same as those that affect rivers, be it in terms of pollution, insecurity or even transport.

It is also important to highlight the interdependent relationship between hinterland countries and countries that do not have any coastal areas. Moreover, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) is applicable to all states. Furthermore, insecurity in countries of transit has an immediate effect on hinterland countries. For example, in recent years, Côte d’Ivoire has experienced difficulties with Burkina Faso and Mali, which ship their merchandise through the port of Abidjan.

« Il faut agir bien sûr sur la capacité des États riverains à intervenir en haute mer pour protéger leur espace et en même temps il faut s’assurer que la protection de l’environnement s’améliore pour préserver les ressources halieutiques. »

Admiral DENYS DE BONNAVENTURE
THIRD HALF-DAY
Tuesday, November 14th 2017

Africa and new Security Issues

Plenary 3
New security challenges facing Africa

Conference 3
Protecting businesses: what public-private partnerships are needed?

Workshop 7
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Plenary 3

New security challenges facing Africa

SPEAKERS

Jean-Yves LE DRIAN
Ministre de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères – France

Moctar OUANE
Délégué général à la paix et à la sécurité, UEMOA

Jacobus Kamfer CILLIERS
Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
Je voudrais tout d’abord remercier les organisateurs d’avoir bien voulu me donner un temps de parole dans ce quatrième forum paix et sécurité. C’est pour moi une émotion de vous retrouver ici, puisque j’étais présent dès la première édition, à la suite des engagements du sommet Afrique-France de décembre 2013. Je vous rappelle que sur l’initiative du président Macky Sall, il avait été convenu d’organiser ce forum en Afrique. Nous avons fait en sorte qu’il ait lieu et qu’il reflète une grande densité que l’on a retrouvée au fur et à mesure des différentes éditions.

Je voudrais saluer tout particulièrement le CEIS qui est le bras armé de l’organisation, et le Centre des Hautes Études de Défense et de Sécurité du Sénégal, qui sont les partenaires de ce forum.

Et puis, je voudrais vous rappeler quel était le point de départ : faire en sorte que ce forum ait une double vocation. D’abord, aboutir à ce qu’il y ait un creuset de réflexion, en Afrique, pour définir collectivement une pensée stratégique sur la sécurité et la paix en Afrique. C’est ce à quoi vous avez contribué au cours des forums précédents et c’est ce à quoi vous avez contribué singulièrement depuis le début de cette quatrième édition.

Et puis l’autre objectif – mais les deux objectifs sont liés – c’était de faire en sorte qu’il y ait l’apparition d’une culture de la sécurité commune au niveau africain. Que ce ne soit pas uniquement réservé aux chefs d’État lorsqu’ils se rencontrent, et que ce soit partagé à la fois par les politiques, les militaires, les industriels et la société civile.

Je crois que les deux buts sont atteints, même s’il va falloir poursuivre l’effort.

Cette année, cette rencontre prend une tournure particulière puisque nous allons avoir dans quelques jours à Abidjan le sommet entre l’Union africaine et l’Union européenne. Ce sera un événement, d’autant plus que pour la première fois, il y aura une déclaration d’intention, une sorte de feuille de route, liée à la paix et à la sécurité en Afrique, si bien que nous nous acheminons – et ce forum y aura sans doute servi à sa manière – vers un cadre de coopération tripartite entre l’Union africaine, l’Union européenne et les Nations Unies, puisque le Secrétaire général assistera à cette rencontre à Abidjan. Ce qui montre les ambitions que nous avons collectivement et aussi l’enjeu sécuritaire qui est majeur pour le continent.

Il y a effectivement une urgence qui s’impose. Le rapport Kaberuka, qui a été exposé hier par le président KAGAMÉ, est le signe de cette prise de conscience. Il est le signe de la volonté africaine qu’à partir du moment où les pays africains s’engagent à prendre part – y compris financièrement – pour permettre aux opérations de paix africaines de gagner en capacité d’action et de répondre plus rapidement et plus efficacement aux crises régionales, alors il importerait que l’ensemble de la communauté internationale soit au rendez-vous. C’est en tout cas le message important que je tenais à faire passer, et qui est la base de ce partenariat à trois, de ce triptyque qui s’affirmera à Abidjan.

Je me souviens de la première édition, où il était dit que dans les opérations de maintien de la paix, il y a un déploiement important des forces des Nations Unies, parmi lesquelles des contributions africaines significatives, mais que si l’on donnait aux Africains les moyens d’agir, ils le ferait sans doute mieux, sans doute plus efficacement, sans doute plus utilement. J’ai entendu ce discours de rénovation des dispositifs, de disponibilité des États africains pour agir. Il apparaît que le rapport Kaberuka va aussi dans ce sens. Moi, je serais tenté de dire, et c’est mon message central aujourd’hui : chiche ! Faisons-le. Faisons en sorte que la mobilisation africaine conduise à des opérations de maintien de la paix plus performantes, à un dynamisme plus fort et à de meilleurs résultats. Il y a une forme de disponibilité à cet égard.
Pour reprendre ce que disait ma collègue Florence Parly hier, il y a une opportunité, une sorte de laboratoire, d’opération pilote qui est disponible et qui concerne la force conjointe du G5 Sahel. Voilà un événement tout à fait nouveau. D’abord parce que cette force conjointe est le résultat d’une volonté affirmée des chefs d’État concernés, ils l’ont dit à plusieurs reprises, ensuite parce qu’elle dispose d’un mandat de l’Union africaine, endossé par le conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine, avec la volonté de lutter contre les groupes terroristes et les trafics dans le Sahel, en commençant par sécuriser les frontières ; et ensuite parce que le Conseil de sécurité a aussi donné son aval. J’ai eu l’occasion, il y a quelques jours de présider le Conseil de sécurité sur ce thème, et j’ai constaté un soutien politique réel et fort. Donc, tentons l’expérience et faisons ensemble la démonstration. Cela suppose, je l’ai bien entendu, qu’il y ait les moyens financiers nécessaires pour accompagner cette démarche novatrice, ce sera l’objet de la conférence de soutien du 14 décembre à Bruxelles. Mais déjà, des contributeurs – je pense à l’Union européenne – se sont identifiés et se sont signalés pour faire réussir l’opération. Et s’il s’agissait, finalement, d’un prolongement concret de nos réflexions engagées depuis la première rencontre ici en 2014, ce serait un aboutissement. Je le dis parce que, pour sa part, la France accorde à cette démarche une importance majeure et que, sans doute, cela peut contribuer à une rénovation des actions d’opérations africaines de paix sur l’ensemble du continent.

Bien évidemment, la paix et la sécurité ne se limitent pas au modèle d’intervention militaire. Même si la prise en compte par les Africains eux-mêmes de la sécurité des Africains est une avancée considérable – et ce saut qualitatif mérite une attention toute particulière – il n’empêche qu’il faut intégrer tout cela dans une stratégie globale. D’abord au niveau militaire et paramilitaire, il faut aussi s’attacher à un certain nombre de causes, et faire en sorte qu’il y ait les moyens de garantir un espace nouveau dans le rapport de force qui concerne l’espace numérique, et de faire en sorte que la cyber-sécurité soit prise en compte à bras-le-corps par les autorités africaines.

C’est sans doute un sujet que l’on n’aurait pas abordé de la même manière il y a quatre ans, il est maintenant d’actualité, et nous souhaitons que cet enjeu figure parmi les priorités du futur au niveau de l’Union africaine et de la prise de conscience de cette nécessité. C’est un espace sur lequel la souveraineté étatique doit pouvoir s’exercer, on le voit en Afrique comme ailleurs, lorsque la capacité des États à protéger leurs citoyens est vacante, lorsqu’il y a un vide laissé par les institutions, lorsque les capacités de protection sont insuffisantes, c’est à ce moment-là que les entreprises criminelles et terroristes pénètrent les espaces, et l’espace numérique est majeur.

C’est le deuxième message que je voulais vous passer aujourd’hui : la France, dans cet état d’esprit de l’urgence de la cybersécurité, souhaite installer une école nationale à vocation régionale dans le domaine de la cybersécurité ici à Dakar. Et je voudrais que cela se fasse dans les plus brefs délais. J’ai eu l’occasion de m’en entretenir avec le président Macky Sall hier soir. Il s’agit d’un projet innovant, en vue de renforcer les capacités de nos partenaires africains dans la réponse aux menaces cyber, que ce soit la protection des réseaux, la réponse aux cyber-attaques, mais aussi la lutte contre la cyber-criminalité et le terrorisme, qui sont des menaces tout à fait réelles qui ne sont pas limitées au monde européen ou au monde américain. On voit bien l’enjeu que cela représente, ici, pour Afrique. Nous allons mettre cela en œuvre avec une dimension africaine affirmée, à partir du Sénégal. Cette mission va être diligentée très rapidement, et j’espère que lors du prochain forum, nous ferons le constat du caractère opératoire de cette école.
Il faut une réponse globale, je l’ai dit, ce qui signifie aussi que la sécurité maritime doit être prise en compte singulièrement pour lutter contre les trafics, notamment de drogue, mais aussi ceux liés aux richesses africaines qui peuvent s’évaporer par ce biais. J’ai assisté au sommet de Lomé il y a peu de temps. La prise de conscience africaine est très forte, il s’agit maintenant de la mettre en œuvre et de vérifier, mois après mois, la bonne clarification des enjeux et surtout la bonne complémentarité des outils, c’est sans doute cela le plus délicat, faire en sorte que quel que soit le lieu maritime où les initiatives sont prises, il y ait une bonne synergie avec l’ensemble des postes qui ont été affectés à cela, singulièrement dans le golfe de Guinée.

Enfin, cela suppose aussi de faire en sorte que les capacités de développement soient prises en compte, car l’intervention militaire n’a pas de sens si parallèlement on ne s’attache pas aux causes. C’est pourquoi le président Macron a lancé le concept d’Alliance pour le Sahel qui doit être concomitant avec la mise en œuvre de la force conjointe pour faire des propositions d’actions dont les retours doivent être beaucoup plus rapides que les actions de développement classiques. Pour, également, que l’ensemble des contributeurs – qui seront aussi mobilisés le 14 décembre à Bruxelles lors de cette réunion de planification – puisse agir ensemble et avoir des temps de retour identifiés et accélérés, à la fois dans le domaine de la formation mais aussi dans tous les domaines de développement qui sont aujourd’hui possibles en Afrique, singulièrement dans l’Afrique sahélienne. Cela concerne les cinq pays dits du G5 Sahel, cela concerne aussi, pour partie, le Sénégal, puisque le pays a une partie sahélienne non négligeable et qu’il n’est pas imaginable qu’il soit exclu de l’Alliance pour le Sahel, il s’agit d’un partenariat globalement sahélien. Nous allons le mettre en œuvre et l’affirmer avec beaucoup de force lors du sommet d’Abidjan dans quelques jours.

Enfin, dernier message en ce qui me concerne, une réponse globale pour la paix et la sécurité signifie aussi réponse globale à l’urgence climatique. Je suis allé ce matin à Saint-Louis, j’ai pu constater les enjeux, les crises, la gravité de la situation si le réchauffement climatique se poursuit de cette manière, certaines villes peuvent disparaître. L’action collective qui a été décidée par les Accords de Paris doit se poursuivre avec détermination, ce sera le cas lors du sommet de Paris du 12 décembre prochain, qui sera amené à vérifier la mise en œuvre des Accords de Paris avec des exemples concrets, et ce sera aussi l’occasion d’affirmer la force que peut représenter l’Afrique dans ce défi que constitue la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique. Lors des Accords de Paris, il a été convenu que la force et la capacité que peuvent développer les territoires africains dans le développement des énergies renouvelables en particulier, doit être une priorité pour l’Afrique. Il a été décidé de mettre en œuvre l’initiative africaine pour les énergies renouvelables, c’est un enjeu essentiel. Cet outil existe, il est constitutif de la dynamique paix et sécurité, il convient donc désormais de le mettre en pratique et de faire en sorte aussi, pourquoi pas, que dans les prochains forums, ce défi fasse partie de l’inventaire et des débats.

Voilà, Chers Amis, les cinq points majeurs que je voulais souligner, en réaffirmant que face aux enjeux, face aux risques migratoires, au risque terroriste et au risque climatique, il y a une réponse, qui doit être globale, intégrée et multidimensionnelle. Le forum de Dakar est le creuset où l’on peut refléchir à tout cela pour permettre à l’Afrique d’aller vers l’avenir avec sérénité. C’est comme cela que je le perçois. Merci de votre attention.
I am privileged to be standing in today for Mr Adallah Boureima, President of the WAEMU Commission, who had to leave Dakar this morning to deal with some last-minute business.

On his behalf, I would like to thank the organisers of the Dakar International Forum on Security in Africa for their very kind invitation; I also wish to say that the WAEMU Commission welcomes the institutionalisation of the Forum, which provides an appropriate arena for deepening the strategic dialogue between Africa and its partners on peace and security in Africa.

In this regard, I am pleased to note that the issues addressed every year at the Forum are in line with the programmatic priorities set out in WAEMU’s common peace and security policy.

Ladies and gentlemen,

With regard to the theme of this year’s Forum—current security challenges in Africa—I would like to comment on the issues connected with migration, humanitarian crises and energy transition, all of which are either creating or exacerbating insecurity in Africa.

Firstly, I would like to stress that WAEMU fully backs the position of ECOWAS on irregular migration, which, I would remind you, is based on an integrated and balanced approach.

Likewise, we welcome the numerous national, regional and international initiatives taken in this area. In this regard, we recommend sound coordination of efforts, the continued pursuit of dialogue through the Rabat (and Khartoum) processes in particular, and the implementation of the Valletta Joint Action Plan.

- My second remark concerns humanitarian crises. Whether they result from natural disasters like the cyclical droughts in the Sahel, or from socio-political upheaval or armed conflicts like those in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, these crises result in very large numbers of displaced persons and refugees. This upsets the social, economic, environmental and even political balance in hosting areas, and affects relations between states. As a result, it is a major factor of insecurity.

Under these circumstances, WAEMU encourages its member states to ensure that humanitarian crises are properly managed and resolved, in particular by organising the return of refugees under proper conditions (in cooperation with host countries), complying with international legal instruments regarding refugees and displaced persons, and establishing a sub-regional framework for dealing with refugee-related issues.

In the same vein, WAEMU fervently believes that climate change adaptation programmes, land tenure security issues and pastoralism projects must be taken into consideration when seeking solutions to these crises.

- My third remark concerns energy transition and the economic and security challenges associated with it.

WAEMU has made this issue one of its top priorities. Therefore, through its high-level energy committee, it is undertaking projects to build large, direct-injection solar power plants on interconnected networks at both national and sub-regional level.
Ladies and gentlemen,

To conclude, I would like to emphasise very strongly that, in WAEMU’s view, only a clear, unified and sustainable commitment by Africa and its partners will enable us to deal effectively with the many complex security challenges that are seriously and indefinitely compromising peace, stability and development on the continent, as well as peace and security worldwide. This commitment must lead to the development of robust, cohesive and integrated strategies. Such is, in fact, the purpose of the Dakar International Forum, which provides a platform for reflection, dialogue and consultation. It can and must participate in this process.

Thank you for your kind attention.
I was the Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies for more than two decades, I am no longer that, and I stepped down off to my third term as a good African leader should, and many of good friends and colleagues here worked with me like the Minister from Algeria.

I do long-term forecasting now, I am fortunate that I no longer have to manage people, because people are just problems. The less people you have the better it is.

So let's first look very briefly of where we have come from before we try and look into the future.

If we look at trends in violence in Africa we tend to forget that violence in Africa picked, at the end of the Cold War, at much higher levels than it is today.

After 1990-1991, generally violence trends in Africa declined until about 2005-2006. And then, violence in Africa stayed at the same level, and then started to increase from 2010. We saw violence in Africa generally picked in 2015, tapered and started to go down. Violence in Africa generally today, despite all the challenges that we face, is significantly below the levels that it was in 1990-1991, and it is important to place things in context. But violence has changed: there are many more non-state actors in Africa today. The situation is much more fractured.

So it is not government vs an armed groups, but it is governments vs many armed groups, and these insurgents and armed are often divided and fighting themselves. There is a lot of splintering.

Terrorism has also increased. But depending on how you define terrorism, terrorism has always been much more prevalent in Africa than elsewhere. Only after 9/11, the terrorism get on to the international agenda.

I think the big question that we ask today is: Does violent extremism and political violence going to move from the Middle East to Africa?

Is it in Africa that Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State will find footage, as they are displaced from the Middle East?

I think that is going of the big questions we have to look at.

A third trend that has happened in Africa is that anti-government turbulence has increased. In the developed world, globalization has led to right-wing populism, as we have seen in many north-American and African countries.

In Africa, it is leading to disaffection and violence around elections.

In the research that the ISS has done, we argue that are seven relationships that explain violence within countries today, especially in Africa.

The first is poverty. Internal armed conflict is much more prevalent in poor countries than in rich countries. This is not because poor people are violent, but because the state in poor countries has much less ability to ensure and to enforce law and order. And the impact of poverty is exacerbated by inequality, such as in my home country, South Africa; and inequality next to poverty breeds violence and sometimes extremism. It certainly lies at the root of global extremism.

Today about 37% of Africans live in extreme poverty, that is about 460 million of Africans. By 2030, we forecast that about 32% of Africans, that is about 548 million of Africans, will live in extreme poverty. So the poverty rate comes down by 5%, but the absolute number of Africans that live in extreme poverty we think is going to increase by around 180 million people.
It is very unlikely that Africa will meet the SDG 1 on eliminating extreme poverty (Sustainable Development Goal n° 1). This is about a growth forecast of Africa growing on average, all of Africa’s 55 countries, on average about 4% per year, on average from now until 2030. That is not a very positive outlook, but is certainly better than it was in the 1970’s and the 1980’s. So if there is a strong relationship between poverty and instability, and I think there is, then Africa is likely to remain turbulent, long-term. And on top of that, development on growth itself is disruptive. We have this vision that development is somehow a harmonious process, it is not. If the West looks at its own history you will to the extent to which development is extremely disruptive and often violent.

The second relationship is the relationship between democratization and instability. Democratization can trigger violence in the short to medium term. We saw it recently in Kenya. Particularly around elections.

In regions where there is a large democratic deficit, such as in North Africa, we saw the impact of the so-called Arab Spring. Where levels of democracy are lower in Africa that they are in comparable countries with same level of income and education, we have a democratic deficit that leads to instability, and this a second big driver of instability in Africa, and will remain so for many years to come.

A third driver is regime type. Most stable countries are either full democracies or full autocracies. Anything in between is generally unstable, and the transition from one to the other is particularly unstable, and there is a large body of literature about that. Most African countries are what we refer to mixed-regimes : They have both autocratic and democratic components within them, and are slowly shifting from autocracy to democracy. And that shift, the regime-type itself is unstable, these countries that are in the middle, doesn’t matter where they are in the word, are just generally more unstable than either democracies or autocracies. Mixed regimes are much more unstable and prone to disruptions.

The fourth relationship is population structure. Africa is young, the medium age in Africa is 19, that means that half of Africans are lower than 19, and the other half are older than 19. The medium age in France is 41. France, by European’s standards is quite a young country. So, 22% of adult French in France are in the age bracket 15-29 years. 47% of Africans are in the age bracket 15-29. Young people are generally responsible for crime and social instability. The younger a population is the more unstable, the more socially turbulent it is, and the more aggressive it is by the way. Young men are largely responsible for violence and crime, and young countries are much more unstable. And if young people lack jobs, and rates of urbanization are higher, then you get instability. Africa is unstable because it is young.

The next relationship is repeated violence. Africa is unstable, compared to other regions; the only other region that is equally unstable is of course The Middle East. Repeated violence, a history of past violence is the best indicator of future violence. It is like in a family. If you come from a broken family, your chances are that you will struggle to hold your family together going forward, and the same holds for countries. Countries such as Mali, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo… are trapped in a cycle of violence, what we refer to as part-dependency, and it is extremely difficult to break that, it takes a huge effort, it is very expensive, and that is of course what peace-keeping often tries to do.

The sixth relationship is a bad neighborhood. A bad neighborhood increases your risk of violence, because borders are not controlled and rural areas are not policed. So, if you stay in a bad neighborhood you are likely to experience the knock-on effect of that, because in Africa very few conflicts are essentially nationals, there is always cross-border impact in Africa.

And finally, number seven, is raising inequality and transnational terrorism. Africa is quite unequal if we use for example the Gini coefficient to measure inequality. Growth does not translate into poverty reduction; and we are, after the great financial crisis of 2007-2008, globally in a low-growth environment. Previously we were forecasting that Africa generally would grow at about 6% until 2030; that forecast is now being revised, as I said earlier, it is about 4%. Africa needs at least an average growth rate of 7% to grow faster and to provide employment. If we do not achieve those levels of growth, we are, as a matter of fact, going backwards.

These seven relationships indicate that the idea that we can somehow silence the guns by 2020 is unrealistic and unachievable. We set ourselves up for failure, and we are then surprised when the rest of the world do not take us seriously. Indeed, violence will inevitably remain a characteristic of a number of African countries for many years to come, and we need to plan accordingly. It is not that things are going badly at all, it is simply that we must be realistic about what growth requires and what the implications are.

So what can be done? I have made the argument that Africa will remain turbulent because it is poor and young, but also because it is growing and dynamic. Development is disruptive, but today key African countries such as Mali and the DRC appear to be weaker and more fragile than they were ever before. We need to recognize that peace keeping and external efforts cannot fix international problems. On the one side peace keeping, by the UN is expensive and outdated. On the other hand Africa does not have the resources for large multidimensional peace keeping efforts, and the international community is unwilling to sustainably invest in peace in Africa. The amounts invested are generally trivial by global
income standards. Instead, we need to build a low-cost system, and institutions for ongoing conflict prevention management and post-conflict reconstruction. We need to get serious about helping our neighbors, and I will conclude with seven recommendations.

First, in the long term only rapid inclusive economic growth combined with good governance can chip away at the drivers of violence that I have listed. Employment in the formal sector is centered at the heart of this. We need to look and we are going to be looking at the potential impact of the forth industrial revolution on Africa, because that is one of the threads that faces us when we look at how are we going to provide jobs in the formal sector for Africa’s hundreds of millions of young people.

We recently released a forecast on the impact in the future of development assistance and we model that out to 2030, and it is clear that middle income countries are making progress and they are benefiting for foreign direct investment. But in poor countries in Africa, low income countries are going to remain aid-dependent for the foreseeable future. Development assistance is going out old-fashioned, but poor countries in Africa will remain aid-dependent for decades to come.

The second recommendation, at the heart of our efforts should be building national capacity in support of good governance, the rule of law, control of borders, and general population management. Countries need to have national identity systems, effective border control, functioning criminal justice systems, and Africans also demand democracy, that sometimes runs against those efforts by governments to have effective population control systems. Doing these things at the same time is quite difficult. So we need to improve the quality of governance, marginalization, lack of voice, lack of accountability lie at the heart of instability in Africa. Regional organizations and neighboring governments need to take governance seriously. The AU and regional organizations does not take democracy governance and human rights seriously.

Thirdly, we need to move from procedural to substantive democracy.

We should not be surprised that there would likely be widespread violence in the DRC, it is happening in Zimbabwe because we have ignored Zimbabwe, in Burundi, will happen in Uganda, and so on. In all of these countries a small elite has kept government and go through the motions of accountability, but there is no substance to this, and we kid ourselves when we make as if these are responsible governments that look after their people, they do not.

The forth recommendation is to focus on the security sector reforms. Work by the ISS and recently by the UNDP has indicated something that we have known for a long time: that government action often leads to the tipping point that triggers a final decision, that by often young people, to join extremist groups, the killing or arrest of family members or friends. The security sector reform lies at the heart of our efforts to engage with violent political extremism in Africa, our military, our police, our gendarmerie and intelligence systems are generally not held to account. There is very little parliamentary oversight and no transparency. This is a source of many problems that translate into support for terrorism. In addition, Africa seems to have board into the US war on terror approach: relaying on the military to respond to a thread. Terrorism firstly requires intelligence and prosecution led and a rule of law approach. We would be well advised, in my view, to revert to intelligence and policing response, rather than a military response to terrorism, wherever this is possible and it is not always possible.

The fifth recommendation relates to the links between transnational organized crime and terrorism, because these linkages are growing. In one sense we have seen the end of conventional war between states, but on the other hand the entire world is now a battle field. Tax heavens, corruption in African governments and theft by ruling elite they all fuel radicalization. Africa and Europe need to work together to end tax heavens, tax avoidance and money laundering. Almost all of these tax heavens are in rich countries, not in Africa, where effective tax rates paid by multinationals are particularly low. There is some progress, but there is a long road to travel.

The sixth recommendation is really just to make the point that raising inequality and resource competition threatens all of us. We need to intensify our efforts towards a rules-based world, including reform of the UN Security Council. Africa needs to stop trying to hide behind the consensus, but think outside the box. This means we need to agitate for real reform of the UN Security Council, which lies at the apex of global security governance. And different to most, I do think that reform is possible, but it would require countries such as France to relinquish their veto and permanent seat, strange and impossible as that may sound. Much more international and regional cooperation is required, peace keeping in Africa needs the United Nations and no effort should be spared to move African peace keeping on to receive UN contributions. That is the only solution to fund peace keeping in Africa. It is not possible for Africans to fund peace keeping in Africa based on African contributions.

Thank you very much.
Conference 3
Protecting businesses: what public-private partnerships are needed?

CHAIR
Aimé SENE
Founder and President of the Senegalese Federation of Franchised Companies

SPEAKER
Jean-Michel LAVOIZARD
CEO of ARIS Intelligence
Insecurity is not just a problem for governments. Security issues in so-called ‘hostile’ areas have become a major matter of concern for companies operating in Africa. Indeed Africa, along with the Middle East, is one of the most vulnerable parts of the world to security risks. Companies are confronted with several types of threat, be they terrorist-related, political, social or economic. In fact, companies have become more or less vulnerable depending on whether their business is strategically important or not, and on their nationality. Indeed, a company’s specific line of business can generate its own threats. However, despite the sense of vulnerability, the vitality displayed by many sectors of the African economy is encouraging companies to pursue and develop their activities on the continent nevertheless.

What do companies need, and what is the current situation in Africa? How can this situation be changed to meet companies’ security requirements and improve their participation in security enforcement?

Security has become a fundamental, indeed top-priority issue worldwide. Security is a state in which the risks and conditions that can cause physical, physiological and material damage are contained, thus protecting the health and well-being of individuals and communities. It is a vital resource for everyday life, which enables individuals and communities to achieve their goals. Experts have shown that security is particularly important to individuals, ranking just below their primary needs. To achieve an optimal level of security, individuals, communities, governments and other stakeholders must create and maintain the following conditions: A climate of cohesion and social peace, as well as the equity needed to protect rights and freedoms both within family units and at the national and international levels.

The necessity of a climate of confidence

Companies as a rule, regardless of their line of business, need a favourable environment, a business climate conducive to free enterprise. A favourable business climate must be built on confidence, thereby enabling operators and investors in Africa and worldwide to do business in a free and responsible manner. From a practical perspective, companies must be able to identify, select and act upon opportunities. With opportunity comes risk. Therefore, companies need to manage the associated risks: Risk of non-performance or non-achievement of targets, risk of damage to the company’s image and reputation, risk of fraud and internal or external misappropriation, risk of non-compliance. Insecurity resulting from instability or crime is a problem, but legal, judicial and transactional insecurity are the most damaging to companies. Inadequate legal security is still an injurious factor for Africa.

Companies need an environment in which they are free to make decisions and choices, with full knowledge of the associated risks. We have seen a paradigm shift in recent years, with demand markets in Africa turning into supply markets. Globalisation is forcing entrepreneurs and decision makers in all fields—business, industry, finance and services—to make more and more important decisions in less and less time, with no room for error. They are engaged in an economic war, in which information has become a strategic priority. Africa as a whole is facing a major challenge: To enter fully into the information society. Information has become a very high value-added commodity. It is even necessary for economic survival: Economic and financial value creation is now a global process, enabled by controlling information.

Institutions and companies – each has its role

In the private sector, the tendency towards poor governance and corruption is affecting the climate of confidence needed by companies to succeed. Therefore, private-sector companies are still operating in an extremely prejudicial environment of distrust – the very opposite of a society built on confidence. In fact, free competition is a myth. Many tenders are rigged. We have gone from a period of direct contract awards to a period of competitive tendering with an eye to moving up the international rankings. In fact, there is too much favouritism. Paradoxically, it is the rule rather than the exception. Non-transparency is prejudicial to African markets, and puts investors off. All too often, governmental authority is insufficient. Although corruption has been widely addressed, many unspoken issues remain. Interventionism goes unchecked, with governments interfering in the private sector. Private companies are unable to do anything about it. Neither are governments and states capable of understanding, making sense of, and controlling the economic warfare that is raging through the markets. The private sector is waiting for one thing: For the public sector, the governmental authorities to do their job and create an enabling environment for business. Security is not the be all and end all. It is simply a prerequisite for a properly functioning, wealth-creating private sector. There are already numerous laws and rules that set out the responsibilities of the various parties. These laws and rules must be enforced. Regulation is essential. The market must not be left to manage itself; each party must better fulfil its role. Obviously, some private-sector players raise problems. It must be possible to establish individual transgressions and responsibilities. However, we must keep in mind that, at the end of the day, wealth-creating companies will finance the cost of reducing poverty and inequality in Africa.
Workshop 7
Migrations et défis sécuritaires : quelles réponses intégrées ?

CHAIR
Professeure Ndioro NDIAYE
Minister Counsellor, President of AMLD

SPEAKERS
Ottilia Anna MAUNGANIDZE
Head of Special Projects - Institute for Security Studies

Christoph LUEDI
Head of the ICRC delegation - Dakar

Mohamed AMARTI
Law professor and Chair of the National Human Rights Council (CNDH) - Morocco
African migration poses a major security challenge not only worldwide but also, and above all, in Africa itself. Furthermore, the issues raised by migration concern more than just the host countries. It is crucial to consider the migrant’s full journey from the country of origin to the destination, via countries of transit.

While migrants are very often drawn by the economic vitality of growth centres, it seems that security factors are becoming increasingly important. In fact, natural disasters, the depletion of resources due to climate change, war and armed violence, large-scale human rights violations and, in recent years, terrorism are all factors of migration.

Recent developments give cause for concern; indeed, there has been an increase in child migration, human trafficking and prostitution. Until now, the issue of African migration has been addressed almost exclusively from a security perspective, with little in the way of results. On the contrary, because the response so far has been inadequate, smuggling rings and migrant trafficking are increasingly rife, as legal channels are shutting down.

Growing and increasingly complex migratory trends

The proportion of African migrants arriving in Europe increased in 2016, to account for 93% of all migration to northern countries. However, the fact remains that over 70% of African migration is intra-regional. Migration patterns in Africa are ancient and structurally entrenched. South-South flows are by far the largest, and the least widely studied. At the end of 2016, there were 65.5 million displaced people in the world (either refugees or internally displaced people), including 80% in Africa.

To address the migratory phenomenon, it is vital to understand the ‘push factors’. Many migrants are pushed to leave their countries by the atrocities of armed conflict, poverty, poor governance, and a complete lack of access to resources for political, economic or climatic reasons. The wide and complicated range of designations for these people show how complex the phenomenon is, and how difficult it is to tackle. A migrant can be a refugee, a regular or irregular migrant, an internally displaced person, a stateless person, a climate refugee, etc. There are more and more women and children in migration streams.

Attitudes towards migration still vary extensively. It is viewed quite positively in Africa, although the push factors do tarnish its image. Conversely, most northern countries see migration through the prism of security, and take rather a negative view of it.

Migrants are not only a source of danger, but they are a target too

In the past ten years, migrants have become geopolitically significant, especially in terms of security. Thus, some military operations—such as Atalante and Barkhane—serve as a framework for training national security forces in handling the migratory phenomenon. The tension between migration and security is steadily rising, with significant involvement of security forces and the adoption of new laws. Indeed, many countries have taken steps to prevent illegal migrants from crossing into their territories. But securing borders, criminalising migrants, and other such measures do not stop migration.

The security issue must be addressed in all its dimensions, not just from the state perspective, meaning that the safety of individuals must also be considered. Migrants are regarded as potentially dangerous, particularly in the West; we tend to forget that they are, above all, victims of violence, and that they need our protection. Paradoxically, migrants flee from one crisis only to trigger another crisis themselves. This can also be explained by the fact that prospective immigrants employ illegal means to reach their final destination.

The need for solutions at all levels

Solutions can be adopted at the national level. For example, Niger is introducing its own cross-sector and multidisciplinary measures against trafficking and smugglers. These national solutions must be supplemented by regional measures to tackle the phenomenon in its entirety (ECOWAS, SADC, UEMOA, etc.). Regions across the world must talk to each other and coordinate their actions in everyone’s interests. Thus, the African Union explicitly mentioned the free circulation of people as a driver of regional integration at the signing of the Abuja Treaty in 1991. The principle of free circulation is not equally honoured across all regional organisations. In fact, it is often flouted due to tensions between states. Lastly, in a joint statement made at the Valletta summit in 2015, European and African states made a commitment to respect human rights, improve legal migration frameworks, combat migration-linked trafficking, and also tackle the structural causes of migration through their development cooperation policies. However, there are still significant areas of divergence between northern and southern countries.

Opting for political solutions over security measures

The Valletta joint statement underlines the importance of taking proactive measures to address the structural causes of migration. For example, Morocco, since 2013, has adopted an approach based primarily on human rights. The country is endeavouring to implement a global and humane solution that respects the basic rights of migrants; hence, in 2014, the government adopted a ‘National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum’. It is composed of 11 programmes, which focus on: education and culture, youth and sport, healthcare, housing, social care and humanitarian aid, solidarity and social development, access to vocational training, and facilitating access to work. It also covers the management of migratory flows and the prevention of human trafficking, as well as dismantling trafficking rings, strengthening international cooperation and partnerships, modernising the legal system, and adopting a communication policy on migration and asylum.

Lastly, it is important to recognise the major role played by non-profit organisations in providing essential support for state intervention, which is limited at present; at the same time, we must remain vigilant that they do not replace the state in its responsibilities.
Workshop 8
Security, humanitarian crisis and development

CHAIR
Marie-Angélique SAVANÉ
International consultant – First female chair of the African Peer Review Panel (MAEP), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the African Union (AU)

SPEAKERS
Ryuichi KATO
Director General, Africa Department, Japan International Cooperation Agency

Jean-Marc CHÂTAIGNER
Ambassador, special envoy for the Sahel – Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs – France

Patrick YOUSSEF
Deputy Regional Director for Africa – ICRC

Atteib DOUTOUUM
Secretary-General of the Chadian centre for strategic studies and analysis – Chad
Armed conflict, mass violence, illegal migration, epidemics, famines and natural disasters are tending increasingly to exacerbate humanitarian crises in Africa. They call for multidimensional international aid. The challenges raised by humanitarian crises are closely entwined with security issues, and the answer lies in the rapid mobilisation of resources in the short term and the provision of appropriate development aid in the long term. While the virtuous link between security and development aid is widely accepted, the practical implementation of a coordinated approach (which includes the humanitarian dimension) has not as yet produced the desired results.

The OECD, the EU, and development agencies are currently discussing how security can be more effectively incorporated into development aid policies. These new approaches seek to better coordinate different elements within a same continuum: Prevention, short-term action focused on humanitarian crises, post-crisis reconstruction, and long-term development action geared more towards the structural causes of crises. This continuum breaks with the usual approach, consisting in the juxtaposition of several circumstantial security strategies; it provides a more effective means of tackling the primary causes of humanitarian crises, and should be used by Africa to take ownership of its own development.

Security problems are growing steadily. It is therefore essential to strike a balance between the funds allocated to security and those earmarked for development programmes. Military security should not be detrimental to development; hence the necessity of coordinating security measures and development actions.

Depoliticising humanitarian aid

While the crises shaking Africa are varied and diverse, the problems they create very often call for a humanitarian response. It is of course necessary to develop long-term solutions aimed at all populations, and addressing political, security, social and economic issues. However, at the same time, an exclusively humanitarian and politically neutral dialogue is required so that the different humanitarian entities can act as impartial intermediaries. Under these conditions, humanitarian aid organisations will be able to work more effectively and focus on specific activities, leaving room for development actions and therefore a positive long-term outcome. Depoliticising humanitarian aid is essential; the impartiality of such aid is 'a public good' that must be preserved, a demonstration of our respect for all human beings.

Development as a means of breaking free from external dependencies

More than half a century after gaining their independence, African countries—especially those in the West African sub-region—still rely on international humanitarian aid, which is too one-sided and too far removed from being a partnership. Humanitarian aid is a consequence of state collapse. Many countries believe that it does nothing to promote development, and they want to put an end to this latest form of ‘life support’.

It is becoming urgent to wean countries off prolonged humanitarian aid, which creates a syndrome of dependence and delays development; at the same time, it opens the door in various ways to security crises, one of the consequences of which is population displacement. In fact, a transition is needed from emergency action to rehabilitation and sustainable development; otherwise, the structural causes of conflict will persist, and we will continue to treat the symptoms only. It is imperative that national political systems in the sub-region prepare the groundwork for modern, self-reliant states capable of developing.

Good governance and coordination of stakeholders

More armed conflicts take place in Africa than on any other continent, and over a third of the 55 countries in Africa are concerned. Most of the conflicts are caused by internal or external political, social and economic problems, as well as environmental issues. It is vital to understand where the interests of the various stakeholders lie, in order to identify potential obstacles, develop strategies to ensure the sustainability of development activities, and make sure that these strategies benefit as many countries and people as possible.

The development of human resources is a key factor in building peace and security. Strengthening states is important to prevent conflicts. States must be more resilient to economic, political and climate turmoil. Indeed, it is essential to reduce disparities and increase public trust in government, by establishing basic social services for example.

Therefore, the legitimacy of states must be strengthened through better governance, which means developing public service capacity so that the state is regarded as a legitimate part of society. Indeed, ‘poor governance is a weapon of mass destruction’. In fact, peace-building takes place during conflicts as well, through the promotion of human rights and the protection of civilians in humanitarian medical facilities.

Legitimising and strengthening states is essential not only to prevent crises, but also to manage them properly. The multi-faceted nature of crises and the multiplicity of actors involved make them even more complex. Under such circumstances, the facts clearly show that the stakeholders (troops, development workers, humanitarian organisations and diplomats) must work together more closely and communicate with each other to develop strong and appropriate solutions and partnerships.
Workshop 9
Economic and security issues associated with energy transitions

Chair
Nana Oumou TOURE-SY
Coordinator of the UNDP regional platform for West and Central Africa

Speakers
Bastien ALEX
Research fellow in charge of the Climate, Energy and Security program - IRIS

Manh LARGE MAIN
Environment and climate policy officer - DGRIS - Ministry of the Armed Forces - France
Climate change is a major 21st century challenge affecting the entire globe, and Africa is no exception; in fact, it is one of the most vulnerable continents to the consequences of climate change. Therefore, at COP21, many states recognised the need to make an energy transition with the help of international funding centralised in the Green Climate Fund. However, the availability of these crucial funds has been compromised by the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement. Now, the cost of adaptation to climate change in Africa could amount to 5 to 10% of the continent’s GDP.

Although very costly, energy transition is nevertheless vital to Africa’s security and economic survival. Development models based on fossil energies must be reconsidered from an economic, environmental and security perspective. Indeed, these resources lie at the root of conflicts and geopolitical tensions, and are an obstacle to effectively combating inequalities in development. Such models are unsustainable and contribute to the acceleration in climate change.

Environmental degradation and the scarcity of resources exacerbate threats and increase migration, creating mounting population pressure on increasingly restricted spaces. They undermine the resilience of states and their ability to manage the many and varied consequences of climate change. The security risk arises from the interaction between climate change and social, economic and political factors.

Security impacts linked with climate change

By 2050-2100, several scenarios indicate that temperatures in the Sahel region will have risen by 2 to 6 degrees. As for precipitation levels, experts agree that inter-annual and inter-decadal variability is likely to increase. These factors will make it increasingly difficult to forecast drought events or rainfall frequency and distribution with any certainty. Furthermore, rising sea levels, coastal erosion and increasingly frequent flooding will also impact on the economy, tourism and security in some African countries.

Climate change could therefore create or exacerbate security problems. One example of this is the risk of tensions between livestock farmers and arable farmers. Falling water levels caused by a decrease in rainfall could expose riverbanks, thus providing more cultivable land for arable farmers. However, this land is a place of passage for nomadic livestock farmers; if it were no longer accessible to them, clashes may occur.

In addition, changing rainfall levels in some areas may affect vegetation, with the result that there is no longer enough to feed livestock. Problems could arise if livestock farmers were to migrate to regions already occupied by arable farmers.

Early warning systems, backed by the EU, have already been put into place to prevent food shortages caused by changing environmental and climate conditions. Nevertheless, although these schemes produce relatively reliable information, getting this information to the people who need it is a challenge. We must therefore work on this issue, and put forward solutions once the risk has been clearly assessed.

Responding appropriately to risks to ensure that security issues are not overlooked

Climate change will also have a direct impact on the ability of states to carry out security and peacekeeping operations. The stability of such missions in the event of natural disasters (cyclones, storms, floods, drought, etc.) is in question. Armed troops and their equipment are increasingly likely to be exposed to hostile environments on the ground (temperatures, humidity, disease, etc.). Lastly, infrastructure too will be more vulnerable to rising water levels, desertification and coastal erosion.

There are several possible solutions to these challenges. The use of eco-design methods could reduce the environmental impact of infrastructure and military equipment without affecting operational performance. Reducing energy consumption is also a major challenge for the armed forces. One option is to improve insulation in buildings to increase their energy efficiency. At the same time, steps must be taken to improve energy performance through smart systems.

It is also worth noting that Africa’s energy potential is substantial. The International Energy Agency estimates that, by 2040, electricity will account for almost half of the continent’s energy supply. Grid interconnection and supply security are essential to the success of this energy transition.
I would like to thank you all for coming, and for the remarkable work that has been done.

I would simply like to say that President Macky Sall had a brilliant idea at the Elysée Summit, when he decided to organise the Dakar Forum. At the time, Mrs Parly spoke of the Forum as an ‘iconoclastic assembly’ of prominent figures. It was a truly inspired idea: Heads of State and Government, business leaders, academics, journalists, and human rights and civil society activists, all coming together to try and find a solution to what has become a global scourge. Seeking a global response was absolutely the right thing to do.

This summary will be brief. It will be a summary of a summary, as I will be soon be giving the floor to the Prime Minister, who will be concluding these proceedings.

I would just like to reiterate what we have said, so that you know it has been heard. I would like to thank all those invited to this year’s Forum, which follows on from previous, successful editions attended by some very dedicated men and women. Allow me to give a special mention to Minister Mankeur Ndiaye, Paul Ndiaye and Olivier Darrason, as well as all those whose planning and organisation have made every edition a success. This fourth edition reflects the growing role and influence of the event.

Several challenges have been identified, in the shape of security, humanitarian, ecological and migratory risks. All of these scourges have been clearly identified. We must now deliver all the social and economic solutions needed to combat the manifestations of terrorism, particularly piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, but also the tide of young people fleeing our countries, only to meet their deaths in the hot desert sands or to perish in the watery graveyard of the Mediterranean Sea.

That is why President Macky Sall felt compelled to underline that sustainable solutions are required, along with economic reforms, and political and social changes that enable progress and open up new opportunities for young and vulnerable people, convincing them that their prospects and their future do not lie elsewhere.
But you also reminded us that every effort must be made to ensure that we all share the task of dealing with security matters. We must develop a culture of security and take ownership of these matters through, as you said, trilateral cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union. We must develop information and intelligence sharing through regional cooperation agreements, ECOWAS and the CAO; anything that enables us, as it were, to mobilise and gain the control needed to tackle and kill off this many-headed hydra once and for all.

You have already said everything that needed to be said, but I would like to end with a story told by a French thinker and farmer, Pierre Rabhi: The Legend of the Hummingbird. It is a Native American tale.

One day, the story goes, there was a huge forest fire. All the animals stood terrified and aghast, watching helplessly as the disaster unfolded. Only the little hummingbird was busy, fetching a few drops of water in his beak to throw on the flames. After a while, the armadillo, exasperated by his futile behaviour, said: ‘Hummingbird, do you really think you’re going to put out the fire with a few drops of water?’ To which he replied: ‘I know, but I’ve done the best I can.’ The legend goes that, after that, all the animals rallied around; each did the best it could, and the forest was saved.

If we work together and shoulder our responsibilities hand in hand, the Earth — Georges Balandier’s global village — can be saved.

Thank you.
We have come to the end of the 4th Dakar Forum on Peace and Security in Africa.

On behalf of the President, His Excellency Macky Sall, I would like to congratulate the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, as well as all the people and institutions who have contributed, directly or indirectly, to the organisation and successful delivery of this Forum.

I would like to commend all the stakeholders and partners for their unwavering commitment to this annual event of major intellectual and geostrategic import, which has now become a firm fixture on the international agenda.

In this regard, allow me to say once again how grateful the President is to the senior foreign officials who have dignified the event with their presence, particularly the President of Mali, the President of Rwanda, the Prime Minister of Chad, the President of the African Union Commission, the Minister of the Armed Forces of France, and the representative of the Japanese government. The opening panel in which they took part produced some very fruitful discussions on strategic matters.

Furthermore, allow me to thank Minister Sidiki Kaba for his summary of the proceedings, which will no doubt serve to commemorate this event going forward.

Two days of presentations, discussions and debates between leaders, government representatives, intergovernmental organisations, the private sector and civil society, defence and security forces, academics, and experts from many backgrounds have shown – were any proof necessary – that Africans are taking joint ownership of security problems, and have confirmed their shared commitment to building Africa’s future on a foundation of peace and security.

Indeed, to address challenges such as youth unemployment, the structural deficit and the impact of climate change, and in order to meet the Sustainable Development Goals, African states are engaged in thoroughly and objectively reviewing their development models to make their economies more productive, inclusive and sustainable. Just like our country with the Emergent Senegal Plan.

But terrorism and religious extremism have made peace and security a priority; otherwise, a positive outcome would not be possible.
In this respect, two key points must be borne in mind: Firstly, a military response is necessary but can only achieve so much and, secondly, the pooling of resources and efforts is a clear necessity.

That is what the general theme of this fourth Forum is all about. It emphasises the need for integrated approaches to security challenges, which effectively combine solutions into a national, regional and international strategy involving stakeholders and partners such as the African Union, the United Nations and the European Union.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The Preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO states that, I quote: ‘Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.’ End of quote.

Driven by this belief, we are calling for a stronger culture of peace, more inter-faith dialogue, and greater tolerance and mutual respect in a world that — as the President, His Excellency Macky Sall pointed out yesterday — must leave no room for threats, exclusion and stereotypes.

By providing an arena for informal, open and free discussion, the Dakar Forum is instrumental in the collective endeavour to direct all our energies into ensuring peace and security in Africa, which is essential to its development and to the well-being of our populations.

Let’s cultivate a spirit of solidarity and work together to consolidate an ecosystem that promotes peace and inclusive development without leaving anyone behind.

To conclude, I would like to thank you for your active participation, reiterate Senegal’s gratitude towards all the partners who have helped organise this Forum, and wish a safe journey home to all those who have travelled here to demonstrate their commitment to peace and security in Africa.

I look forward to seeing you here again next year for the 2018 Forum and, with these words, I declare the proceedings of the 4th Dakar Forum on Peace and Security in Africa closed. Thank you for your kind attention.
DAKAR FORUM 2017
Des dirigeants africains appellement à permettre au continent d’assumer sa propre sécurité

(13 novembre 2017)

Des dirigeants africains ont appelé lundi à aider leurs États à assurer leur propre sécurité, à l’ouverture de la quatrième édition du Forum de Dakar sur la paix et la sécurité en Afrique (...)

M. Kagamé, qui présidera l’UA en 2018, a exhorté ses pairs africains à se prendre en main. « Sï nous laissons les autres définir nos défis et prendre la responsabilité de régler nos problèmes, nous ne pouvons-nous en prendre qu’à nous-mêmes », a-t-il lancé, tout en reconnaissant l’importance de la coopération internationale.

« Il faut que l’Afrique prenne en charge sa sécurité, mais pour cela il faut que nos partenaires nous accompagnent », a insisté Macky Sall. « La maintenance des forces, les indemnités à payer, le comblement d’effectifs... Là, l’Union européenne, les Nations Unies pourront venir en appui. Mais la base doit être assurée par les Africains ». 

Le président de la République, Macky Sall, a jugé lundi vitale “la riposte militaire” contre le terrorisme, mais celle-ci doit être selon lui « solidaire et globale pour ne laisser aucun santraux aux groupes terroristes ».

“ De toute évidence et en premier lieu, la riposte militaire sur le terrain contre les groupes terroristes est vitale. Nous ne pouvons pas laisser le champ libre à des forces dont le seul objectif est de semer la mort et le chaos », a-t-il dit à l’ouverture de la quatrième édition du Forum de Dakar sur la paix et la sécurité en Afrique.

L’éditioh 2017 de cette rencontre est ouverte lundi au Centre international de conférence Abdou Diouf de Diamniadio (CIDAD), en présence notamment des présidents rwandais et malien Paul Kagamé et Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.

“ Les accréditations de la presse ouvertes

En asie.

Dialogue de Munich ou le Werkhunde nable, au même titre que le forum européen un rendez-vous stratégique annuel incontournable en l’espace de quatre années comme Serval, dans la foulée de l’intervention française au Mali lors du Sommet de l’élysée qui s’est tenu dans la foulée de l’intervention française au Mali (opération Serval), le Forum de Dakar s’est imposé en l’espace de quatre années comme un rendez-vous stratégique annuel incontournable, au même titre que le Forum européen de la Werkhunde de Munich ou le Dialogue de Shangri-la en Asie.

Le Soleil – Forum sur la paix et la sécurité : les accréditations de la presse ouvertes

(13 novembre 2017)


APS – Lutte contre le terrorisme : la riposte militaire « vitale », mais doit être « globale » (Macky Sall)

(13 novembre 2017)

Le président de la République, Macky Sall, a jugé lundi vitale “la riposte militaire” contre le terrorisme, mais celle-ci doit être selon lui « solidaire et globale pour ne laisser aucun santraux aux groupes terroristes ».

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RFI – La gestion des nouveaux défis sécuritaires africains au menu du Forum de Dakar

(13 novembre 2017)

Ce lundi matin s’ouvre dans la capitale sénégalaise le Forum International de Dakar sur la Paix et la Sécurité en Afrique. Organisé par l’État sénégalais, en collaboration avec le ministère français de la Défense, cette rencontre informelle réunit depuis quatre ans des diplomates, des militaires et des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts), qui réfléchissent ensemble et à haute voix sur des civils (chercheurs, universitaires et experts). Impulsé par la France lors du Sommet de l’Élysée qui s’est tenu dans la foulée de l’intervention française au Mali (opération Serval), le Forum de Dakar s’est imposé en l’espace de quatre années comme un rendez-vous stratégique annuel incontournable, au même titre que le Forum européen de la Werkhunde de Munich ou le Dialogue de Shangri-la en Asie.

Le Soleil – Forum sur la paix et la sécurité : les accréditations de la presse ouvertes

(13 novembre 2017)

À la tribune de ce Forum l’hôte du jour, le président sénégalais Macky Sall, a relancé le débat sur le rôle, les moyens et les droits des forces de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. Macky Sall craint aussi le retour en Afrique de combattants terroristes venus d’autres régions du monde : « Le risque aujourd’hui et pour les années à venir, c’est de voir des terroristes vaincus ailleurs chercher des zones de repli en Afrique. La riposte militaire sur le terrain contre les groupes terroristes est vitale. Il ne faut pas faire la fine bouche. On ne peut pas, avec des fleurs, occueller ou régler le problème qui se passe sur le Sahel. Il faut régler le problème militaire d’abord. ».

Jeune Afrique – Sénégal : Kagamé et IBK à l’ouverture du Forum de Dakar sur la sécurité

(13 novembre 2017)

La 4e édition du Forum International sur la paix et la sécurité en Afrique s’est ouverte ce lundi à Dakar. Les présidents rwandais, Paul Kagamé, et malien, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, ont fait le déplacement.

Pendant deux jours, les grands enjeux sécuritaires africains seront au centre des discussions à Dakar. Les 13 et 14 novembre, la capitale sénégalaise accueille la 4e édition du Forum International sur la paix et la sécurité en Afrique. Cette année, près de 800 personnes – militaires, experts, diplomates... – participeront à ce qui s’est imposé, depuis 2013, comme l’un des rendez-vous majeur pour les questions de sécurité sur le continent.

BBC – Sécurité : L’Afrique prête à se prendre en charge

(14 novembre 2017)

Le 4ème forum sur la Paix et la sécurité en Afrique s’est refémber hier soir à Dakar. Deux jours de discussion entre experts, responsables militaires et politiques qui ont échangent leurs idées sur la meilleure approche pour lutter contre le terrorisme sur le continent.

Mohammed Dionne, le Premier ministre sénégalais, a exprimé sa satisfaction au terme du 4ème forum sur la Paix et la sécurité en Afrique. « Le forum de Dakar participe à cet effort collectif de mobilisation de toutes les énergies pour le triomphe de la paix et de la sécurité en Afrique, conditions à son développement et au bien-être de la population », a souligné Mohammed Dionne.

Le Soleil – Paul Kagamé, président du Rwanda : « Malgré les défis, nous pouvons réussir en travaillant ensemble »

(14 novembre 2017)

Après avoir dit toute sa joie d’être présent au 4ème Forum sur la sécurité et la paix en Afrique, et en mettant l’accent sur les questions de sécurité de façon globale, le président du Rwanda, Paul Kagamé, a soutenu, à cette occasion, que « malgré les défis et leur ténacité, nous pouvons réussir en travaillant ensemble, en coopérant ensemble adéquatement. Car l’insécurité perd de différentes et de nombreuses formes ». Il a, cependant, précisé que l’Afrique ne parviendra pas à relever les défis sécuritaires si elle permet aux autres de penser et de prendre des décisions pour elle.
Le Soleil – 4e édition du forum sur la Paix et la Sécurité : Macky Sall préconise une riposte « solidaire et globale » contre le terrorisme
(14 novembre 2017)

Senenews – La France annonce une école de cyber-sécurité à Dakar « dans les plus brefs délais »
(15 novembre 2017)

AFP – Les missions de maintien de la paix de l’ONU condamnées à se réformer en Afrique
(14 novembre 2017)
Matériel insuffisant, vulnérabilité, mandat inadapté… des dirigeants africains ont dénoncé au Forum de Dakar l’inadéquation des missions des Casques bleus au nouvel environnement sécuritaire, une préoccupation partagée par les Nations Unies, qui veulent faire évoluer leurs interventions. « Face à la violence asymétrique, les missions de maintien de la paix éprouvent des difficultés, au point qu’elles sont parfois contraintes de consacrer leurs moyens à leur propre sécurité », constate le President of the African Union Commission (UA), Moussa Faki Mahamat, déplorant à ce Forum annuel sur la paix et la sécurité en Afrique « l’impuissance de la puissance ».

Le Monde – Paris et Dakar veulent créer une école pour former les Africains au cyber sécurité
(16 novembre 2017)
Le Sénégal a accepté la proposition de la France d’ouvrir un centre consacré à la surveillance d’Internet et à la lutte contre le piratage informatique.


Le Soleil – Maintien de la Paix : d’ici à la fin de l’année, le Sénégal sera le plus grand contributeur de troupes au Mali
(15 novembre 2017)
En marge du Forum de Dakar sur la paix et la sécurité, le général Cheikh Guèye, chef d’État-major général des armées, revenant sur l’insécurité au Mali, a dit la solidarité du Sénégal pour ce pays frère. Pour le Cemga, d’ici à la fin de l’année, le Sénégal sera le plus grand contributeur de troupes dans les opérations de sécurisation en cours au Mali. Le Sénégal sera présent avec 2 forces de réaction rapide dans ce pays, « ce qui n’existe nulle part ailleurs ». Pour le Cemga du Sénégal, cela s’explique par le fait que le Sénégal et le Mali sont constitués par le même peuple, « avec un même drapeau et la même devise nationale ». Confortant le Cemga, le Haut-commandant de la gendarmerie nationale, le général Meissa Niang, affirme que les unités de la gendarmerie rayonnent à Bamako et dans d’autres localités du Mali. Il révèle aussi que le Sénégal a encore déployé, dans ce pays, une unité de lutte antiterroriste à la demande de la Minusma.
Dakar International Forum
on Peace and Security in Africa

Organisé par

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PARTNERS
Le GICAT (groupement des industries de défense et de sécurité terrestres et aéroterrestres) est l’organisateur du salon ShieldAfrica qui regroupe des délégations officielles venus de tous les pays d’Afrique et des industriels du monde entier proposant des produits adaptés au continent africain pour garantir la sécurité des biens et des personnes, surveiller les espaces terrestres et les approches maritimes et répondre aux menaces qui entravent le développement du continent.

Le prochain salon ShieldAfrica et sa conférence inaugurale se tiendront du 21 au 24 janvier 2020 au Sénégal avec pour thème la protection et le contrôle des frontières.

Le forum de Dakar a permis aux responsables du GICAT de rencontrer les acteurs clés de la sécurité en Afrique pour préparer dans les meilleures conditions ShieldAfrica 2019, œuvrant ainsi pour une Afrique plus sûre, sachant protéger son développement.

Implanté depuis plus de 20 ans en Afrique de l’Ouest et en Egypte, le Groupe cimentier français VICAT a tenu à marquer son engagement aux côtés du Sénégal et plus généralement des États de la Sous-Région dans le cadre de programmes de développement, de paix et de sécurité. La volonté de VICAT est d’être partenaire des décideurs africains et d’apporter ensemble les réponses aux grands enjeux auxquels le continent est confronté. La paix et la sécurité en font partie, c’est la raison pour laquelle le Groupe soutient le forum de Dakar depuis sa création.

VICAT contribue par ses cimenteries et ses installations industrielles à la valorisation des richesses et au développement de l’emploi au Sénégal, au Mali et en Egypte. Le dynamisme démographique et économique du continent génère une nouvelle révolution urbaine et le besoin de logements accessibles au plus grand nombre ainsi que d’infrastructures performantes, conditions indispensables au développement économique et à la stabilité sociale et politique des États. VICAT contribue à répondre à ce besoin avec l’élaboration de matériaux et de solutions constructives africaines conformes aux critères de la construction durable et de la préservation de l’environnement.

Inscrit dans une dynamique de lutte contre l’insécurité, le Forum de Dakar constitue une opportunité unique de rencontres multiculturelles de haut niveau permettant l’interaction entre experts, décideurs et acteurs économiques, et confirme son statut d’événement incontournable dans l’agenda international africain. Les échanges que nous avons pu avoir en novembre 2017 lors de cette 4ème édition sont allés dans ce sens et sont très prometteurs pour l’avenir.


MBDA, an integrated European group, stands alongside all who face the threat of terrorism. Our core mission is to provide armed forces with the decisive military capabilities that uphold sovereignty.

Working with our customers and suppliers, we constantly strive to deliver new technologies that will enable these threats to be countered more effectively and give our armed forces the operational capabilities they need, and to defend our countries by focusing on performance so as to guarantee a military and technological edge with carefully managed costs and risks as part of a multinational cooperation.

MBDA, a founding member of the Dakar Forum, is once again a partner for this fourth edition devoted to the new strategic challenges facing the African continent and the search for integrated solutions to security issues.

This major forward-looking event, in an informal framework of discussion, raises issues of defence and security with the highest authorities, confirming the relevance of a strategic dialogue between private players and government agencies working together for development, peace and security on the African continent.

The goal is to gain a clearer understanding of the new strategic and security issues confronting Africa. A large number of productive discussions have brought forth new approaches to defence, security and development policies, and have reinforced African partnerships with international, and especially European, bodies.

The exceptional plenary session on Africa and its security concerns, as well as the various associated workshops, provided a space for discussion about the security challenges facing our countries and for thinking about how best to converge towards the stability required for the continent’s development.

The strong presence of a French parliamentary delegation, deeply involved in the debates, was another key factor in the success of this Forum, and the quality of the speakers clearly reflects the strategic dimension of the issues addressed.
Le Forum de Dakar 2017 aura une nouvelle fois été l’occasion pour Nexter d’échanger sur les défis sécuritaires régionaux. La présence de hauts dignitaires de différents pays, la pertinence et la qualité des workshops, le soutien appuyé des pays tiers, dont la France, représentent autant de facteurs constitutifs de la réussite de cette édition 2017 du Forum. Nexter, partenaire de l’événement, remercie les organisateurs pour leur engagement à ses côtés ainsi qu’aux côtés de tous les contributeurs.

Le constat dressé pendant ces deux journées invite à une prise de conscience collective d’une situation sécuritaire régionale encore fragile. Dans ce contexte incertain, Nexter maintient son engagement auprès des principaux acteurs de la région, en proposant des moyens adaptés à leurs missions, tant sur leur territoire national qu’en opérations extérieures. Cette présence durable contribue à consolider l’indispensable confiance mutuelle.

Nexter soutient également les initiatives conjointes prises actuellement par les pays du G5 Sahel qui, sans nul doute, contribueront à une meilleure prévention des risques. La route est encore longue : poursuivons là ensemble.


Nous y avons retenu qu’une réelle coopération régionale pour répondre à de nombreuses crises et conflits se mettait en place à Abidjan lors du sommet Union Africaine / Union Européenne fin novembre.

En tant qu’entreprise de Services de Défense et de Sécurité (ESSD), ERYS GroUP a pu présenter son grand nombre d’acteurs institutionnels, gouvernementaux, en offrant son savoir-faire en matière d’assistance à la Réforme et à la Sécurité (RSS), de formation et mentoring des forces de sécurité des entreprises et de protection des personnes.

Pendant le forum, ERYS GroUP annonçait son implantation à Abidjan, ERYS WEST AFRICA, en association avec Fabrice SAWEGNON, fondateur et PDG de la célèbre agence de communication VODOO. Nous sommes satisfaits des rencontres et des relations à développer avec de nombreux décideurs africains, des prescripteurs et des partenaires pendant cet événement d’envergure.

Présent dans 150 pays à travers le monde, EY et ses 247 000 collaborateurs contribuent à créer les conditions de la confiance dans l’économie pour dessiner un monde plus juste, plus équilibré, plus respectueux des hommes et de l’environnement.

Près de 6 000 collaborateurs se mobilisent auprès des entreprises et des gouvernements pour participer au développement du continent africain dans 33 pays.

Actionnant quatre leviers, EY aide les armées et les forces de sécurité dans l’optimisation de leurs performances : transformation digitale, management des risques, gestion financière, modernisation des soutiens opérationnels.


Depuis la création de SOFRECAP, son dirigeant et ses équipes s’investissent avec passion en Afrique. Cette passion justifie notre volonté permanente d’être présent physiquement en terre africaine, par nos implantations, nos actions et nos investissements.


Nous tenons particulièrement à féliciter les organisateurs de ce Forum pour le sérieux et la disponibilité dont ils ont fait preuve pendant ces deux jours.

Pour Naval Group, cette quatrième édition du Forum de Dakar sur la Paix et la Sécurité en Afrique confirme la nécessité de ce rendez-vous annuel, moment privilégié qui, chaque année, permet la participation unique d’échanges multiculturels de grande valeur, réunissant, aux côtés de plus hautes autorités africaines, un exceptionnel panel d’intervenants de haut niveau.

Naval Group est le leader européen du naval de défense incluant l’ensemble des prestations des services aux marines et leurs bases navales. Naval Group propose des solutions de surveillance et d’intervention à la mer innovantes, adaptables et modulaires. En particulier, ces solutions s’appuient sur un concept de la mer vers la terre basé sur la mise en réseau des moyens navals mobiles (navires d’action de l’état en mer et leurs moyens déportés tels que les drones) et des moyens terrestres (Centres de Surveillance Maritime) par une plateforme de données permettant de coordonner les échanges d’information en temps réel lors de missions de sécurité à la mer ou sur le territoire. L’offre de Naval Group est conçue pour aider à structurer rapidement les moyens déjà disponibles et pour apporter des capacités complémentaires optimisées.

La France par sa forte représentation qui, en dehors d’industriels tels que Naval Group, est composée de ministres, de parlementaires et de représentants de l’État-Major de la Défense française, est très impliquée dans les échanges et est un acteur majeur du succès de ce Forum dont la qualité des intervenants illustre bien la dimension stratégique des enjeux.
ORGANISERS

Under the High Patronage of
HE Macky SALL
President of the Republic of Senegal

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Sénégalais de l’extérieur

Under the authority of
HE Sidiki KABA
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad

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ABDEL KADER AGNE
Abdel Kader Agne is currently the Senegalese Ambassador to Niger, having previously served as Honorary Consul of Senegal in Niger. He is involved in managing migration, particularly the large numbers of Senegalese migrants.

CYRIAQUE AGNEKETHOM
Cyriaque Agnekethom graduated from the University of Montesquieu Bordeaux IV in 1998, with a PhD in Political Science. From 1999 to 2005, he was a Programme and Research Officer at the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) in Lomé, Togo. As Director of Peacekeeping and Regional Security for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from 2014, he was also responsible for defining and monitoring the peace, security and stability strand of regional security for the economic community.

MAHAMAT SALEH ANNADIF
In December 2015, Mahamat Saleh Annadif was appointed Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

BARTHÈLEMY BLÉDÉ
Barthélemy Blédé is an international consultant on maritime safety and security. He works in West Africa on projects financed by the UNDP and the World Bank, as well as with the General Secretariat of the Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa. He is also an instructor at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra.

MOHAMMED AMARTI
Mohamed Amarti is a Professor of International Law and Human Rights at the University of Mohamed 1st in Oujda, Morocco. A member of the Moroccan National Human Rights Council (CNDH) since 2011, he chairs the regional human rights commission in the Oriental region of Morocco. He is also Director of the Laboratory for Studies and Research on Human Rights (LERDHOHM) and President of the Centre for Studies and Research on Migration, Asylum and Human Rights in Morocco. As an expert in refugee law, his research and publications focus primarily on right of asylum, refugee law and international migration law.

JEAN-Daniel Châtaigner
On 1 October 2017, Jean-Marc Châtaigner was appointed Ambassador and Special Envoy for the Sahel. He had been Deputy Executive Director of the French Research Institute for Development (IRD) since March 2015. Prior to that, Jean-Marc Châtaigner was Deputy Managing Director of globalisation, development and partnerships at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development. He has also served as France’s Ambassador to Madagascar (2009-2012), Chief of Cabinet of the French Secretary of State for Cooperation and Francophonie (2007-2009), and Director of Strategic Planning and Partnerships at the AFD (French development agency) (2004-2007). From 2005 to 2007, he was co-chair of the OECD’s Fragile States Group. Jean-Marc Châtaigner has written various books and articles on development and peace consolidation.

ABDOU CHEFOU
Abdou Chefoou is head of the anti-terrorism investigation and cross-border organised crime division within Niger’s Central Service for the Fight Against Terrorism (SCLCT). He is regularly involved in assessments of the various terrorist groups operating in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Abdou Chefoou has worked as a consultant in other countries in the sub-region, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Cameroon, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger.
Gambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2009, he joined the national police force in the grade of captain, and worked as an investigator in the criminal investigation department in Niamey.

BRUNO CLÉMENT-BOLLÉE
General Bruno Clément-Bollée has served as Commander of the French Armed Forces in the Indian Ocean and in Côte d’Ivoire (Operation Licorne). He is a former Director of Security and Defence Cooperation at the French Foreign Ministry. He has been involved in numerous Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, and served as advisor to the DDR programme in Côte d’Ivoire from 2013 to 2016. He is currently CEO of Partenariat Sécurité Développement Conseil (PárSèDev Conseil), which develops post-conflict management support programmes in Africa. He works in collaboration with a company called EPEE (Expert Partenaire pour l’Entreprise à l’Etranger).

HERVÉ DENYS DE BONNAVENTURE
Vice Admiral Hervé Denys de Bonnaventure is Deputy Director of International Relations and Strategy at the French Ministry of the Armed Forces. He is also maritime security coordinator for the whole of the Ministry of Defence. Previously, he served as maritime advisor in the cabinet of the Minister of Defence, Naval Air Force Commander, and head of the defence ministry’s joint force deployment division.

GRÉGOIRE DE SAINT-QUENTIN
General Grégoire de Saint-Quentin joined the Saint-Cyr military academy in 1981 (the ‘Grande Armée’ class). From July 2009 to July 2011, he was head of the planning office (J5) at the defence ministry’s Joint Operations Planning and Command and Control Centre. In August 2011, he assumed command of the French forces in Senegal (Eléments Français au Sénégal – EFS). He served as commander of Operation SERVAL in Mali from 11 January to 11 August 2013. From August 2013 to August 2016, he was commander of the French Special Operations Command. He became the defence ministry’s deputy chief of operations on 1 September 2016.

ATTEIB DOUTOUm
Attieb Doutoum is an economist by training and, on several occasions, has served as CEO of commercial banks (such as the Banque Commerciale du Chari in Chad) and development and investment banks (including the Banque Sahélienne pour l’Investissement et le Commerce – BSIC) in West and Central Africa. He is a former economic and financial advisor to the President of Chad, and a former budget and finance minister; since 2010, he has been Secretary-General of the Chadian centre for strategic studies and prospective analysis.

COMFORT ERO
Comfort Ero has been Crisis Group’s Africa Programme Director since 2011 and, as such, she oversees the organisation’s work in the West, Centre and South of Africa, as well as in the Horn of Africa. She first joined the organisation in 2001 as Project Director in the West Africa office, and then worked for three years as Political Affairs Officer and Policy Advisor to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, United Nations Mission in Liberia (2004-2007). She has served as Deputy Africa Program Director for the International Centre for Transitional Justice (2008-2010), a research fellow in the Conflict, Security & Development Group at King’s College, London (1999-2001), and a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (1998-1999). She has a PhD from the London School of Economics. Her areas of expertise include conflict prevention, management and resolution, mediation, peacekeeping, transitional justice, African politics and international relations, and economic governance.

FRANÇOIS LOUNCÉNY FALL
Françs Louncény Fall is currently Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Central Africa, based in Libreville. Born in 1949, he has pursued a career as a diplomat and a politician in Guinea-Conakry. In 2002, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and, in February 2004, he became Prime Minister under President Lansana Conté. He resigned two months later. He would serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs again from 2012 to 2016. He then joined the United Nations and was appointed Special Representative for Central Africa from 2007-2008, after serving in the same capacity in Somalia in 2007. In 2012, he was Vice-Chairman of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission of the South Sudan Peace Agreement.

MPAKO FOALENG
Mpakao Foaleng specialises in SSR programmes and governance. She has supported various SSR processes politically with ECDWAS and the African Union, in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. She is currently a security sector reform advisor to the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). Before joining UNOWAS, she worked within the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) at the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Mpako Foaleng has a PhD in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

FLORENT GEEL
Director of the Africa Desk and Deputy Director of Operations at the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). A lawyer and an expert in international law and geopolitics, he is a graduate of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. For the past 15 years, he has been participating in the investigations, analyses, diplomacy and legal actions conducted in Africa by the FIDH and its 184 member organisations. At the same time, he is developing a critical analysis of the strategic challenges facing Africa, and is the author of numerous reports and articles.

CHEIKH GUEYE
General Cheikh Gueye, born on 15 January 1960 in Diadiôrè near Cok (Senegal), is a General Officer in the Senegalese army; he was appointed Chief of Defence Staff by President Macky Sall on 1 January 2017. Since his early days in the infantry, General Gueye’s career has seen him performing several periods of active duty in the southern region, working for the United Nations, and keeping company with political leaders within his role as Chief of Defence Staff.

PAPA GUEYE
Papa Gueye is police commissioner, head of the special cybersecurity division in the criminal investigation department, and an instructor at Senegal’s national police academy, which provides basic and in-service training for police officers. He has a PhD in Private Law and Criminology from Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar (UCAD), and wrote his doctoral thesis on how criminal policy is
being put to the test by the development of cross-border organised crime.

He has served as head of the economic and financial crimes unit, and head of the cybercrime prevention unit (now the special cyber-security division). Doctor Papa Gueye is also a Council of Europe expert, and a member of the management committee of the Global Action on Cybercrime (GLACY) project.

MOHAMED EL HACEN LEBATT
Professor Mohamed El Hacen Lebatt is a Doctor of Law. He is currently Principal Strategic Advisor to the President of the African Union Commission. He has served successively as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mauritania’s Ambassador to the African Union, Ethiopia and South Africa, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Economics at the University of Nouakchott, and Rector of the University of Nouakchott. Professor Lebatt has also served as the OIF’s Special Envoy to the RDC, Burundi and Chad, and the African Union Commission’s Special Representative for the Central African Republic (CAR) and Central Africa.

TAFSIR HANE
Tafsir Hane conducts research in the field of intelligence, financial crime and economic intelligence. His doctoral thesis in criminology, which he defended at the University of Strasbourg in 2015, discusses how Competitive and Strategic Intelligence (CST) can contribute to the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. He teaches a course on "Information and Economic Intelligence" as part of a two-year Master’s degree in Defence, Security and Peace, at the Centre for Advanced Studies in Defence and Security (CHEDS) in Dakar. In 2015, he participated in the International Visitors Leadership Program (IVLP) in the United States, which focused on 'International Criminal Issues'.

MATHURIN HOUNGNIKPO
Doctor Mathurin Houngnikpo is the Strategy and Security Sector Reform Advisor to the Secretary of the National Security Council of Côte d’Ivoire. Until July 2013, he served as the Academic Chair of Civil-Military Relations at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington DC. He is an expert in civil-military relations and, in particular, the military history of Africa, democratic civil control of the security sector, and matters relating to strategy, accountability, transparency and good governance. He has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Paris VIII, Saint-Denis (France) and another PhD in International Studies from the University of Denver, Colorado (the United States).

EBOE HUTCHFUL
Eboe Hutchful is a Professor of African Studies at Wayne State University in Detroit, USA. He has taught in several other universities in Africa and North America, including the University of Toronto, Trent and Waterloo Universities in Ontario (Canada), the University of Ghana, and the University of Port Harcourt (Nigeria). He is currently a member of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (ABDM), the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and the International Advisory Board of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

RYUICHI KATO
Ryuci Kato is Director General of the Africa Division of the Japanese International Co-operation Agency (JICA). He has held various positions, notably in the planning and general affairs divisions. From 1997 to 1998, he was seconded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo (2nd Africa Division, Office of Middle-Eastern and African Affairs). He has extensive work experience in French-speaking Africa. He served as Deputy Resident Representative in the Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal office from 2002 to 2006, and then Chief Representative in the Senegal Office from 2012 to 2016. In 2016, President Macky Sall made him an Officer in the National Order of the Lion.

RAMTANE LAMAMRA
Algerian Minister of State; Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation from 2013 to 2017. From 2008 to 2013, he was African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security. He has also served as the Secretary-General of the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005-2007), Algerian Ambassador to Portugal, the United States, Austria and Ethiopia, Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York (1993-1996), and Permanent Representative to the African Union. In September 2017, he was appointed a member of the UN’s High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation. In October 2017, he was also appointed the African Union’s High Representative for ‘silencing the guns in Africa’.

PIERRE LAPAQUE
Pierre Lapaque is an Assistant Commissioner in the French police force. He has served as head of the economic and financial crime unit, where he led numerous investigations into the Italian and Russian Mafia and their connections with money laundering. For over three years, he was deputy director of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CPAIT). In 2002, Pierre Lapaque joined the Organization of American States (CICAD), where he worked as a senior anti-money laundering advisor until 2005. From 2005 to 2009, he served as the internal security attaché at the French embassy in Portugal.

After a stint as the Law Enforcement, Organized Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Chief of Unit within the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNOCD), he was appointed Chief of the Implementation Section of the Organised Crime Branch. Since August 2012, he has been UNOCD Regional Representative for West and Central Africa.

MANH LARGEMAIN
Manh Largemain started out as a consultant in the private sector from 1998 to 2001, and has since held several environment-related positions within the Ministry of the Armed Forces. As environment and climate policy officer within France’s Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGIRIS), he organised the first international conference on ‘The implications of climate change for defence’, prior to COP21 in 2015. From 2011 to 2015, he served as policy officer for the senior ministerial officer for sustainable development, and was involved in drafting, monitoring and updating the sustainable development strategy. From 2007 to 2011, he was deputy head of the environment protection office within the government armaments agency (DGA). As such, he helped to manage the DGA’s environment policy: eco-design of military equipment and management of test centres.

JEAN MICHEL LAVOIZARD
CEO of ARIS since 2010, Jean-Michel Lavoizard has been involved in actionable and operational intelligence at international level for 25 years. A former officer of the French special forces, he entered the private sector in 2006. Drawing on his extensive experience in Africa (where he now lives), his multinational, multi-disciplinary teams of analytical investigators help companies to grow and secure their business through specialised, made-to-measure intelligence services. He is actively involved in various societal causes, and readily shares what he has learned from his everyday experiences in Africa.

CHRISTOPH LUEDI
Swiss-born Christoph Luedi works for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). He specialises in development and natural resource economics and, from 1985 to 1993, was a scientific associate at the Institute of Latin American Studies and Development Cooperation. Since 1995, he has worked with the ICRC in various parts of the world, including Latin America, Africa, the
Middle East and Europe. He has served successively as a protection delegate, a head of delegation, and a monitoring and evaluation planning unit manager. Since 1 July 2017, he has been working in Dakar as the head of the ICRC regional delegation.

MARIAM MAHAMAT NOUR
Mariam Mahamat Nour has held several ministerial positions over the past ten years (Minister of the Economy, Planning and International Cooperation, Minister of the Environment and Water, Secretary General of the Government, and Secretary of State for Finance). She has worked at the United Nations, in civil society, and for an NGO specialising in integrated rural development. She currently chairs the Council of Ministers of the GS Sahel, and has also served as a Governor of the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the African Capacity-Building Foundation. She is a member of the African Union Reform Steering Committee led by Rwanda’s President Paul Kagamé.

OTTILIA ANNA MAUNGANIDZE
Ottilia Anna Maunganidze is Head of Special Projects at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). She runs projects on new security threats, manages the institute’s strategy and strategic engagement, and coordinates work on migration, counter-terrorism planning and international justice. Before joining the ISS, she worked as a human rights education coordinator and a legal advisor. Ottilia has an LL.M and a postgraduate diploma in international studies.

BACRE WALLY NDIAYE
Bacré Wally Ndiaye has over 40 years’ experience in law, leadership and management in the human rights field. He has worked in various capacities (private legal practice, Vice-President of Amnesty International’s executive committee, founder and member of several legal and academic organisations, senior official at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), international commissioner on the Haitian National Truth and Justice Commission, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for MONUSCO).

MICHELLE NDIAYE
Michelle Ndiaye is currently Director of the Africa Peace and Security Programme developed by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University, and Head of Secretariat for the Tana Forum on Peace and Security in Africa. Michelle has extensive experience in development, democratic governance, and conflict management.

NDIORO NDIAYE
Ndioro Ndiaye is Minister-Counsellor to the Senegalese presidential office, and is the current coordinator of the Francophone Network for Gender Equality (RF-EFH). She is President of the NGO ‘Alliance pour la Migration, le Leadership et le Développement’ (Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development), and was Deputy Director-General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) from 1999 to 2009. As Senegal’s Minister of Social Development and Minister for Women, Children and Family from 1987 to 1995, Ndioro Ndiaye was instrumental in managing the conflict between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989, and in setting up safe routes between the two banks of the Senegal River to protect displaced populations from Saint Louis to Tambacounda.

MEISSA NIAING
Major General Meïssa Niang is Head of the Gendarmerie and Director of Military Justice in Senegal. Now 58, the new chief of Senegal’s National Gendarmerie has been a police officer for 38 years. A former pupil of the preparatory military school (Pytannée militaire) in Saint-Louis, Meïssa Niang went on to become a border officer at the University of Dakar Faculty of Law, and at the Gendarmerie Officers’ School in Meλun. He has served as assistant commanding officer of the first motorised squadron of the Lgi (a field force unit) and commander of the Légion sud (the southern corps of the Gendarmerie), as well as occupying various other positions from Dakar to Casamance and Diourbel.

MOUSSO AUGUSTIN OCHOGNI
Police Commissioner Augustin Ochogni has a Master’s Degree in Business Law and a Master’s Degree in Business Management. He has completed 18 years’ service, including three at the DITI (computer science and technological evidence division). Ochogni has taken part in several seminars and training courses in Côte d’Ivoire and abroad (cybercrime control, legal cooperation against cross-border organised crime, international cooperation and the fight against cybercrime: the case of the Budapest Convention).

FRANÇOIS OUEDRAOGO
Colonel François Ouedraogo began his career as an officer in Burkina Faso in October 1988. He graduated from the military academy in Pó, Burkina Faso, as an Infantry Section Leader. In April 1994, he obtained a diploma in computer systems analysis from the Conservatoire National Des Arts et Métiers (CNAM) in Paris. From June 2002 to March 2013, he served as Aide-de-Camp to the President of the National Assembly and, at the same time, Director of Data Transmission and Computing within the National Gendarmerie. He was appointed Director General of the National Agency for Information Systems Security (ANSSI) in July 2013. François Ouedraogo was appointed Director General of the National Intelligence Agency on 23 March 2016.

OSWALD PADONOU
Oswald Padonou has a PhD in political science and international relations from the University of Rennes 1 in France. He is a senior civil servant in Benin, and has served as Director of International Cooperation within the national mediator’s office. He is the author of numerous studies and publications on political governance in Africa and on security issues. He also runs a programme on ‘Governance and security in Sub-Saharan Africa’ for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and works with several think tanks as a research fellow. In addition, he teaches in universities and military academies in West Africa.

JEAN-PAUL PALOMÉROS
Retired General Jean-Paul Paloméros graduated as an engineer from the French Air Force Academy; he has held several staff positions in equipment and budget planning for the Air Force and then the Armed Forces. As a fighter pilot, he flew 85 combat missions on various types of aircraft (Mirage, Rafale). General Paloméros served successively as Chief of Staff of the French Air Force (2009-2012), NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (2012-2015) in Norfolk (Virginia/USA), and Strategy, Transformation and Security Consultant.

MARIE ANGÉLIQUE SAVANÉ
Marie Angélique Savane is a sociologist specialising in development matters, and is currently working as an international consultant. She was the first female chair of the African Peer Review Panel (MAP) as well as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union, and has served as Director of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in New York. She has also served as Special Advisor to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva. Given her active interest in food issues, she was selected by the UNRISD to coordinate its research programme on food systems in Africa, based in Dakar and Geneva. As a feminist activist, she has been closely involved in the creation of civil society organisations in Africa, focusing on women’s empowerment, human rights and development.

DAVID SCHARIA
David Scharia (PhD, LL.M) is Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directo-
rate (CTED). He is responsible for counter-terrorism policy, and oversees a group of international experts who provide advice to the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee. The branch under his supervision covers all areas of counter-terrorism policy, including legal responses, criminal justice, the financing of terrorism, law enforcement, border control, the fight against terrorism, and the use of technology and the Internet. David Scharia has served as First Senior Deputy in the Israeli Attorney General’s Office. He has been the lead lawyer in many counter-terrorism cases before the Israeli Supreme Court, and has chaired the Inter-Ministerial Counter-Terrorism Committee.

AIMÉ SÈNE
Aimé Sène is a company director in the tourism sector. He manages a portfolio of several companies. He is President of Groupe Aimé Sène (GAS) and Via Sénégal Voyages, and is also the brains behind the Étoile du Lac holiday resort, the Bourse de l’Immobilier real estate group, the Bourse de la Voiture car rental company (BVOD), and the Fleur de Lys chain of hotels. He is also involved in the radio industry through his role as founder and Chairman of the Board of Radio Espérance Sénégal. Aimé Sène is a Knight in Senegal’s National Order of the Lion, and Vice-President of the National Council of Senegalese Employers.

NANA OUMOU TOURÉ-SY
Coordinator of the UNDP sub-regional platform for West and Central Africa, Nana Oumou Touré-Sy leads the political and operational response to the challenges in the Sahel region, and promotes cooperation and advocacy with regional institutions such as the G5 Sahel, the LCBC, WAEMU, and CEMAC. Formerly Head of the UNDP Unit for Economic Politics and Strategies in Senegal, she has also worked at the African Development Bank in Côte d’Ivoire and Tunisia. She has worked on various development programmes undertaken by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and has led several strategic and political processes (emergency development programme, public development policies, prospective study of the Sahel, etc.).

JAIR VAN DER LIJN
Dr Jair Van der Lijn is a senior researcher and Director of the Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme at SIPRI. He is also a senior researcher at the ‘Clingendael’ Institute and is affiliated with Radboud University Nijmegen. He specialises in conflict resolution, peace operations, peace agreements, peace consolidation, and the role of the United Nations and regional organisations. He has published numerous articles and conducted research on the ground in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Salvador, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, and South Sudan.

KOEN VERVAEKE
Koen Vervaekte was appointed Managing Director for Africa within the European External Action Service in January 2016. He has also served as Senior EU Coordinator for the Great Lakes region, working closely with delegations from the EU, the European Commission, and EU Member States to support the regions most affected by conflict. From December 2007 to October 2011, he was EU Special Representative to the African Union, and Head of the European Commission delegation to the African Union in Addis Ababa. A former Ambassador, he has also served in the past as Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, and spokesperson for Belgium’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MOCTAR YEDALY
Moctar Yedaly is a telecom and computer engineer with more than 25 years’ international experience in communication network management. Moctar Yedaly has worked for Intelsat in the USA and RASCOM in Côte d’Ivoire. Since 2008, he has been in charge of the information society division at the African Union Commission. He runs numerous projects and conferences across the world, including the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the dotAfrica project, the African Internet Exchange System (AXIS) project, and the AU convention on cybersecurity and personal data protection. He also chairs the advisory council of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise. He speaks fluent English, French, Arabic, Russian and Wolof.

PATRICK YOUSSEF
Patrick Youssef joined the ICRC in 2005 and has since completed various missions in Sudan, Chad, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay (Cuba). From 2010 to 2013, he was Deputy Head of Operations for the Near and Middle East, covering Yemen, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. He ran the ICRC delegation in Iraq for over two years. Since 2016, he has been managing the institution’s operations in the Maghreb, the Sahel region, the Lake Chad Basin, and West Africa.

RAINER MEYER ZUM FELDE
Retired Brigadier General Rainer Meyer Zum Felde is currently a member of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK), and a visiting Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). From July 2013 to September 2017, he was Senior Defence Advisor at Germany’s Permanent Delegation to NATO in Brussels, and represented Germany on NATO’s Defence Policy and Planning Committee. He has completed several assignments relating to security policy at the German Ministry of Defence, as policy advisor to the Minister and in the politico-military department. He has gained extensive experience at NATO through integrated assignments at the Strategic Command Headquarters in Mons and in Norfolk (Virginia), and through national assignments at NATO HQ in Brussels.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prénom et Nom</th>
<th>Titre</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EINAS ABDALLA MOHAMMED</td>
<td>Senior Policy Officer</td>
<td>Commission de l’Union africaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. YOSSISSOUF BRAHIM ABDEL MADJID</td>
<td>Conseiller militaire</td>
<td>Bureau Régional des Nations Unies pour l’Afrique Centrale (UNOCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. SAAD ADOUM</td>
<td>Spécialiste</td>
<td>Département des opérations de maintien de la Paix des Nations Unies</td>
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<td>4. CYRIQUE PAWOUMOTOM AGNEKETHOM</td>
<td>Directeur Maintien de la Paix et Sécurité Régionale</td>
<td>Délegation Cédéao / ECOWAS</td>
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<td>5. CÉLESTINE AKUBE</td>
<td>Attaché de Défense</td>
<td>Ministère de la Défense - NIGER</td>
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<td>6. ATTA AL MANNAN</td>
<td>Ministre Délégué</td>
<td>Ministère des Affaires étrangères - SOUDAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. BASTIEN ALEX</td>
<td>Chercheur</td>
<td>ISTI</td>
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<td>8. UMAR MOHAMMED AL KALI</td>
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<td>9. PASCAL ALLIZARD</td>
<td>Vice-Président</td>
<td>Commission des Affaires étrangères et des forces armées du Sénat - FRANCE</td>
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<td>10. MOHAMED AMARTI</td>
<td>Universitaire</td>
<td>CNDDH, Conseil National Marocain des Droits de l’Homme - MAROC</td>
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<td>11. MOHAMED ANAKO</td>
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<td>12. MAHMAD SAHEH ANNADIF</td>
<td>Représentant Spécial</td>
<td>Mali</td>
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<td>13. ALAIN ANTIL</td>
<td>Directeur</td>
<td>Programme Afrique subsaharienne, IFRI</td>
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<td>Direction Afrique, États-Unis</td>
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<td>15. HAMA ASSAH</td>
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<td>18. ABDULRAHMANE ATTEIB DOUTOUM</td>
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<td>20. MAMADOU LAMINE BA</td>
<td>Journaliste Indépendant</td>
<td>Community Manager - DEUTSCHE WELLE DAKAR</td>
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<td>Ministre des Finances</td>
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<td>22. SELLY BA</td>
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<td>Mouvement contre les Armées Légères en Afrique de l’Ouest</td>
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<td>25. NIAGALÉ BAGAYOKO</td>
<td>Chercheur</td>
<td>RSS ASSN</td>
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<td>26. CHEIKH BAKHOUM</td>
<td>Directeur Général</td>
<td>Direction Générale de l’Information de l’État - SENÉGAL</td>
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<td>27. DOUKOUKOLO ALPHA OUMAR BA-KONARE</td>
<td>Psychologue Clinicien</td>
<td>Observatoire Kisal - MALI</td>
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<td>28. ABDOUYAYE BIBI BALDE</td>
<td>Ministre de la Communication</td>
<td>État-Major défense belge - Section Afrique - Section Défense - FRANCE</td>
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<td>29. HABIBU YAYA BAPPAH</td>
<td>Adjoint exécutif, Commissaire aux affaires politiques</td>
<td>Communauté Économique des États d’Afrique de l’Ouest</td>
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<td>30. BERTRAND BARBE</td>
<td>Directeur général adjoint</td>
<td>Expertise France</td>
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<td>31. FRÉDÉRIC BARDENET</td>
<td>Chercheur Diplomate et Directeur</td>
<td>Développement AFRIQUE subsaharienne SNCF</td>
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<td>32. AUGUSTE DENISE BARRY</td>
<td>Ex-Ministre de l’Intérieur</td>
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<td>33. MAMADOU ALIOU BARRY</td>
<td>Président</td>
<td>Résident Agence Japonaise de Coopération Internationale</td>
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<td>34. JEAN-PIERRE BAT</td>
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<td>Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères - FRANCE</td>
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<td>35. PIERRE BAUCHEON</td>
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<td>Défense A.D. TRADE BELGIUM</td>
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<td>36. FRANCIS BEHANZIN</td>
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<td>CEDEAO - GUINEE BISSAU</td>
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<td>Conseiller politique</td>
<td>Commission de l’UE pour le Sahel - Union Européenne</td>
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<td>39. EMMANUEL BETH</td>
<td>Associé senior</td>
<td>ESL &amp; Network</td>
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<td>40. JEAN-DANIEL BIELER</td>
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<td>41. CHRISTOPHE BIGOT</td>
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<td>Ambassade de France au Sénégal</td>
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<td>42. LAURENT BIGOT</td>
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<td>sur l’Afrique subsaharienne - Indépendant</td>
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<td>43. JACQUES BILODEAU</td>
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<td>45. VINCENT BLANCHARD</td>
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<td>47. BARTHÉLÉMY BLEDE</td>
<td>Chercheur Organisation maritime de l’Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre (OMAC) - CÔTE D’IVOIRE</td>
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<td>48. UTE BOCANDE</td>
<td>Chargé</td>
<td>Programmes du bureau de Dakar - Konrad Adenauer Stiftung</td>
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Sénat - France

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Strategie – US AFRICOM

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Chargée des relations institutionnelles AFD

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55. IBRAH BOULAMA ISSA  
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78. JEAN MARC CHATAIGNER  
Envoyé spécial Sahel – Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères – France

79. ABOU CHEFOU  
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80. PATRICIA CHOLLET  
Chargée des relations avec le Parlement - MBDA

81. NADÈGE CHOULAT  
Chargée des relations institutionnelles AFD

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